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ABSTRACT
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION, CULTURE, AND
WOMEN’S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN
TURKEY
SEPTEMBER 2015
YASEMIN DILDAR
B.A., MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., MIDDLE EAST TECHNICAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor James K. Boyce
Turkey has experienced important structural and social changes that would be
expected to facilitate women’s participation in market work. Social attitudes toward
working women have changed in recent years; women are becoming more educated;
they are getting married at a later age; and fertility rates are declining. Despite these
factors, women’s labor force participation rates are very low in comparison to the
countries at a similar development stage.
This dissertation analyzes the underlying causes of low female labor force par-
ticipation in Turkey. In addition to a background chapter (Chapter 2) analyzing
structural transformation and employment generation patterns, the dissertation has
three main chapters. In Chapter 3, I investigate the role of patriarchal norms and
religiosity in constraining women’s labor force participation using 2008 Demographic
and Health Survey data. Employing an instrumental variable estimation, I find that
vi
internalization of patriarchal norms has a negative impact on female labor force par-
ticipation.
In Chapter 4 I use qualitative data from in-depth interviews based on field re-
search in 2013 to investigate women’s preferences as well as their actual behavior.
I analyze women’s labor force participation decisions, past schooling decisions and
fertility decisions in light of their individual preferences and aspirations on one hand,
structural constraints and household dynamics on the other, and I question the com-
mon assumption that paid employment leads to empowerment of women. I find that
women are not given equal opportunity to make their life choices from an early age.
Many women express a preference for work outside the home but face constraints
including the burden of care work and husband’s disapproval. The interviews with
working wives, on the other hand, reveal that the gender division of labor in the
household is not changed substantially by the employment status of women.
In Chapter 5 I examine the impact of an employment subsidy enacted in Turkey
in 2008 on women’s employment, accounting for variations across culturally diverse
provinces. I estimate a difference–in–differences model using a monthly panel of
province–level employment data from the Social Security Administration of Turkey.
I find that the employment package increased the female share of employment in the
provinces where positive discrimination was effective. Moreover, I find that there is
not a statistically significant difference between conservative and progressive provinces
in terms of the effectiveness of the policy: a demand-side policy can increase women’s
employment despite cultural constraints that are normally thought to prohibit female
labor supply.
The findings of the dissertation support the premise that understanding the low fe-
male labor force participation in Turkey requires taking into account complex social,
economic, and cultural factors. Using complementary quantitative and qualitative
methodologies, the dissertation shows that both supply–side and demand–side con-
vii
straints are in play, implying need for policy–makers to address both sides of the labor
market to raise women–s employment.
viii
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
1.1 Motivation and Objectives
Turkey has experienced important structural and social changes that should facil-
itate women’s participation in market work. Social attitudes toward working women
have changed in recent years1; women are becoming more educated2; they are getting
married at a later age3; and fertility rates are declining.4
In the development economics literature, a U-shaped trend in the female labor
force participation rate during the course of development is widely accepted as a
1According to 2012 International Social Survey Program data on family and changing gender
roles, 67.6 percent of the respondents in Turkey agreed with the statement “both man and woman
should contribute to the household income” (30.3 percent strongly agreed, 37.4 percent agreed).
Only 6.5 percent of the respondents strongly disagreed and 7.5 percent disagreed with the statement.
Although the majority of respondents (61%) thinks that “a job is all right, but what most women
really want is a home and children”, women are still expected to work at a job and contribute to
the family income (ISSP, 2012). The comparable nationally representative data is not available
for earlier dates, but smaller scale field studies show that the expectation of women’s contribution
to the family income was not as widespread. For example, only 16.8% of the respondents defined
women’s primary role as contributing to the family budget in a study from 1993 (Acar, 1993). The
primary role of women is still defined as full-time homemaking (42 percent of the respondents) by
2012; however at the same time there is rising acceptance that sole breadwinner family model is not
sustainable under current economic conditions (Carkoglu & Kalaycioglu, 2013).
2The adult female literacy rates increased from 45.1% in 1975 to 91.6% in 2012. The primary,
secondary, and tertiary gross enrollment rates increased from 89.9%, 14.6%, and 1.9% in 1971 to
99.3%, 83.7%, and 63.7% in 2012 respectively. The data is extracted from World Bank WDI Database
on 1/9/2015.
3The mean age at first marriage was 19.9 in 2008 in comparison to 18.8 in 1998 among ever-
married women in Turkey according to Demographic and Health Surveys (TDHS, 1998; 2008).
According to Household Labor Force Surveys, the mean age at first marriage for women increased
from 22.2 in 2001 to 23.6 in 2013.
4Women in Turkey were expected to give birth to 1.9 children on average in 2008, compared to
5.7 children in 1968 and 3 children in 1988 (World Bank, 2009).
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stylized fact (Goldin, 1994; Schultz, 1990; Psarchapoulos & Tzannatos, 1989; Du-
rand 1975). As the economy moves from an agrarian society in which housework and
fieldwork can be handled together to an industrial and service-based formal econ-
omy where housework and market work are spatially separated, female labor force
participation rates initially fall. But in the later stages of development, as fertility
declines and the education level of women increases, their labor force participation
rises. The trend in Turkey does not conform to this picture: Turkish women are still
at the bottom of the ‘U’ despite significant demographic and structural changes in
the economy.
Higher labor force participation among women is a desirable goal on several
grounds. First, economic independence is crucial for women’s empowerment. La-
bor market participation improves women’s economic position and their social sta-
tus. Second, gender equality has some instrumental benefits. Cross-country studies
show that greater economic equality between women and men is associated with
poverty reduction (World Bank, 2001; Klasen, 1999). Third, women’s integration
into the economy leads to a higher utilization of a country’s human capital for eco-
nomic development. Joblessness or non-participation represents a waste of human
resources (Argy, 2005). Furthermore, women’s empowerment contributes to growth
by increasing the human capital formation of future generations. Employed women
are found to be more involved in decision making with regard to children’s education
and health than full-time homemakers (Angel-Urdinola & Wodon, 2010). It is argued
that women’s control over household income leads to greater investment in human
capital (Hoddinott & Haddad, 1995; Bussolo, De Hoyos & Wodon, 2009).
This dissertation analyzes the underlying causes of low female labor force partic-
ipation in Turkey. Drawing on complementary quantitative and qualitative method-
ologies, I disentangle the social, economic, and cultural mechanisms affecting female
labor force participation. The main objectives of this dissertation are: (i) to ana-
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lyze the supply-side determinants of female labor force participation in Turkey and
quantify the impact of patriarchal norms and personal religiosity; (ii) to examine the
relationship between paid work and women’s empowerment; and (iii) to identify the
importance of demand-side constraints on women’s employment by evaluating the
impact of a demand-side intervention while accounting for cultural variation among
provinces.
1.2 Chapter Summaries
This dissertation consists of 6 chapters. Chapter 2 provides descriptive background
information about (i) structural transformation and employment generation in the
Turkish economy; (ii) women’s labor force participation according to age, education,
marital status over time and gender segregation; and (iii) family structure, ideological
context, and government policies.
In Chapter 3, I investigate the role of patriarchal norms and religiosity in con-
straining women’s labor force participation using 2008 Demographic and Health Sur-
vey data. My analysis contributes to the understanding of the Turkish low female
labor force participation puzzle by introducing culture as an explanatory variable
using information on women’s values and religious practices. Employing an instru-
mental variable estimation, I find that internalization of patriarchal norms has a
negative impact on female labor force participation.
In Chapter 4, I use qualitative data from in-depth interviews based on field re-
search in 2013 to investigate women’s preferences and behavior. I analyze women’s
labor force participation decisions, past schooling decisions and fertility decisions in
light of their individual preferences and aspirations on one hand, and structural con-
straints and household dynamics on the other, and I question the common assumption
that employment automatically leads to empowerment of women. I find that women
are not given equal opportunity to make their life choices from an early age. Many
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women express a preference for work outside the home but face constraints including
the burden of care work and husband’s disapproval. The interviews with working
wives, on the other hand, reveal that empowering potential of paid work is limited,
and that the gender division of labor in the household is not changed substantially
by the employment status of women.
Chapter 5 examines the impact of an employment subsidy enacted in Turkey
in 2008 on women’s employment, accounting for variations across culturally diverse
provinces. I estimate a difference-in-differences model using a monthly panel of
province-level employment data from the Social Security Administration of Turkey.
I find that the employment package increased the female share of employment in the
provinces that did not benefit from regional incentive schemes previously. Moreover,
I find that there is not a statistically significant difference between conservative and
progressive provinces in terms of the effectiveness of the policy: a demand-side pol-
icy can increase women’s employment despite cultural constraints that are normally
thought to inhibit or prohibit female labor supply.
Chapter 6 presents the main findings and conclusions drawn from this disserta-
tion. The findings of the dissertation support the premise that the low female labor
force participation in Turkey is the result of complex social, economic, and cultural
factors. Using complementary quantitative and qualitative methodologies, the disser-
tation shows that both supply-side and demand-side constraints are in play, implying
need for policy-makers to address both sides of the labor market to raise women’s
employment.
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CHAPTER 2
STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION AND WOMEN’S
LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION IN THE TURKISH
ECONOMY
2.1 Structural Transformation and Employment Generation
2.1.1 A Short Economic History of Turkey Before the Structural Adjust-
ment Programs
The Republic of Turkey was established in 1923. Its economic history before lib-
eralization in the1980s can be analyzed broadly in four periods: Establishment years,
1923-1930; etatism1, 1930-1950; attempts of liberalization, 1950-1960; and import
substitution industrialization, 1960-1980 (Kazgan, 1999; Kepenek & Yentu¨rk, 2000;
Boratav, 2003). The establishment years were initially intended to follow liberal
economic policies, however transformation of the economy from a largely agrarian
structure required state involvement. A liberal approach to foreign trade could not
become successful, especially after the onset of Great Depression when export rev-
enues declined and the terms of trade deteriorated. The state took an active role in
the creation of a national bourgeoisie and encouraged private business through public
entrepreneurship (Taymaz, 1999). The etatist period started with the introduction
of five-year industrial plans in 1930s. The main objectives of the plans were to estab-
lish industrial regions and to encourage the production of basic consumption goods
that were previously imported (I˙zdes¸, 2011). State-owned enterprises dominated the
1Etatism refers to statist policies. It was considered “a unique mixture of capitalism and social-
ism” by the Turkish government (O¨nis¸ & Riedel, 1993).
5
economic activity and the industrial sector experienced very high growth rates albeit
from a low base. The average annual growth rate of industry was 17.1% during the
period 1929-1935 and 11% during 1935-1939 (Kazgan, 1999).
During the multi-party system in the 1950s, the new government followed liberal
economic policies and achieved high growth rates due to favorable external condi-
tions (Taymaz, 1999). The protectionist trade policies of 1930s were removed and
imports were liberalized (Boratav, 2003). In this period, Turkey was integrated into
the international division of labor based on its comparative advantage in agriculture.
Investment in agriculture and mechanization resulted in a 50 percent expansion in the
agricultural output between 1950-53 (I˙zdes¸, 2011). One of the main characteristics
of the period was the increasing share of the private sector in the economy (Herr
& Sonat, 2013). This period ended in 1960 with a military intervention, partially
as a response to a deteriorating trade balance, increasing foreign debt and stagnant
industrial development. The establishment of the State Planning Organization in
1963 institutionalized development planning, and import substitution industrializa-
tion (ISI) became the main development strategy until 1980. Development planning
achieved a 6.8% average annual growth rate between 1962-1976; the average growth
of industry was 9.3% during the ISI period while agriculture grew by 3.9% (Boratav,
2003).
Table 2.1 shows labor market trends before the 1980s. The share of agricultural
employment has been steadily declining. Labor force participation has been also
declining as labor was released from agriculture. Industrial employment increased
faster than service employment up until the 1950s. Starting from 1960s, expansion
in the service sector outpaced industry.
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Table 2.1: Labor Market Indicators, Selected Years
Year Labor Force Unemployment Sectoral Distribution of Employment
Participation (%) Rate (%)
Agriculture Industry Services
1924 72.2 6.8 89.8 4.6 5.5
1929 71.2 3.2 87.8 6.2 6
1933 70.4 3.9 89.4 4.9 5.7
1939 71.6 2.1 86.7 8 5.3
1944 71.3 3 86.5 8.3 5.2
1950 69.9 1.4 84.8 8.4 6.8
1960 72 3.1 74.8 11.5 13.7
1970 67.9 6.3 64.2 16.3 19.5
1980 63.3 8.1 54.2 20 25.8
1988 57.8 8.4 47.4 21.9 30.8
Source: Bulutay (1995), Tables 7.A and 8.A. Labor force participation and unem-
ployment for population of 15+ years of age, sectoral employment for population of
12+ years of age. Industry includes construction.
2.1.2 Export-Oriented Industrialization and the Transformation of the
Labor Market
The ISI strategy ended with a severe balance of payments crisis in 1978 and the
government announced a stabilization program on January 24, 1980. The structural
adjustment program (SAP) was implemented by a military government until 1983.
The major goals of the SAP were reducing the price distortions in foreign trade and
factor markets, liberalizing the trade and capital accounts, and minimizing the role of
state-owned enterprises (Taymaz, 1999). The export-oriented industrialization (EOI)
strategy initiated at this time relied on continuous currency devaluations and export
incentives as well as wage suppression supported by the military coup. With the 1980
military coup, trade unions were closed and strikes were terminated. Productivity
increases in this period were not accompanied with wage increases (Boratav, Ko¨se
& Yeldan, 2000; Voyvoda & Yeldan, 2001). Real wages dropped by 40% in 1980-
1987 (Taymaz, Voyvoda & Ylmaz, 2014). Figure 2.1 shows that manufacturing value
added increased faster than wages during this period.
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Figure 2.1: Annual Rates of Change in Nominal Wages and Value Added in Manu-
facturing, 1951-2001
Source: TURKSTAT, 1923-2009 Statistical Indicators
The Structural Adjustment Program also had indirect effects on labor markets
through the cuts in agricultural subsidies and privatization of state-owned enterprises.
The loss of income in rural areas contributed to massive rural to urban migration.
At the same time, the privatization of state-owned enterprises led to significant job
losses. As a result, the urban economy faced an increasing amount of surplus labor.
Export-oriented industrialization did not generate sufficient employment to absorb the
surplus labor. Figure 2.2 shows the annual change in manufacturing employment. The
overall performance during the EOI period was considerably worse than that in the
ISI period. The annual rate of growth in real value added was 5.6 percent in 1970-76
while employment growth was 5.1 percent. The average rate of growth in employment
in the 1980-87 “trade liberalization” period, however, was only 2.7 percent, while the
growth rate of output was 10.4 percent (Taymaz & Voyvoda, 2012, p. 90).
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Figure 2.2: Annual Rate of Change in Employment (%) in Manufacturing, 1951-2001
Source: TURKSTAT, 1923-2009 Statistical Indicators
The relatively poor investment performance is one of the important reasons why
export-oriented industrialization did not generate sufficient employment. Private
gross fixed investment increased by 14.1 percent per annum during 1983-87 but only
a small portion of it was directed to manufacturing. Private investment in manufac-
turing increased by 7.7 percent while investment in housing increased by 24.5 percent
in this period (Table 2.2). Investment boom in the housing sector explains most of
the increase in private investment during the EOI period. The inconsistency between
the export-orientation goal in foreign trade and a pattern of accumulation away from
manufacturing despite the price and subsidy incentives has been identified as a major
structural failure of the export-oriented growth strategy in Turkey (Ko¨se & Yeldan,
1998; Yentu¨rk & Onaran, 2005; Boratav & Yeldan, 2006; Taymaz & Voyvoda, 2012).
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2.1.3 Post-2001 Period: Jobless Growth
Taymaz and Voyvoda (2012) split Turkey’s experience with neoliberal industri-
alization into two periods, the first from 1980-2001 and the second being post-2001.
In accordance with the principles of the Washington Consensus, the first phase was
characterized by opening the economy to the world commodity and financial mar-
kets (trade liberalization: 1980-88; financial liberalization: 1989-2000). The second
phase of neoliberal restructuring, the post-2001 era, was governed by the principles
of the “Post-Washington Consensus”, centering on good governance through market-
regulating institutions particularly in the banking sector after the 2001 crisis. One
important feature of the post-crisis period is increasing unemployment and jobless
growth. Official unemployment rates stayed around 10 percent during this period,
but the number of discouraged workers increased dramatically. The total unemploy-
ment measure that accounts for discouraged workers increased from 11.1 percent in
2000 to 15.9 percent in 2013. Figure 2.3 displays the jobless growth phenomenon.
Figure 2.3: Real GDP and Employment Indices (1998=100)
Source: TURKSTAT, National Accounts and Household Labor Force Statistics. Employ-
ment index is created using total number of employed.
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Contrary to the mainstream explanations, the stagnant employment performance
cannot be attributed the labor market rigidities. Turkey is among the highly flex-
ible OECD countries according to a labor market flexibility index calculated using
data on minimum wages, hiring and firing practices, centralized collective bargain-
ing, unemployment insurance and top marginal tax rate (Lawson & Bierhanzl, 2004).
Considering the size of informal labor market and the prevalence of informal practices
in the formal labor market through subcontracting, the degree of flexibility becomes
even greater (Taymaz & O¨zler, 2005). Moreover, Turkey is the second most flexible
country in the OECD with respect to the rate of indexation of real wages to the
productivity increases (OECD, 2000; Aydner-Avs¸ar & Onaran, 2010). Figure 2.4
shows that productivity increased faster than real wages both in public and private
manufacturing after 2001.
Figure 2.4: Index of Real Wages and Productivity per Production Hours in Manu-
facturing Industry (1997=100), 1988-2006
Source: TURKSTAT, Industrial Labor Input Indices.
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Turkey is among the developing countries still going through structural change
(Figure 2.5). According to Rodrik (2010), Turkey has been relatively successful in
reallocating labor from low productivity to high productivity sectors and experiencing
“growth-enhancing structural change” in recent three decades. Transformation is still
ongoing along with rapid urbanization. However, the ability of the economy to create
“good” jobs, usually associated with manufacturing sector, for reallocated labor has
been diminishing. Neither services nor industry have been able to absorb net potential
labor resources (as measured by the working-age population) that were released from
the agricultural sector (Figure 2.6).
Figure 2.5: Share of Employment by Sector, 1985-2010
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Statistics.
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Figure 2.6: Unemployment and Inactivity Rates for Men and Women
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Statistics.
The output elasticity of employment growth, defined as the percentage change
in employment associated with a one-percent change in output, has diminished in
all three major sectors (Table 2.3 and Table 2.4). A declining elasticity indicates
that employment is becoming less responsive to economic growth. As diminishing
output elasticities show, this pattern of structural change has not created satisfactory
employment opportunities for a growing population. Both Figure 2.6 and Table 2.4
show that the situation is even worse—indeed much worse—for women. Inactivity is
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very high and increasing. Output elasticity of employment for women was actually
negative in two sub-periods, 1996-2000 and 2000-2004.
Table 2.3: Output Elasticities of Employment by Sectors, 1989-2008 (annual average)
1989-2008 1989-2000 2002-2008
Total 0.25 0.39 0.14
Agriculture -1.19 -0.42 -1.66
Non-agricultural sectors 0.54 0.68 0.48
Industry 0.43 0.49 0.39
Services 0.55 0.76 0.47
Source: Yeldan (2011), Table 3.2, p.10.
Table 2.4: Output Elasticities of Employment by Gender, 1992-2008
Elasticity of total employment to total GDP
1992-1996 1996-2000 2000-2004 2004-2008
Total 0.43 0.16 0.06 0.19
Male 0.5 0.33 0.14 0.22
Female 0.24 -0.3 -0.15 0.11
Average annual GDP growth rate
1992-1996 1996-2000 2000-2004 2004-2008
4.03 3.41 3.61 5.21
Source: Key Indicators of Labor Market, 6th edition.
The sectoral analysis of the post-2001 employment patterns reveals that depop-
ulation in the rural economy continued. Agricultural employment decreased by 3.07
million workers from 2001 to 2008. The total increase in industry was only 667,000,
while employment in services increased by 1.94 million (Yeldan, 2011). In other
words, agricultural labor did not all shift to industry. Taymaz and Voyvoda (2009)
find that all but one of the 21 subsectors of manufacturing achieved positive growth
rates between 2002 and 2007, yet nine of these subsectors reported labor shedding.
Food processing, textiles, mining and quarrying were the subsectors experiencing the
15
most significant employment losses. Moreover, there is evidence that agricultural
labor surplus has been moving into small-scale family-owned services with low pay,
further contributing to informality (Ercan & Tansel, 2006; Taymaz & O¨zler, 2005).
2.2 Women’s Labor Force Participation
2.2.1 Urbanization and Female Labor Force Participation
The gender gap in labor force participation has increased from 28.2 percentage
points in 1960 to 40.7 percentage points in 2013, according to census data and house-
hold labor force surveys. Urbanization is an important factor explaining the increasing
gap. During the same period, urban population as a percentage of total population
increased from 31.5 percent to 72.4 percent. Women working as unpaid family workers
in the rural areas often withdrew from the labor market when they migrated to cities.
Figure 2.7 shows the trends in labor force participation in urban and rural areas since
1988. The decline in men’s labor force participation rates in both rural and urban
areas is a sign of weak employment performance of the economy as discussed in the
previous section. We see the impact of structural change and urbanization particu-
larly in women’s participation trends. Rural participation rates have been steadily
declining while urban participation rates stayed mostly stagnant until after the crisis
in 2008.
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Figure 2.7: Trends in Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender, 1988-2013
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.
Rural to urban migration is identified as one of the reasons why urban female
labor force participation remains low. It is often argued that because of their low
level of education and insufficient skills rural migrant women, who were once working
in agriculture, are likely to become discouraged workers in the urban labor market
(Dayog˘lu & Kırdar, 2009; Taymaz, 2009; World Bank, 2009; Uraz, Aran, Hu¨samog˘lu,
S¸analmıs¸ & C¸apar, 2010). Using the 2008 Turkey Demographic and Health Survey,
Figure 2.8 presents labor force participation rates of three groups of women according
to their migration status: (i) those who were born in rural areas but currently living
in urban areas; (ii) those who were born in rural areas and are currently living in
rural areas; and (iii) those who were born in urban areas and are currently living in
urban areas. In total, the participation rate of rural women (ii) is higher than both
migrant women (i) and urban women (iii). When we control for education, women
who were born and stayed in rural areas have the highest participation in all education
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categories, except for higher education. Migrant women with higher education have
the highest participation rates. Moreover, migrant women with low levels of education
(no education or primary school) have higher participation rates than the women
who were born and stayed in urban areas. In other words, migration status is not
associated with lower labor force participation once we control for education.
Figure 2.8: Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%) by Migration Status and
Educational Attainment
Source: TDHS 2008.
2.2.2 Labor Force Participation by Education Level
In neoclassical labor supply models labor force participation increases with educa-
tion because higher levels of education increase the opportunity cost of not working in
the form of forgone wage increases. If so, we should expect to see disparities in the la-
bor force participation between people with higher educational attainment and those
with lower levels of education. For example, the labor force participation of urban
18
men increases to 86 percent with a university degree from about 70 percent among
primary and high school graduates.2 This relationship is much stronger for women
in Turkey. Participation rates show striking disparities between university graduates
and the rest. Urban labor force participation rates for women are 21 percent for
primary school graduates, 31 percent for high school graduates and 72 percent for
university graduates.3 Figures 2.9 and 2.10 show the trends in labor force partici-
pation by educational attainment level for the entire male and female working-age
population, respectively.
I˙lkkaracan (2010) explains this particularly strong relationship between education
and participation for women in Turkey in terms of the lack of legal and institutional
mechanisms with regard to work-family reconciliation. University education not only
increases the opportunity cost of not working for women but also makes paid work
preferable and manageable for two other reasons in comparison to women with lower
levels of education. First, relatively high wages make the purchase of care services
from the market possible. Second, since highly educated women are more likely to be
employed in the formal sector, they are able to benefit from rights guaranteed by the
labor laws such as maternal leave for birth and breastfeeding. They have the guarantee
to keep their jobs after giving birth, and in this way they can enjoy retirement benefits
without having long ruptures in their working life (p. 23). The majority of women
with low educational attainment are employed in the informal sector, which does not
offer any of these benefits. For example, 53 percent of women with primary education
were working without social security registration in 2013. This ratio increases to 79
percent for women without education (illiterate and primary school incomplete).
2TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys 2013.
3TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys 2013.
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Figure 2.9: Labor Force Participation of Men by Educational Attainment Level, 1988-
2013
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.
Figure 2.10: Labor Force Participation of Women by Educational Attainment Level,
1988-2013
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.
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2.2.3 Labor Force Participation by Age
Age profiles of the women participating in the labor force show huge disparities
in rural and urban areas in Turkey, and the disparities have persisted since 1988
(Figure 2.11). Women of all ages have lower participation rates in the rural areas
in comparison to 1988, but the largest decline is seen among young women. This
is consistent with increasing levels of education. We see an increase in the urban
participation rates for all age groups, except for the 15-19 year group.
Urban participation rates by age show neither a traditional M-shaped pattern,
dipping between the early twenties and the main childbearing years of 25-34, nor the
inverted U-pattern seen in Nordic countries with successful work-family reconciliation
policies. Instead, they start to decline at the prime-working age (35-39) suggesting
that most women do not return to the labor market after giving birth.4
Figure 2.11: Labor Force Participation of Women according to Age: 1988 versus 2013
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.
4The decline in labor force participation of urban women used to start at earlier ages (20-24) in
1988. As educational attainment increase, women postpone marriage and childbearing. By 2013,
the beginning of the decline in participation shifts to a higher age bracket (35-39).
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When we look at the participation rates of urban women according to age and
education, we see that most of the increase in urban participation comes from women
with less than a high school degree. Figure 2.12 shows that middle aged (35-50)
illiterate women have slightly higher participation rates in 2013 than in 1988. Women
with primary and secondary school degrees have higher participation rates in all age
groups except the 15-19 year group in 2013. The highest increase is observed for
the age group of 35-44. In contrast, there is significant decrease in the labor force
participation of high school graduates in the age group of 15-40. University graduates
show a similar pattern with a smaller decrease in the participation of women younger
than the age of 40. Comparing the participation profiles in 1988 and 2010 (not shown
in the figure) reveals that the increase in the participation of less educated women
(illiterate and less than high school) happened after 2000. I˙lkkaracan (2010) argues
that this increase can be explained by the added-worker effect as a response to crisis
conditions and contraction in the overall employment.
22
Figure 2.12: Labor Force Participation of Urban Women according to Age and Edu-
cation: 1988 versus 2013
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Figure 2.12 (continued): Labor Force Participation of Urban Women according to
Age and Education: 1988 versus 2013
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.
2.2.4 Labor Force Participation by Marital Status and Unpaid Domestic
Labor
Marital status is an important determinant of women’s labor force participation in
Turkey. Figure 2.13 shows that married women have lower labor force participation
than single women in all education categories. In line with the male-breadwinner
model, the situation is exactly opposite for married men; they have higher partici-
pation rates than single men in all education categories. The gender gap is highest
among married men and women with a high school degree, while it almost disap-
pears among highly educated single men and women. For example, there is only a
4-percentage point difference between the labor force participation of single men and
women with a university degree. This gap increases to 20 percent when university
graduates are married. Single women’s participation is about 20 percent lower than
single men’s among high school graduates, and 33 percent lower for the ones with
less than a high school degree. Married women, on the other hand, have a participa-
24
tion gap of 60 percent among high school graduates and 50 percent among the less
educated.
Figure 2.13: Labor Force Participation according to Marital Status and Education
(Urban, 2013)
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Surveys.
Memis¸, O¨nes¸ and Kızılırmak (2012) argue that neither supply-side arguments nor
the demand-side arguments can explain the gender gap in labor force participation
without taking into account gender differences in unpaid work. Using 2006 time use
survey data, they show that women shoulder a disproportionate burden of housework
regardless of employment status and household type. Table 2.5 shows the average
daily hours spent on paid and unpaid work by married couples. On average women
spent longer hours on activities described as work (paid and unpaid). Only in single-
earner families without children is total work time close to being equal for spouses
wives doing the unpaid work while husbands are engaged in paid work. Unpaid
work time declines in dual earner families for women, but it is substituted by work
time and women end up working longer hours. In other words, it can be argued
25
that women have a double burden when they participate in labor force because (i)
married employed women have a higher burden of total work than their husbands;
(ii) employed married women have much longer total hours of work than full-time
homemakers (9.1 hours vs. 6.4 hours without children).
Table 2.5: Mean Time Spent on Unpaid and Paid Work-Married Couples, 2006
Without children With children
Single-earner Dual-earner Single-earner Dual-earner
Unpaid work
Men 0.8 0.7 0.9 1
Women 6.2 3.8 7.8 4.9
Paid Work
Men 5.5 6.1 6.5 6.6
Women 0.2 5.3 0 4.9
Total Work
Men 6.3 6.8 7.4 7.6
Women 6.4 9.1 7.8 9.8
Source: Memis¸ et al. (2012), Tables 6.3 and 6.4, p. 96. Couples without children
include 183 families with single-earner and 111 families with dual-earners. Couples
with children include 813 families with single-earner and 193 families with dual-
earners.
Table 2.6 displays how the time use patterns of employed men and women change
with marriage and children. The comparison of the first and second phases shows
the effect of marriage on time use. Both paid and unpaid work time decreases with
marriage for men and as a result, they see a decline in total work time. For women, on
the other hand, total work time increases with marriage from 7.8 hours to 9.1 hours
because of the increase in unpaid work time. Having children increases the time men
spend on both paid and unpaid work in Turkey. However, Memis¸ et al. shows that
this observation is only true for the first child. After the first child, men stop sharing
the burden at home and women’s total work time rises significantly (2012, p. 100).
To sum up, the unequal distribution of unpaid work plausibly explains why married
women are less active in the labor market.
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Table 2.6: Comparison of Paid and Unpaid Work Burden over the Life Course
Households in: Men Women
1. Singlehood phase
Paid work 6.6 5.3
Unpaid work 1.1 2.5
Total work 7.6 7.8
2. Married-without children phase
Paid work 6.1 5.3
Unpaid work 0.7 3.8
Total work 6.7 9.1
3. Married-with children phase
Paid work 6.6 4.9
Unpaid work 1 4.9
Total work 7.7 9.8
Source: Memis¸ et al. (2012), Table 6.5, p. 98. Data
of 46 singlehood phase, 111 married-without children
phase, 193 married-with-children families are used.
Household labor force surveys provide additional evidence that housework is a
significant constraint on women’s labor force participation. In these surveys, the
respondents are asked about the reasons for not participating in the labor force. The
primary reason listed by women in both rural and urban areas is household work
(Tables A1 and A2 in Appendix A). This category is not even listed for men. Despite
the clear gender division of labor, there is some improvement from 1988 to 2012.
The percentage of women whose main reason not to participate is housework has
diminished from 83% to 62% in urban areas, and from 72% to 59% in rural areas.
Moreover, education became the main reason for 12% (9%) of the urban (rural) women
in 2012, while it was the main reason for only 6% (3%) in 1988. Family and personal
reasons seem to be affecting urban women more than rural women. The importance
of two categories, “discouraged” and “available for work but not seeking a job”, has
increased since 1988. This can be an indicator of the worsening economic conditions
in terms of employment creation explained in the previous section.
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2.2.5 Sectoral Distribution of Female Employment and Gender Segrega-
tion
The gender wage gap and occupational segregation by sex are important factors
affecting women’s position in the labor market. Industries in which women are con-
centrated are usually different from those in which men are concentrated. Certain
types of jobs are considered as “female work” and women usually end up with low-
skill, low status jobs (Kasnakog˘lu & Dikbayır, 2002). According to a World Bank
labor market report, average earnings of male wage and salary earners have increased
by 22 percent in the period 1988-2002, while female earnings have increased by 12
percent during the same time period (2006, p. 54). In the same study, it is found that
women earn 78-83 percent of what men earn in Turkey. Based on the 1994 Survey of
Employment and Wages, I˙lkkaracan and Selim (2007) find that a substantial portion
of the gender wage gap is attributable to occupational and industrial gender segrega-
tion. They argue that gender segregation operates via both labor supply and labor
demand because not only do women have systematically lower human capital en-
dowments but also they are systematically allocated into lower-paying private sector
jobs not covered by collective bargaining agreements. Using a Oaxaca decomposi-
tion analysis, they show that 57 percent of the wage gap can be explained by lower
endowments of women when only human capital variables are considered. Human
capital variables together with workplace variables (occupation, branch of industry,
collective agreement etc.) can explain the 78 percent of the gap. The unexplained 22
percent, they argue, is due to outright discrimination (I˙lkkaracan & Selim, 2007, p.
588).
Occupational gender segregation is an important reason why gender wage gaps
and women’s inferior status in the labor market persist (Blackburn et al., 1995).
When we look at the sectoral distribution of female employment in Turkey, we see
that rural and urban labor markets differ substantially. Most of the women in rural
28
areas are still employed in agriculture, although there has been a significant decline
in the share of agricultural employment since 1988 (Table 2.7).
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The loss in agricultural employment is partially compensated by the increase in
the share of manufacturing, trade and services. But overall there has been a decline in
female employment in rural areas due to domestic migration. The female employment
rate decreased from 48.5 percent in 1988 to 35 percent in 2013, while female labor
force participation rate decreased from 50.7 percent to 36.7 percent. In the urban
areas, the share of agriculture in female employment decreased from 14% in 1988 to
7% in 2013 (Table 2.8). The share of manufacturing decreased as well from 32% to
21%. There has been an increase in the share of wholesale and retail trade, including
hotels and restaurants, and of community and social services (education, health etc.).
Since agricultural employment dominates in the rural areas, gender segregation
analysis is only conducted here for urban labor market. Two different measures
of segregation are used in the analysis. The first is the Dissimilarity Index (DI)
introduced by Duncan and Duncan (1955). The second is the Coefficient of Female
Representation (CFR). The Dissimilarity Index has a minimum value of 0, which
indicates that gender distribution across occupations/industries is perfectly equal,
and a maximum value of 100, which indicates perfect segregation. DI is calculated as
follows:
DI = 0.5 ∗ Σ|fit −mit|
where subscripts i and t denote industry and year, respectively; fit = (
Fit
ΣFit
)∗100, and
mit = (
Mit
ΣMit
) ∗ 100, where Fit = Number of females in industry i, ΣFit = total female
employment, Mit = Number of males in industry i, ΣMit = total male employment.
Coefficient of Female Representation (CFR) is calculated as follows:
CFRit =
Fit
Tit
ΣFit
ΣTit
34
where Tit = Number of people in industry i and ΣTit = total employment. Women
are over-represented in a given occupation if the CFR for that occupation is greater
than unity and under-represented if it is less than unity.
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Table 2.9 presents the results of gender segregation analysis. The dissimilarity in-
dex decreases over time, though it is a very small decline from 27.51 in 1988 to 23.58
in 2013. Women are overrepresented in agriculture, finance and services. Overrepre-
sentation increases in services over time, while it decreases in agriculture and finance.
CRF shows an increasing underrepresentation in manufacturing starting from 2000s,
although this sector as a whole has the least gender segregation. If we disaggre-
gate the manufacturing industry, we find that the public and private sectors show
different trends in the two sub-sectors with the highest female concentration, food
and textiles. In the public manufacturing industry, the female share of employment
decreased significantly in the food-processing sub-sector from 1985 to 2001, while it
increased slightly in textiles (Table 2.10). Exactly the opposite trend is observed for
private manufacturing. The share of female employment in food increased, though
not enough to compensate the loss in public manufacturing, while female employment
in textiles decreased slightly (Table 2.11).
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Table 2.12 presents the dissimilarity index for production workers and others sep-
arately. Among production workers, gender segregation was stronger in the public
sector in 1985, but it declined from 42.03 to 29.21 between 1985 and 2001. In the
private sector, gender segregation increased slightly for production workers. Simi-
larly, for other workers, gender segregation decreased in the public sector while it
increased in the private manufacturing. In other words, while public manufacturing
became more women-friendly over time, private manufacturing increased its discrim-
ination against women. The dissimilarity index for the manufacturing sector as a
whole decreased after 2001, from 34.56 in 2003 to 28.73 in 2012.5
Table 2.12: Gender Segregation in Manufacturing, Dissimilarity Index, 1985-2001
Production Workers Other Workers
Public Private Public Private
1985 42.03 35.42 23.36 9.62
1986 39.05 38.14 13.15 10.78
1987 45.4 37.93 7.54 12.07
1988 44.95 38.98 9.96 12.57
1989 47.52 38.59 12.17 12.53
1990 48.25 38.07 11.46 13.58
1991 47.66 38.66 9.85 13.36
1992 46.23 38.17 13.2 14.68
1993 43.08 38.08 17.27 11.34
1994 41.89 37.78 7.66 14.19
1995 42.62 36.91 14.54 15.59
1996 39.93 36.13 13.19 16.46
1997 41.75 37.25 10.7 14.65
1998 38.08 38.35 6.42 15.68
1999 39.06 36.9 7.83 14.05
2000 36.5 37.6 11.7 13.97
2001 29.21 36.03 8.54 14.19
Source: Annual Manufacturing Surveys, I˙zdes¸ (2011),
Tables 4.20 and 4.21.
5Author’s calculations based on Annual Manufacturing Surveys.
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In summary, there is significant gender segregation in the urban labor market,
women being increasingly overrepresented in the services. In the manufacturing sec-
tor, women are concentrated in the food and textiles sub-sectors. Moreover, there
is also segregation by job status within the female-dominant industries. Dividing
production workers into four groups according to job status (high level technical per-
sonnel; medium level technical personnel; foreman, supervisor and other skilled per-
sonnel; and unskilled workers) Kasnakog˘lu and Dikbayır (2002) find that women are
over-represented among the unskilled workers group in food and textiles industries.
2.3 Family Structure, Ideological Context, and Government
Policies
Family structure in Turkey can be described as classical patriarchy that is preva-
lent in the Middle East and in South and East Asia. In the classical patriarchy,
there is a strict hierarchy in which men are the heads of the household and providers
while women are economically dependent. There is also a complete separation of
public and private spheres and women are considered to need patriarchal surveillance
(Kandiyoti, 1988). However, the secular nature of the family law introduced by the
Kemalist reforms in the 1920s made Turkey unique in the MENA region. Women
were granted equal rights at the foundation of the Turkish Republic. They took part
in social and professional life, but the effects of the reforms were mostly limited to
Istanbul and modernization did not actually transform the rural Anatolia. Kandiyoti
(1987) describes Turkish women as “emancipated but unliberated” because Kemalist
reforms mostly failed to address the inequalities in the internalized patriarchal system
(Dedeog˘lu, 2012, p. 131). As a result, gender discriminatory practices such as honor
killings or preservation of family honor as justification of limiting women’s mobility
have persisted (I˙lkkaracan & I˙lkkaracan 1998).
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Until the early 2000s, the Turkish Civil Code defined the man as the head of the
family and the woman as homemaker, and married women’s labor force participation
was conditional upon their husband’s approval. In practice, however, approval was
not enforced as a legal obligation (I˙lkkaracan, 2012, p.15). European Union acces-
sion negotiations after Turkey’s official candidacy in 1999 created impetus in state
action for legal reform to achieve gender equality. The major legal changes to improve
women’s status included the adoption of the new Civil Law (2001), the new Labor
Law (2003), and the new Penal Code (2005). The new Civil Law abolished the “head
of the family” concept and equalized men and women before the Law. It brought a
new property regime where property acquired during the marriage is equally divided
after the divorce (Dedeog˘lu, 2012, p. 131). Moreover, the new Labor Law introduced
egalitarian arrangements for women’s work. It included “the principles of equal pay
for work of equal value; equal treatment as regards employment; protection of preg-
nant and breastfeeding women, and women who recently gave birth; the reversal of
burden of proof to the employer in cases of sex-based discrimination at the workplaces,
and non-discrimination against part-time workers” (Dedeog˘lu, 2012, p. 132-3).
On the other hand, the Turkish legal system does not offer much in terms of
work-family reconciliation measures. There are sixteen weeks of partially (fully) paid
maternity leave granted by the Labor Law to the private (public) sector employees.
Only public sector workers have three days of paternity leave (I˙lkkaracan, 2012, p. 16).
In other words, work-family reconciliation is still considered as the woman’s problem
and this attitude is reflected in the recent policy agenda of the AKP government.
The Regulation on Working Conditions of Pregnant and Nursing Women, issued in
2004, required workplaces employing more than 100 women workers to have nursery
rooms and those employing more than 150 women workers to have pre-school facilities
for children between 36-72 months. However, enforcement of the regulation remains
very limited. It is also argued by the Coalition of Women’s Groups for Women’s
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Work (KEIG) that this regulation actually discourages employers to hire increasing
number of women to avoid the expenses of opening up a nursery or childcare facility
(Dedeog˘lu, 2012).
Institutional care is not common in Turkey. The starting age for primary school
was decreased from age 6 to 5 with a recent law in 2012. But the preschool enrollment
rate for children under age 5 is very low. The few state-subsidized childcare centers are
usually attached to public workplaces in compliance with the regulation mentioned
above. Working women with low education and low wages can only rely on other
family members for childcare. Mothers, mothers-in-law, and older daughters are
usually the caregivers in low-income dual-earner households. Currently about 25.8
percent of children in the ages of 3-6 benefit from daycare, but the distribution of
the services is quite regressive. Figure 2.14 shows that as of 2009 fewer than one
in ten children were benefiting from institutional care from the bottom asset decile,
while about one in three children in the top asset decile were enrolled in daycare and
preschool education (Aran, Immervoll & Ridao-Cano, 2014).
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Figure 2.14: Percentages of Children under Age Five that Benefit Various Childcare
Arrangements by Household Asset Deciles, 2009
Source: Aran et al. 2014, Turkey, EU-SILC 2009.
According to a recent survey on family, work and gender roles, a majority of Turk-
ish society still sees women predominantly as homemakers. Although they believe
both men and women should contribute to the family income, they define women’s
primary role as being good wives and mothers. For example, 61 percent of the re-
spondents agreed with the statement “ a job is alright, but what most women really
want is a home and children”. Additionally, 58 percent of the respondents agreed
with the statement “a pre-school child is likely to suffer if his or her mother works”
(C¸arkog˘lu & Kalaycıoug˘lu, 2013).
The gender ideology that defines women’s primary role as motherhood gained
strength during the AKP rule since 2002. According to AKP’s conservative political
agenda, women first and foremost are defined with their traditional roles in the family.
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Cos¸ar and Yeg˘enog˘lu (2011) define AKP’s gender politics as a form of neoliberal-
conservative patriarchy that expects women to adapt to the changing global market
conditions without challenging their primary roles as good wives and mothers. In line
with this mentality, the Ministry of Women’s Status was transformed to the Ministry
of Women and Family in 2011. Erdog˘an emphasized the importance of motherhood
for women’s status on multiple occasions with statements such as “woman’s status
rises by being mother and heaven is only one step away from them” or “our religion
[Islam] has defined a position for women: motherhood”.6 The AKP’s definition of
ideal womanhood is reflected in their hostility towards feminist political identity and
their aggressive pro-natalist discourse. When women marched against a draft bill
criminalizing adultery with the slogan “our body and our sexuality is ours”, Erdog˘an
denounced the protests by stating that these “marginal” women who do not comply
with the traditional values of our society cannot represent Turkish women. The pro-
natalist rhetoric started in 2008 with a call for women to bear at least three children
to preserve dynamic structure of the population, and this was complemented with
anti-abortion initiatives and banning C-section births unless it is medically necessary.
Erdog˘an stated that he is against abortion in 2012: “I see abortion as murder. There
is no difference between killing the child in the mother’s womb and killing her after
the birth”.7 Demographic concerns lie behind the interference in women’s bodies
as reflected in Erdoan’s statements “with C-section no more than two children are
possible... C-section is nothing but an operation to stop population increase in this
country”.8
6Guardian, 24 November 2014, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/24/turkeys-
president-recep-tayyip-erdogan-women-not-equal-men.
7‘Erdog˘an: Sezaryene kars¸ıyım, ku¨rtaj bir cinayettir’ (Erdog˘an: I am against
C-sections; abortion is murder), 25 May 2012. http://www.radikal.com.tr/
Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalDetayV3&ArticleID=10891&CategoryID=78.
8‘Erdog˘an: Sezaryenle iki c¸ocuktan fazlası olmaz’ (Erdog˘an: with C-section no more than two
children are possible), 29 May 2012, http://www.ntv.com.tr/arsiv/id/25353517/.
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Moreover, the conservative-religious agenda of the AKP government was reflected
in two concrete policies that are expected to have important effects on women’s posi-
tion in the labor market. The first one is the change in compulsory education with a
proposal known as the “4+4+4 Law.” The new law came into force in April 2012. Al-
though it has many dimensions, the most relevant aspect of the law for girls’ schooling
is the division of the education into three phases as 4-year primary, 4-year secondary
and 4-year high school education, instead of 8-year compulsory primary education.
The compulsory schooling of 8 years started in the 1997/1998 academic year. Sig-
nificant improvements in schooling ratios for primary and secondary education were
achieved since then. More importantly, gender inequalities in education began to be
eliminated. For example, schooling ratios of girls relative to boys have increased from
85 percent to 100 in primary education and from 75 to 88 percent secondary educa-
tion in the period 1997-2011. Furthermore, it is estimated that 8-years compulsory
schooling reduced the probability of marriage and giving birth for teenage women.
The probability of marriage by the age of 16 fell by 44 percent while the probability
of giving birth by the age of 17 decreased by 36 percent (Kırdar, Dayıog˘lu & Koc¸,
2011). Now with the new “4+4+4 Law”, there is the danger of girls being taken out of
school after the first 4 years by their parents and directed to alternative arrangements
such as distance learning or religious schools. The motivation behind introducing the
4+4+4 system despite the effectiveness of the previous eight-year compulsory educa-
tion was to promote the religious imam and preacher schools (imam hatip schools)
that were basically functionless during the eight-year compulsory primary education
system. The AKP government, in line with their intention to “raise religious youth”,
was able to increase the enrollment in imam hatip schools by more than 35 percent.9
9According to Ministry of National Education (MEB) statistics, there were 537 imam hatip high
schools in 2011-2012 academic year before 4+4+4 system, this number has increased to 708 one year
after 4+4+4 system became effective. The number of imam hatip secondary schools increased from
730 to 1099.
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The second policy AKP initiated recently (announced in January 2015) is the
Family and Dynamic Population Structure Conservation Program. The main targets
of the program are stated in the 10th Development Plan as (i) protecting family
welfare and strengthening family institution; (ii) strengthening intergenerational sol-
idarity; (iii) harmonizing work and family; and (iv) increasing total fertility rate.10
The strengthening of the family institution is going to be achieved with higher mar-
riage rates through incentives such as state support for “dowry accounts” and lower
divorce rates through premarital education and family counseling services. Erdog˘an’s
call for at least three children is supported by monetary incentives with this program.
Women will receive cash assistance after giving birth by the amount of 300TL for the
first child, 400TL for the second child and 600TL for the third child. The main goal
of the program is to prevent population growth from falling below the replacement
level. Although increasing women’s labor force participation is emphasized, the real
aim is to increase fertility. The policies to increase female employment are designed
in a framework to increase fertility. For example, one of the main components of the
program regarding women’s employment is right to work part-time after giving birth.
After using their maternity leave women in the public sector will be able to have 2
months of part-time work with full-time compensation after the first birth, 4 months
after the second birth, and 6 months after the third birth. Moreover, mothers will be
able to work part-time if they prefer until the child starts primary school. It might be
possible to keep more women in the labor force by this way, but the nature of employ-
ment and eligibility for social security benefits will change with more flexible forms of
employment. In the middle-income households women can afford to have a part-time
job temporarily. But the main risk with this arrangement is that men will become
10The 10th Development Plan: 2014-2018, Ministry of Development,
Ankara 2014. Accessed at: http://www.mod.gov.tr/Lists/RecentPublications/
Attachments/75/The%20Tenth%20Development%20Plan%20%282014-2018%29.pdf.
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more attractive to hire in the public sector. Employers are likely to prefer full-time
continuous employees instead of women working part-time in between births. They
have already raised some concerns. For example, the president of Denizli11 Cham-
ber of Industry emphasizes the continuity in production in high-skilled industry jobs:
“Even though a payment is granted by the government for non-working hours, it is
going to be a serious burden for employers who are already having hard time finding
skilled workforce when qualified workers stay away their jobs for a long time or work
part-time.”12 He points out the risk of women concentrating in low-skilled jobs after
this program.
Another complication is how to fill the positions of the women switching from
full-time to part-time status. Private Employment Agencies and temporary job ar-
rangements are proposed to fill the gap. If these temporary workers bring additional
tax burdens to employers, the program may end up decreasing the demand for female
labor. Istanbul Textile and Apparel Exporters’ Association points out the difficulty
of filling these positions: “How are we going to find part-time workers when it is
difficult to find full-time workers under current circumstances...No employer in our
companies which have hundreds and thousands of women workers would want to take
such a risk. Our companies might stay away from hiring women and turn to men.”13
In summary, this program is designed with a perspective that sees women’s position
in the labor market secondary to their main role, motherhood. Rather than being
empowering, the part-time flexible forms of employment suggested for women are
11Denizli is the center of textile production.
12‘Sanayicilerden pakete tepki: Kadınlar niteliksiz is¸lerde istihdam edilecek’ (Response
to the package from industrialists: Women are going to be employed in low-skilled
jobs), http://www.sokhaberci.com/sanayicilerden-pakete-tepki-kadinlar-niteliksiz-islerde-istihdam-
edilecek-haberi-11113
13“Milyonlarca kadın is¸sizlig˘e mahkum ediecek” (Millions of women are going to be condemned
to unemployment), 14 January 2015, http://www.halkinhabercisi.com/milyonlarca-kadin-issizlige-
mahkum-edilecek.
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likely to preserve the traditional gender roles in the family, women being secondary
earners.
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CHAPTER 3
DETERMINANTS OF WOMEN’S LABOR FORCE
PARTICIPATION: THE ROLE OF SOCIAL
CONSERVATISM
3.1 Introduction
Urbanization and agricultural labor shedding are seen as the main factors that
result in low female labor force participation in Turkey (World Bank, 2009). One of
every three women has become an internal migrant. Most women who have migrated
from rural to urban areas formerly worked in the agricultural sector, but many with-
drew from the labor force once they moved to the urban areas. Plausible explanations
for their withdrawal include lack of affordable childcare, cultural pressures, and lack
of necessary skills and education. In surveys, women also cite getting married and
not finding the proper jobs as reasons for withdrawal from the labor market (Turkey
Demographic and Health Survey, 2003; 2008). Women’s reservation wage remains
high in the cities given the lack of subsidized childcare and subsidized pre-school edu-
cation. Moreover, the Turkish labor market has a significant informal sector in which
women are disproportionately concentrated.1 The informal sector generally does not
offer decent pay and working conditions, which further discourages women to enter
or stay in the labor force.
Many researchers focusing on the supply-side determinants of women’s participa-
tion have emphasized the importance of education (Kasnakog˘lu & Dayıog˘lu, 1997;
1Informal employment rate was 52 percent for women and 30.2 percent for men in 2013 according
to Household Labor Force Statistics.
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O¨zar & Gu¨nlu¨k-S¸enesen 1998; Tansel, 2002a; Bas¸levent & Onaran 2003; Gu¨ndu¨z-
Hos¸go¨r & Smits, 2008; Taymaz, 2010). Others have argued that education cannot
explain the Turkish female employment puzzle on its own, noticing that men with
similar levels of education do not have low participation rates, instead maintaining
that low levels of participation can be better explained by social and cultural values
(Gu¨ner & Uysal, 2014; Go¨ksel, 2013; Gu¨ndu¨z-Hos¸go¨r & Smits, 2008; Uraz et al.,
2010). One important cultural factor influencing women’s labor force participation
decision in Turkey may be patriarchy. Turkey is part of what Caldwell (1978) calls the
“patriarchal belt” and Kandiyoti (1988) calls the “belt of classic patriarchy” which in-
cludes North Africa, the Muslim Middle East (including Turkey and Iran), and South
and East Asia (Pakistan, Afghanistan, Northern India and rural China) (Moghadam,
1992). In these countries, there is typically a strict separation between the male and
female domains, with men operating in the public sphere and women more restricted
to the private sphere. Modernization has challenged this strict public-private division
in Turkey, but there are strong remnants of patriarchal relations in society.
This chapter focuses on the role of social conservatism as a constraint for women’s
labor force participation in Turkey. I examine the correlates of women’s labor force
participation using probit regression analysis with a recent dataset compiled by
Hacettepe University based on Turkey Demographic and Health Surveys (TDHS).
Different from household labor force survey data, this dataset allows me to analyze
social and cultural determinants together with the traditional supply side variables.
I include an “internalization of patriarchal norms” variable created out of women’s
answers to nine opinion questions. These questions capture different aspects of pa-
triarchal relations such as gender division of labor in the household, women’s mobil-
ity in the public domain, decision making in the family, and control over sexuality.
Moreover, I incorporate the role of religion using a religiosity variable based on the
frequency of religious practices of women, prayer (namaz ) and fasting.
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This analysis reveals the correlation between gender-role attitudes and labor force
participation, but it does not allow me to make causal claims, due to potential en-
dogeneity. It is possible that the direction of causation runs from labor force par-
ticipation to more progressive attitudes, rather than vice versa. Or the direction of
causality may run in both directions: from having progressive values to participation
in the labor market, and from working outside the home to being less mindful of
patriarchal norms. To address the potential problem of endogeneity, I use instru-
mental variable estimation. The literature on the long-run effects of family structure
on gender-role attitudes emphasizes the importance of pre-adult socialization in the
formation of these attitudes. I therefore use a scale of family conservatism as an
instrument for patriarchal norms.
3.2 Historical and Comparative Trends in Women’s Labor
Force Participation
The women’s labor force participation rate in Turkey is very low in comparison to
the countries at a similar development stage. Moreover, it has been steadily declining
since the 1960s, which makes it a matter of concern not only for academics but also for
international organizations as a deteriorating development indicator. The women’s
labor force participation rate declined from 65.4 % in 1960, to 26% in 2009 and showed
a small increase to 30.8 % in 2013. The increase after 2009 global economic crisis
may be explained by the added worker effect2 and the incentives given to women’s
employment.3 In fact, there has been a decline in men’s labor force participation,
from 93.6% in 1960 to 70.5% in 2009, during the same period as well (Table 3.1).
2The added worker effect refers to an increase in the labor supply of married women when their
husbands become unemployed.
3Government introduced an incentive scheme with the 2008 Employment Package that gave social
security contribution cuts to employers if they hired women and young men. For the impact of these
incentives on women’s employment, see Chapter 5, Ayhan (2013), and Uysal (2013).
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By 2013, men’s participation rate (71.5%) is still in line with averages in the OECD
(69.5%) and Europe and Central Asia (67.3%). However, women’s participation rate
(30.8%) is substantially lower than the averages in OECD (50.9%) and Europe and
Central Asia (50.4%).4
4World Development Indicators, extracted from World Bank WDI Database on 4/28/2013.
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Table 3.1: Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender, 1960-2013
Year Men Women
Census of Population
1960 93.6 65.4
1965 91.8 56.6
1970 79.5 50.3
1975 80.9 47.3
1980 79.8 45.8
1985 78.3 43.6
1990 78.2 42.8
Household Labor Force Surveys
1988 81.2 34.3
1989 80.6 36.1
1990 79.7 34.1
1991 80.2 34.1
1992 79.6 32.7
1993 78 26.8
1994 78.5 31.3
1995 77.8 30.9
1996 77.1 30.6
1997 76.7 28.8
1998 76.7 29.3
1999 75.8 30
2000 73.7 26.6
2001 72.9 27.1
2002 68.7 27.9
2003 70.4 26.6
2004 70.3 23.3
2005 70.6 23.3
2006 69.9 23.6
2007 69.8 23.6
2008 70.1 23.5
2009 70.5 26
2010 70.8 26.6
2011 70.7 28.2
2012 71 29.5
2013 71.5 30.8
Source: 1960-1990: Census of
Population, TURKSTAT, Tansel
(2002a), p.29, 1988-2013: House-
hold Labor Force Surveys, TURK-
STAT, www.tuik.gov.tr.
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Turkey had the lowest female labor force participation rate among OECD countries
in 2010 (Figure 3.1). However, it has one of the lowest GDP per capita among OECD
countries as well. A comparison among countries in the income group to which Turkey
belongs is more revealing. When we look at the upper-middle income countries,
Turkey emerges again as an outlier, along with a few Middle Eastern countries (Figure
3.2). It is clear that there are other social, cultural, and institutional determinants
of women’s labor force participation in addition to the per capita GDP level. OECD
or upper-middle income country groups may not be the right benchmark to make
comparisons for Turkey. Since Turkey shares some socio-cultural properties of Middle
Eastern countries, the MENA region is a better benchmark. When we look at the
female labor force participation in Middle Eastern and African countries, Turkey
seems to be conforming to the trends in the region (Figure 3.3). It is not an outlier
among MENA countries. However, even in the MENA region the average female labor
force participation rate has been increasing in the past two decades, from 18.2% in
1990 to 21.14 % in 2011.5 On the contrary, Turkey has seen a declining trend during
the same period, from 34.5% in 1990 to 28.1% in 2011.
The level of education is frequently cited in the literature as the main determinant
of women’s labor force participation in the literature. It is argued that women lack
the necessary qualifications to participate in the labor force. Statistics show that this
claim is valid only to a certain extent in Turkey. Table 3.2 presents the labor force
participation rates for men and women by education level. It shows that literacy or
having a degree below high school does not significantly increase women’s participa-
tion, whereas the highest participation rates for men are seen among primary school
graduates. In other words, returns to education appear to differ for men and women.
5World Development Indicators, extracted from World Bank WDI Database on 4/28/2013.
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Explaining women’s low participation rates by lack of education does not reflect the
whole reality.
Figure 3.1: Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%), OECD Countries, 2010
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Figure 3.2: Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%), Upper-Middle Income Coun-
tries, 2010
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
Figure 3.3: Female Labor Force Participation Rate (%), MENA Countries, 2010
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators.
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Table 3.2: Labor Force Participation Rates by Year and Education Level
1988 1995 2002 2013
M F M F M F M F
Illiterate 70.5 32.3 62.5 28.4 48.1 24.4 33.8 17.4
Literate but no school completed 76.3 31.7 67.6 25 48.5 22.4 58.2 20.8
Primary school 88.9 34.3 86 31.8 78.8 26.7 73.3 29.5
Junior high school or vocational 61.4 19.5 59 15.9 68.4 18.4 79.8 27.5
High school 75.5 45.7 73.4 34.9 64.6 28.5 70.1 32.1
Vocational school at high s. level 82.8 52.5 80.9 46.4 77.7 39 81.3 39.3
University and other higher ed. 89.5 82.5 88 73.8 84.5 71.5 86.1 72.2
Source: TURKSTAT, Household Labor Force Statistics.
Moreover, Turkey did not go through the feminization of the labor force that was
seen in many developing countries even though, like many other countries, it has
adopted an export-oriented growth strategy since 1980. There is an extensive litera-
ture on export-oriented industrialization and feminization of employment (Standing,
1989; Seguino, 2000; Joekes, 1999; Wood, 1991; Elson, 1995; Elson & Pearson, 1981;
C¸ag˘atay & O¨zler, 1995; C¸ag˘atay & Berik, 1990; Caraway, 2006). The countries in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region have not shown a trend of feminiza-
tion despite the fact that they have gone through similar liberalization experiences
as other developing countries. I˙lkkaracan (2012) argues that Turkey has conformed
to some of the macroeconomic trends of the MENA region that negatively affected
women’s employment in export sectors such as prolonged import substitution indus-
trialization, relatively high wages based on male-breadwinner norms, and overvalued
exchange rates.
3.3 Literature Survey
3.3.1 Women’s Labor Force Participation in the MENA Region
As an alternative to the conventional labor supply model, economists undertaking
gender and development research have identified a number of constraints on women’s
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employment. Moghadam (1998) summarizes these constraints as: (i) household in-
equalities and traditional sexual division of labor; (ii) the broad gender ideology
operating in the society; (iii) the legal system and regulatory framework; (iv) social
and physical infrastructure; and (v) economic conditions and policies. Some of these
constraints are argued to affect MENA countries more strongly because of the cultural
restrictions that Islam imposes on women.
Researchers such as Moghadam (2001) and Karshenas (2001) challenged the view
that cultural and religious factors are the main reasons why the feminization of the
labor force has not occurred in the MENA region. They point out the importance
of industrialization and growth strategies in shaping the context in which cultural
and social factors affect women’s labor force participation patterns. For instance,
Karshenas (2001) explains women’s low participation rates by the relatively high
manufacturing wages that made the absence of women in paid work affordable by
households. Similarly Moghadam (2005) argues that during the oil boom the supply of
and demand for female labor remained limited in the MENA region. At the same time,
non-economic factors such as the role of state and the cultural understanding of male-
female roles reinforced a “patriarchal gender contract”. When these countries started
to liberalize their economies, they found themselves in an uncompetitive position
mainly due to lack of an educated labor force, especially among women.
In other words, these researchers claim that the patriarchal gender contract in
MENA countries has been enforced by the oil economy, relatively high wages for
men, and their particular industrialization strategies (import substitution industri-
alization in most of the MENA countries). Therefore, they predicted that economic
liberalization and structural change in the post-oil boom era were going to challenge
the patriarchal contract and increase women’s employment. For instance, in 1998
by looking at the experience of Turkey, the earliest adopter of structural adjustment
policies in the region, Moghadam concluded that: “There is much evidence to suggest
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that Turkey has hit the bottom of the U curve”, relating female labor force partici-
pation to time and GDP per capita (1998, p. 92). Contrary to the optimism among
some researchers, however, Turkey has still not seen the upward trend in female labor
force participation.
3.3.2 Empirical Studies of Labor Force Participation of Women in Turkey
Tansel (2002a) examines the U-shaped impact of economic development on female
labor force participation in Turkey using times series (for the years 1980, 1985, and
1990) and cross-provincial data. She finds evidence for the U-shaped relationship
for total female labor force participation (with a negative coefficient for provincial
per capita GDP and positive coefficient for its square). However, for non-agricultural
labor force participation, the U-shaped relationship is not observed. The employment
share of the agriculture sector has a positive effect while the employment share of
industry has a negative effect on female labor force participation.
C¸ag˘atay and Berik (1990) analyze whether employment in manufacturing industry
is feminized through the shift from import substitution industrialization to export-
led growth using establishment-level data for two years, 1966 and 1982. Their main
finding is that under both industrialization strategies the technological characteris-
tics and export orientation of the establishments explain the gender composition of
manufacturing employment. Under both regimes, women’s employment is higher if
the industry is more export-oriented, more labor-intensive, and has a high ratio of
non-skilled to skilled production workers. Yet, the shift to an export-led growth strat-
egy was not accompanied by a feminization of manufacturing employment. Bas¸levent
and Onaran (2004) also analyze the impact of the export-oriented growth strategy
on female labor force participation using two rounds of household labor force survey
data, 1988 and 1994. They find that long-term growth at the province level has a
significant positive impact on participation of both single and married women. How-
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ever, export-orientation has a positive impact on the participation of only young and
single women. It does not have any influence on married women’s participation. This
finding is important because it suggests that there are specific barriers to the labor
force participation of married women.
Taymaz (2010) examines the labor force participation probabilities of men and
women in urban areas using a multinomial logistic model. He finds that educa-
tion improves the participation of women in all types of employment, but that the
strongest effect is seen in service employment. Household size has a negative impact
on the employment of the female parent and a positive impact on the employment of
the male parent. He interprets this result as “parent women are either more produc-
tive in home production than men, or there are cultural factors that consider home
production as feminine activity, so that parent women tend to stay at home in larger
households” (p. 13). His main explanation for the low urban female participation
is the “under-participation trap”. The under-participation trap refers to a situation
where imperfectly competitive labor markets lead to under-participation in the labor
force (Booth & Coles, 2007). Urban women with high homemaking productivity pre-
fer to stay at home because they do not receive the full return to their investment
in education if they engage in market work. Being in the under-participation trap,
these women further lower their ex-ante investment in education because it is not use-
ful for home production. In terms of policy implications, this analysis suggests that
changing the relative prices of market versus home products could partially overcome
the under-participation trap. Therefore, Taymaz proposes to subsidize labor market
participation of women with state-provided childcare support as a solution. A World
Bank study also explains the low participation rates of poorly educated women in
urban areas using the idea of the under-participation trap. Urban women with low
levels of education are more likely to work in the informal sector. Wages offered by
the informal sector are usually lower than what women would have to pay to hire
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someone else for housework and childcare. Therefore the labor supply of women who
would have a chance to be employed only in the informal sector is likely to be low.
Consequently, low wages and returns to education cause families to under-invest in
the education of girls (World Bank, 2009).
Dayıog˘lu and Kırdar (2011) examine the labor supply behavior of women using
cohort analysis. Controlling for age and time effects they find that younger cohorts of
women are more likely to participate in the labor market than older cohorts in urban
areas. But it is not clear what drives these results: changing attitudes toward the
labor market or the changing composition of the female workforce? When they control
for education, they find that participation rates are either stagnant or falling.6 They
conclude that the favorable development in women’s participation rates (participation
increasing in each younger cohort) mainly stems from compositional shifts towards a
more educated workforce who have higher participation rates in urban areas.
Using a Marxist-feminist analytical framework, another group of researchers em-
phasizes the interactions between two parallel systems, capitalism and patriarchy,
and explains the gendered outcomes in Turkish labor market with the inability of
the capitalist growth process to undermine patriarchy. For instance, Tokso¨z (2011)
argues that during the import-substituting phase of Turkey’s development trajectory,
the articulation between patriarchy and capitalism was realized through the exclusion
of women from the labor market. Relatively high wages made it possible for male
household heads to provide for the family alone and that women could afford to stay
at home.
6Specifically, when they look at cohort effects for women with less than primary education, they
do not find any significant variation among participation rates of older and younger cohorts. For
women with primary education, younger cohorts have significantly higher participation rates than
the older cohorts. The opposite trend is observed for women with high school education and higher
education. Among the high school graduates, the probability of labor force participation decreases
for successive cohorts of women. Younger cohorts are also found to have a lower likelihood of
participation among women with higher education.
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I˙lkkaracan (2012) presents a multi-layered analysis based on the interaction be-
tween economic growth strategies and the male-breadwinner family under different
industrialization strategies. The import-substitution industrialization period (1950-
80) and “family wages” reinforced the patriarchal contract and conservative family-
oriented care regime7 based on the male breadwinner model. There was a rise in fe-
male employment under the export-oriented industrialization era starting from 1980,
but the feminization was weak in comparison to other countries. In the first half
of the 1980s, real wages declined but then started to rise again in the beginning of
1990s (explained in Chapter 2). Karshenas interprets this quick recovery in the wages
despite the neo-liberal policies as the resistance of the patriarchal family to market
pressures in Turkey (I˙lkkaracan, 2012; Karshenas, 2001).8 The financial liberalization
of 1990s brought unstable growth and weak labor demand conditions. Moreover, the
economy was characterized by jobless growth after the financial crisis of 2001. In
other words, weak demand conditions led to the institutionalization of family-based
care regime and patriarchal contract to such an extent that marriage and motherhood
became constraints independent from demand conditions, which she calls an adverse
path dependency (I˙lkkaracan, 2012).
As I˙lkkaracan states, the care regime in Turkey is predominantly family-oriented
based on the patriarchal male breadwinner model. The dual career model supported
by institutional care provision is seen only among university graduates. For example,
among the women working at a job and living with a child under age five, only 4.2
percent benefited from institutional care and only 4.3 percent purchased the care
7Feminist economists developed care regimes analysis building on the welfare regimes analysis of
Esping-Anderson (1990). It is argued that all welfare regimes have a “caring regime” (Lewis, 1992;
Sainsburry, 1994; and Jenson, 1997). Three types of care regimes are identified: liberal/market-
based, conservative/state supported family-based, and social democrat/public service-based (Razavi,
2007; I˙lkkaracan, 2010). The care regime in MENA is predominantly the second type, conservative
family-based.
8An alternative explanation for rising real wages in the beginning of 1990s in Turkey is democratic
transition from military rule (Taymaz, Voyvoda & Yılmaz 2014).
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services from market using servants or babysitters in 2003. These numbers increased
to 6.1 and 5 percent respectively in 2008. The care for the small children is provided
by the mother herself (38.7 %, 35.3%), mother-in-law (20.1%, 23.7%), older female
children (12.2%, 7.5%), and other relatives among the family (6.4%, 4.9%). It is very
rare (2.4%, 2.5%) that small children are taken care of by fathers (TDHS, 2003; 2008).
Although everywhere men are usually considered as the primary breadwinners,
seeing women’s work as optional is more common in MENA. World Value Surveys
give an idea about the prevalence of the perception that women take away men’s jobs
in the case of scarcity rather than being entitled to those jobs. If we compare Turkey
with other middle-income countries such as Brazil or Mexico, first we see that the
male-breadwinner model is more accepted (see Figure 3.4). The percentages of people
agreeing with the statement “When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a
job than women” are higher. Second, while we observe a decline in the acceptance in
most other countries, it has increased in Turkey from 49.8 to 59.4 percent from first
wave to the fifth wave of the surveys. The growth process in other countries might
have eroded the male breadwinner model more successfully. However, we also notice
that Turkey had higher acceptance of male breadwinner model than other countries
even during the first wave of the surveys.
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Figure 3.4: Percentage of Respondents who agree with the Statement “When Jobs
are Scarce Men Should Have More Right to a Job than Women”
Source: World Value Surveys, several rounds.
I˙lkkaracan (2010) argues that the cultural constraint in Turkey does not affect
women’s labor market outcomes by excluding them from the public sphere but that it
reinforces the gender ideology that defines women’s primary role as being good wives
and mothers. The significant discrepancies in labor force participation of married
versus single women with similar levels of education support this argument (see Figure
2.13 in Chapter 2). In other words, the lack of family-work reconciliation policies
together with gender ideology restricts women’s mobility. Empirical studies on the
mobility patterns in Turkish labor market also show that low labor force attachment is
an important problem for married women. Tansel and Kan (2012) show that women
have higher probability of leaving the labor market independent from their initial
jobs (formal or informal sector). Analyzing job-to-job transitions, Tas¸c¸ı (2009) shows
that marriage lowers the probability of switching jobs for women. In a case study
from I˙zmir, Eryar and Tekgu¨c¸ (2013) find that gender determines different mobility
patterns and being married raises the likelihood of women’s transition from a job to
non-employment.
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In this chapter, building on I˙lkkaracan’s (2010; 2012) framework, I incorporate
gender ideology into the analysis of female labor supply in Turkey. In an attempt to
quantify the impact of traditional gender role attitudes on women’s preferences, I in-
clude a scale of “internalization of patriarchal norms” based on opinion questions from
a unique dataset. Several cross-country studies use Islam as a proxy for patriarchal
culture (Tazannatos 1999; Lincove 2008; Boone 1996). Braunstein (2014) criticizes
this approach as obscuring the role of patriarchy “as a system of male advantage” that
constrains economic development. She argues that “it is not that certain countries or
societies are closely wed to their (extremist) religious beliefs that they are willing to
pay high economic costs to maintain them, but rather that patriarchal systems benefit
the few at the expense of the many” through “patriarchal rent-seeking” (p. 59). I fol-
low a similar approach and focus on the patriarchal norms created and maintained by
male dominance separately than the impact of religion. Although I do not attribute
distinctively strong gender inequitable attitudes to Islam, I believe religious practice
on a personal level might be associated with more traditional attitudes. Therefore I
include religiosity as a potential determinant of female labor supply as well.
According to gender stratification9 theory, the status and power hierarchies derive
from gender division of labor and men’s control over material resources. Their ad-
vantageous position gives men motivation to continue the gender inequalities. At the
macro-level, male power shapes the ideology and norms as well as formal institutions.
As long as women choose to comply with the gender norms, men do not even need to
use their power to maintain the status quo. In other words, “gender stratification is
comprised of intentional processes (through perhaps deeply embedded in institutions
so as to appear ‘natural’) that ensure male dominance in all aspects of social life”
9Gender stratification refers to “hierarchical social and economic relations based on accentuated
differences between women and men that in turn shape a gender division of labor (Seguino, 2013;
p. 13).
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(Seguino, 2013, p. 13). Why do women comply with the gender norms that put them
in a disadvantageous position? Braunstein (2008) explains it with the formation of
gender identity internalized through repeated social interactions. Internalized norms
and social sanctions, such as punishment in the marriage markets, increase the costs
of deviation from the established norms for women.
The system of gender stratification involves multiple causal relationships. Seguino
(2013) draws a scheme of these complex relationships (see Figure 3.5). On one hand,
at the household level, the gender division of labor constrains women’s access to
material resources, and men’s command over resources gives them bargaining power
to control women’s unpaid labor. At the macro-level, demand conditions shape the
opportunities for women to gain power and social status through paid work. On the
other hand, the traditional gender roles ensure the persistence of gender inequality
as these roles reinforce the norms and stereotypes. Gender norms and stereotypes,
in turn, shape the institutions (family, property rights, organized religion etc.) that
embed the gender ideology. In other words, there is a two-way causal relationship
between the economic (macro and micro) and the cultural spheres (Seguino, 2013, p.
20).
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Figure 3.5: Gender Stratification in the Economic and Cultural Spheres
Sources: Seguino, 2013, Figure 3.
This chapter focuses on the causal effect of gender norms on women’s decision-
making at the household level. My research is part of a growing body of the literature
that attempts to incorporate culture as a determinant of women’s labor force partic-
ipation in Turkey. Gu¨ndu¨z-Hos¸go¨r and Smits (2008) find that women who are more
strongly controlled by their families, as indicated by the fact that bride money was
paid at their weddings or that they have only a religious marriage, have a higher
probability of being housewives. Go¨ksel (2013) finds that the conservatism variable
has a negative effect on women’s participation decision in urban areas and a positive
effect in rural areas. Her analysis is unique because she uses husband’s conservatism
as a determinant of the wife’s labor market decision. Uraz et al. (2010) show that
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proxies used for traditional family values10 do not have a significant coefficient in the
overall sample but they have a negative effect in the urban sample.
However, these studies suffer from a major drawback: they are not able to make a
causal claim about the role of culture on female labor force participation because of
potential problems of endogeneity. I address this issue with an instrumental variable
estimation, and show that internalizing patriarchal norms has a negative impact on
labor force participation decision. By using a new dataset (the 2008 round of Demo-
graphic and Health Surveys), which has more information about women’s opinions on
various aspects of patriarchal culture, I am better able to capture the extent which
women internalized patriarchal values.
Gu¨ner and Uysal’s (2014) work is closest to this study in examining the causal
relationship between culture and female labor force participation. Using the epidemi-
ological approach for domestic migration, they focus on only migrant women’s labor
market behavior. They also use the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey dataset,
but limit their analysis to migrant women living in urban areas (1759 observations
out of 7405 ever-married women in the dataset). They use female employment rates
in 1970 in the migrant’s province of origin as a proxy for cultural values of migrant
women. They find that female employment rates in the province of origin around the
time the migrants were born have a positive impact on female migrants’ labor supply
behavior. In the epidemiological approach, ideally indicators of the previous genera-
tion’s attitude towards women’s work, such as the working status of the mother would
be used to deal with endogeneity, but that information is not available in the dataset.
The major problem with making a causal claim about the role of culture based on
Gner and Uysal’s method is that all women who were born in the same province are
assumed to have the same attitude towards women’s work outside the home. I esti-
10Three dummy variables indicating whether (1) or not (0) “marriage was arranged by the family,
“brides money was paid” and “woman has a male dominant view of the world”
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mate the causal impact of patriarchal norms on labor supply with an individual-level
instrument, using the rich information about women’s gender-role attitudes and their
family background in the dataset. Moreover, while culture refers to attitudes towards
women’s paid work outside the home in their analysis, attitudes towards paid work
in my analysis is only one among nine aspects of patriarchal culture internalized by
women.
This chapter makes three important contributions. First, I address the potential
problem of endogeneity with an instrumental variable estimation strategy in analyzing
the effects of patriarchy on female labor force participation. Second, I construct
the patriarchy scale using new information about gender-role attitudes in the 2008
Turkey Demographic and Health Survey. Third, I include religion as an important
determinant of women’s labor force participation in Turkey.11 Religion can be a
very important obstacle to women’s work outside of the home in Turkey for at least
two direct reasons. First, practicing prayer (namaz) five times a day is practically
impossible with a regular job outside of the home. Second, wearing a headscarf
was banned in public institutions such as schools and hospitals until very recently
(in 2008). Women who have strong religious beliefs would find it quite difficult to
reconcile their religious practices with a working life.
3.4 Empirical Analysis
3.4.1 Data and Methodology
In order to determine the correlates of labor force participation, I use data from
the 2008 Demographic and Health Survey. The Turkey Demographic and Health
11Go¨ksel (2013) includes husband’s religiosity but not women’s own religiosity as a determinant
of women’s labor supply. Gner and Uysal’s paper includes a proxy for religiosity. It is based on
electoral votes in the 1973 elections in women’s province of origin. Similar to their proxy for culture,
it is a province level variable lacking individual level variation. My religiosity variable is based
on individual religious practice while theirs is based on electoral success of conservative parties in
women’s province of origin.
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Survey, 2008 (TDHS-2008) is a nationally representative survey of 10,525 households
and 7,405 ever-married women age 15-49. I use the ever-married women module for
my analysis. It provides data on women’s health, education, fertility, migration his-
tory, husband’s income and education, household wealth and employment. Moreover,
different from household labor force survey data, TDHS-2008 has various opinion
questions that provide information about cultural and social values of the women
interviewed. Hence, it allows me to analyze social and cultural determinants together
with traditional supply-side variables such as age, education, or number of children. I
estimate the following probit regression model for urban and rural samples separately:
L∗i = β0 + β1Patriarchyi + β2Religiosityi + β3Xi + µ+ i (3.1)
Where Li is a dummy variable
12:
Li =
 = 1 ifL
∗
i > 0
= 0 ifL∗i ≤ 0
Xi is a vector of individual and household characteristics (including age, years of
schooling, number of children under age five, migration, mother’s education, house-
hold size, household wealth quintile13, and husband’s schooling), µ represents region
dummies and  is an error term.
12Labor force participation is defined as: “currently working” and “currently looking for a job if
not working”.
13Wealth Quintile is a dummy variable that categorizes household wealth in five wealth quintiles.
The wealth quintiles are constructed using the Filmer-Pritchett asset index in the DHS surveys.
The asset index was already constructed in the raw TDHS dataset using the durable goods in
the household and some other characteristics of the household. Specifically, the wealth index was
constructed using the information about dwelling and household characteristics (source of drinking
water, sanitation facilities, type of flooring material etc.) and access to consumer goods and services
(weather the respondent’s household owns the following assets/services: fridge, gas/electric oven,
microwave oven, blender/mixer, dishwasher, washing machine, iron, vacuum cleaner, air-conditioner,
cellphone, computer/laptop, internet, plasma-TV (LCD), cable-TV, satellite antenna, DVD-player,
camera, car, taxi/mini-bus, tractor).
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The variable number of children under age five can be thought of as a constraint for
women’s mobility based on the sexual division of labor in the household. Household
size might affect labor force participation either negatively through higher need for
household care or positively through need for more income. Husbands’ schooling is
included as a proxy for husbands’ conservatism to account for the restrictions they
might impose on women. Marital status is not included in the regressions because
the vast majority of the women in my sample (ever-married women) are currently
married.14 Mother’s education is found in the literature to be positively associated
with non-traditional gender role attitudes15; therefore it is included.
Religiosity is a weighted index of intensity of religious practices, prayer (namaz )
and fast.16 The majority of the women in the sample reported that they fasted reg-
ularly but prayed irregularly (Table A4 in Appendix A). I constructed a weighted
religiosity index that puts more weight on less common measure of religious expres-
sion (regular praying) and less weight on more common practices (irregular praying
and regular fasting).17 A higher index number is associated with higher religios-
ity. Patriarchy measures the internalization of patriarchal norms by women based
14Among 7405 women, 7042 of them are currently married, the remaining 363 are “living with a
man”. This might include co-habiting single couples and couples who have only religious marriages.
15More highly educated mothers, whether or not employed outside the home, hold less traditional
gender role attitudes and transmit them to their children (Powell and Steelman 1982, Tallichet and
Willits 1986, Kiecolt and Acock 1988).
16An earlier version of this study included wearing headscarf in the religiosity index. However,
this is problematic because of the ban against headscarf in universities and public institutions.
Although the government lifted the ban in 2008, it is argued and there is some anecdotal evidence
that private sector discriminates against women wearing headscarf (Cindog˘lu 2011). Since any
negative correlation between headscarf and probability of employment can also be attributed to
discrimination rather than reflecting women’s labor market preferences, headscarf is taken out of
the index. I’m thankful to an anonymous referee for making this point.
17I use the following weights: 1−µiΣj(1−µj) , µi is the mean religiosity variable i. All religiosity variables
used in the index are dummy variables taking 0 or 1. See Appendix A for the coding. I followed
Gulesci & Meyersson (2014)’s approach of weighting for the religiosity index. I choose this method
to avoid assigning random weights to irregular practices.
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on their responses to various statements. Specifically, they were asked whether they
agree with the following statements.
• Men should also do the housework like cooking, washing, ironing, and cleaning.
• A married woman should work outside the home if she wants to.
• A woman may go anywhere she wants without her husband’s permission.
• Women should be more involved in politics.
• The important decisions in the family should be made only by men of the family.
• A woman shouldn’t argue with her husband even if she disagrees with him.
• Men are wiser.
• Women should be virgins when they get married.
• It is better to educate a son than a daughter.
Taking the arithmetic average of these nine opinion dummies creates the patri-
archy scale.18 The higher scale numbers are associated with stronger internalization
of patriarchal norms. Some of these questions capture universal aspects of patri-
archy, such as gendered division of labor, while some others are more widespread in
the MENA region such as control over sexuality. Table A3 and A4 in Appendix A
provide descriptive statistics in the form of cross tabulations. 19
Table 3.3 presents the main reasons for not working at a job. The main three
reasons expressed by women for not working are childcare, being a housewife, and
18See Table A5 in Appendix A for coding.
19Table A3 presents percentages of women participating in the labor force according to their age,
education, presence of small children in the house, husbands’ education, household wealth, and
geographical region. Table A4 shows percentages of women in the labor force according to their
views on patriarchal norms and religiosity.
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husband/family’s disapproval in both urban and rural areas. Table 4 shows the cor-
relations of the main reasons for not working at a job with patriarchy and religiosity.
It is interesting to note that there is positive correlation between internalization of
patriarchal norms and self-reported status of being a “housewife”, the lack of part-
ner/family consent, and “do not want/need to work” answers. The negative coeffi-
cient between childcare as the main reason and patriarchy suggests that women with
less patriarchal values are more likely to report childcare as the main obstacle. This
makes sense because in the absence of work-family reconciliation policies, childcare
is a concrete obstacle almost independent from women’s own values apart from their
fertility preferences.
Table 3.3: Main Reason for Not Working at a Job
Urban Rural
Main reason Frequency Percentage Frequency Percentage
Caring for children 1,200 29.2 328 29.42
Housewife 951 23.14 337 30.22
Partner/family doesn’t allow 906 22.04 170 15.25
No job/looking for a job 235 5.72 80 7.17
Does not need to work 331 8.05 65 5.83
Disabled/sick 230 5.6 86 7.71
Caring for elderly 29 0.71 7 0.63
Does not want to work 44 1.07 5 0.45
Retired 57 1.39 4 0.36
About to get married 6 0.15 4 0.36
Just about to start working 16 0.39 1 0.09
Just migrated/left 10 0.24 1 0.09
Other 86 2.09 19 1.7
Total 4,110 100 1,115 100
Source: TDHS-2008.
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Table 3.4: Correlations of Main Reason for Not Working at a Job with Patriarchy
and Religiosity
Urban Rural
Main reason not to work Patriarchy Religiosity Patriarchy Religiosity
Caring for children -0.034 0.011 -0.032 -0.079
Housewife 0.13 0.05 0.066 0.055
Partner/family does not allow 0.074 0.045 -0.038 -0.001
No job/looking for job -0.066 -0.044 -0.043 0.0139
Does not need to work 0.013 0.013 -0.016 -0.005
Disabled/Sick 0.05 -0.011 0.023 -0.027
Caring for elderly -0.002 0.003 0.001 -0.007
Does not want to work 0.022 0.005 -0.014 -0.116
Source: TDHS-2008.
In TDHS-2008, there is a question about reasons for quitting a job. The data show
that 27 percent of women quit their jobs when they get married. Table 3.5 presents
the percentage distribution of women “who worked for at least 6 months after age
12 and were not working at the time of the survey” according to main reason for
quitting and age. Marriage is the main reason for quitting a job for each age group
and pregnancy is cited as the second most important reason. As expected, leaving
the labor market after marriage is more common among young women (56.6% for the
15-19 age group). The survey data thus provide further evidence that gender ideology
that defines women’s primary roles as being good wives and mothers is an important
factor excluding women from the labor market.
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Table 3.5: Main Reason for Quitting a Job
15-19 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-39 40-44 45-49
Marriage 56.6 36.9 28 26.3 25.8 22.2 21.2
Pregnant/child care 1.7 10.1 10.3 15 11 9.7 8.1
Did not want to work 9.2 11.2 11.7 11.1 12.6 7.3 7.3
Work related problems 5.2 8.2 13.2 12.1 11 11.4 7.9
To find a better job 2.8 8.6 12.1 12.1 8.4 11.9 7.4
Just moved/migrated 3.9 4.2 2.6 4.5 7.1 8.7 8.7
Opposition of partner/ 3.1 7.8 3.4 2.4 2.5 2.2 2.8
elderly
Other 17.4 13 18.5 16.4 21.2 26.4 36.5
N 69 417 876 806 653 695 667
Source: TDHS-2008.
Notes: Other category in this table includes “housework”. “sick/disabled”, “appoint-
ment of partner”, “not need to work”, “worked unpaid”, “dismissed”, “sick/elderly
care in the family”, “retirement”, “seasonal/temporary”, and “other”. For a more
detailed table, see Turkey Demographic and Health Survey 2008 Main Report:
http://www.hips.hacettepe.edu.tr/eng/tdhs08/.
3.4.2 Probit Regression Results
The average marginal effects from estimation of the probit regression specified
above are shown in Table 3.6. As expected, education is an important correlate
of the labor force participation of urban women. An additional year of schooling
increases the probability of being in the labor force by 3.6 percent for urban women
and by 6.7 percent for rural women. Having children under the age of five has the
expected negative effect. One additional child under age of five decreases the labor
force participation probability of urban women by 7.4 percent. It has a smaller
effect in rural areas, 3.2 percent. In both urban and rural sub-samples, increased
wealth quintiles are associated with less labor force participation among women. For
instance, a woman in the highest wealth quintile in urban areas is 14.6 percent less
likely to be working in comparison to a woman in the lowest quintile. This might
suggest that women in wealthier households can afford not to work.
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One interesting result is that the patriarchy and religiosity variables are not signif-
icant in the rural sample, while they are both significant in the urban sample. This is
understandable because in rural areas women work mostly as unpaid family workers
under the control of their husbands or family. The changes in predicted probabilities
from minimum to maximum values of patriarchy and religiosity scales are -0.167 and
-0.06.20 In other words, the probability of being in the labor force is 16.7 percent
lower for a woman who completely internalizes the patriarchal norms (a woman who
answers all nine survey questions in a conservative way) in comparison to a progres-
sive woman (a woman who answers all nine survey questions in a progressive way) in
the urban areas. Religiosity has a weaker impact. A woman who regularly practices
namaz and fasts is 6 percent less likely to be in the labor force in comparison to a
woman who does not fast or pray at all. To give an economic meaning to these results,
a complete internalization of patriarchal norms has a slightly bigger impact (16.7%)
than having two children under age five (14.8%) in the urban areas. Practicing namaz
and fasting regularly has a slightly lower impact (6%) than having one small child
(7.4%) or not practicing religion exerts a similar magnitude of positive impact with
two additional years of schooling (7.1%).
20Not presented in the table, calculated with Long and Freese’s prchange command in STATA.
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Table 3.6: Probit Regression Results: Urban versus Rural
Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Urban Urban Rural Rural
Patriarchy -0.155*** -0.162*** -0.0394 -0.0603
(0.033) (0.033) (0.055) (0.054)
Religiosity -0.0821** -0.0796** 0.0389 0.0324
(0.039) (0.039) (0.078) (0.077)
Age 0.0441*** 0.0447*** 0.0513*** 0.0514***
(0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010)
Age squared -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006*** -0.0006***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling 0.0365*** 0.0348*** 0.0672*** 0.0586***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.020) (0.020)
Schooling squared -0.0079*** -0.0077*** -0.0180*** -0.0170***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Schooling cubed 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0011*** 0.0011***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of children under 5 -0.0736*** -0.0730*** -0.0316** -0.0289**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013)
Household size 0.0001 0.0002 0.0089** 0.0121***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Wealth Quintile 2 -0.0341 -0.0285 -0.0713*** -0.0693***
(0.024) (0.024) (0.026) (0.026)
Wealth Quintile 3 -0.0855*** -0.0788*** -0.130*** -0.124***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.033) (0.033)
Wealth Quintile 4 -0.111*** -0.104*** -0.170*** -0.171***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.043) (0.043)
Wealth Quintile 5 -0.146*** -0.141*** -0.222*** -0.231***
(0.022) (0.023) (0.068) (0.066)
Husband’s schooling -0.005** -0.0046** -0.0041 -0.0035
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
Mother’s education 0.0114*** 0.0113*** 0.00940* 0.00839*
(0.002) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
Migration -0.0035 -0.004 -0.0459 -0.0437
(0.013) (0.013) (0.032) (0.032)
Note: Results continued on next page.
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Table 3.6 (continued): Probit Regression Results: Urban versus Rural
Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Urban Urban Rural Rural
(0.013) (0.013) (0.032) (0.032)
West Marmara 0.0272 0.00176 0.0518 0.0135
(0.031) (0.034) (0.096) (0.100)
Aegean 0.0831*** 0.0657** 0.212** 0.194**
(0.030) (0.031) (0.089) (0.093)
East Marmara 0.0841*** 0.127*** 0.200** 0.296***
(0.028) (0.038) (0.091) (0.085)
West Anatolia -0.0875*** -0.0675** -0.125 -0.0179
(0.024) (0.029) (0.089) (0.099)
Mediterranean -0.0314 -0.0201 -0.00887 0.141
(0.024) (0.036) (0.089) (0.095)
Central Anatolia -0.0812*** -0.0727** -0.0199 0.0316
(0.025) (0.031) (0.093) (0.095)
West Black Sea 0.0931*** 0.132*** 0.0662 0.163
(0.029) (0.046) (0.093) (0.106)
East Black Sea 0.222*** 0.154*** 0.363*** 0.258**
(0.035) (0.046) (0.077) (0.103)
Northeast Anatolia -0.0971*** -0.0986*** -0.108 -0.197**
(0.025) (0.031) (0.088) (0.088)
Central East Anatolia -0.122*** -0.147*** -0.276*** -0.182*
(0.025) (0.031) (0.073) (0.095)
Southeast Anatolia -0.0918*** -0.127*** -0.144* -0.210**
(0.024) (0.027) (0.087) (0.082)
Female unemployment rate -0.0008 -0.0133***
(0.002) (0.003)
Share of service employment 0.0009 -0.0006
(0.001) (0.002)
Export share of ISIC 15-18 0.002*** 0.0043***
(0.001) (0.001)
Pseudo R2 0.1441 0.1461 0.1252 0.1407
Observations 5,329 5,329 1,938 1,938
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors are shown below
the marginal effects. For the second specification, standard errors are clustered at
NUTS-2 regional level. The data for regional control variables, female unemployment
rate and share of service employment, comes from the household labor force statistics.
See Appendix A for the data sources of export share variable. Estimation is performed
using STATA 13.0.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Differences in local labor markets and institutions affect the labor force partici-
pation decision. To control for the labor market differences across regions, besides
the region dummies, I include three different variables in the regressions: share of
services in total employment, female unemployment rate and export performance by
NUTS2 regions (26 regions). Share of service employment is expected to positively
affect women’s labor force participation because service jobs tend to be physically less
demanding and more “respectable” for women than the typical industry jobs (Goldin,
1994). Female unemployment rate is expected to have a negative effect. Higher ex-
port orientation is expected to positively affect female labor force participation.21
Introducing demand-side control variables does not change the results; patriarchy
and religiosity are still significant in the urban sample (Specification 2).
I interpret these preliminary results with caution because correlation does not
prove causation. For example, it is possible that the direction of causation runs
from labor force participation to more progressive attitudes, rather than vice versa.
That is, women may become less conservative once they start to engage in paid work
outside the house. Therefore, I estimate the causal impact of patriarchal norms on
labor force participation using instrumental variable estimation. Since patriarchy is
significant only in urban areas, I conduct the instrumental variable analysis only for
the urban sample. Religiosity is also endogenous but I do not attempt to establish
causality for religion in this study and only focus on the internalization of patriarchal
norms.
21I use two alternative measures of export orientation; only the results with export share of major
sectors that employ women (ISIC Rev 2, 15,16,17 and 18) are reported in the Table 3.6. See Appendix
A for discussion and definition of the export orientation variables.
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3.4.3 Instrumental Variable Estimation and Possible Channels of Causa-
tion from Patriarchy to Lower Female Labor Force Participation
The literature on the long-run effects of family structure on gender-role attitudes
emphasizes the importance of pre-adult socialization in the formation of these atti-
tudes (Powell & Steelman, 1982; Tallichet & Willits, 1986; Kiecolt & Acock, 1988).
Therefore, I use a scale of family conservatism as an instrument for patriarchal norms.
I construct the family conservatism variable using six survey questions. It is a scale
variable created out of following dummy variables:
• If there is a blood relationship between woman’s mother and father.
• If there is a blood relationship between her and her husband.
• If she has attended Quran course during her childhood.
• If she uses headscarf.
Turkey has a high rate of consanguineous marriage, especially cousin marriages
(21.2 percent in 201122). The preference for this traditional form of marital union
in the family can be seen as a sign of having a conservative social environment.
The Department of Religious Affairs offers Quran courses to children during the
summer months. Since the participation in these courses happens before the age of
consent, families usually make the decision for the children, sometimes by motivating
them and sometimes by force. The decision to use a headscarf is more complicated.
According to Islamic rules, girls should start to use a headscarf when they start
puberty. Many women make the decision in their early adolescence years, although
there are exceptions. Families play a role in the decision making process, sometimes
by forcing girls and sometimes by presenting it as the only socially acceptable way
22Youth in Statistics, TURKSTAT (2011).
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of having a public life. My ethnographic research also provided anecdotal evidence
that the habit of wearing headscarf is related to family background. The family
conservatism variable is constructed by taking the average of these four variables.
Higher values are associated with a more conservative family.
The presence of a direct effect of an instrumental variable on the outcome is a
potential problem in any instrumental variable analysis, and could introduce bias
(Angrist & Krueger, 2001). Families might be directly intervening in women’s labor
market participation decisions. The correlation between family conservatism and
labor force participation is quite low at -0.0907. Moreover, the low correlation between
family conservatism and lack of family/partner consent as the main reason not to work
(0.0529) gives evidence that families are not directly affecting women’s labor market
decisions. This is consistent with the traditional patriarchal culture as well. In Turkey,
families restrict women until they get married. However, once they are married the
natal family would have less say over their decisions, transferring “the responsibility”
for the woman, so to speak, to her husband or husband’s family. Therefore, evidence
supports the argument that family conservatism is a valid instrument.23
After accounting for potential endogeneity, the next step is to investigate the
possible channels of causation from internalization of patriarchal norms to lower labor
force participation. There is substantial evidence that by shaping cultural norms and
behaviors, formal religious institutions have an impact on the rigidity of gender roles
and attitudes (Inglehart & Norris, 2003). Using World Value Surveys data, Seguino
(2011) finds that religiosity is positively associated with gender inequitable attitudes.
In other words, the direction of causality may run from religiosity to patriarchal norms
23The validity of an instrument cannot be tested in a just-identified model using only one instru-
ment, family conservatism. But it is possible to test the validity of overidentifying instruments in
an overidentified model. Therefore, I estimated the model using the four variables in family conser-
vatism scale as separate instruments and run an overidentification test. The test of overidentifying
restrictions: χ2(3)= 3.8509 (p=0.278). Because p > 0.05, the null hypothesis is not rejected and it
can be concluded that overidentifying restriction is valid.
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and then to lower labor force participation. In this study, I argue that patriarchal
norms have a separate negative impact on female labor force participation. The
correlation between my patriarchy and religiosity variables is 0.1371. It is difficult to
precisely identify the direction of causality with the available data, but dividing the
sample based on mean religiosity can reveal the relative importance of patriarchal
norms for religious versus non-religious women. If the negative impact of patriarchy
disappears among less religious women, it can be argued that the causal relationship
between patriarchy and labor force participation is driven by religion.
Besides the direct impact, patriarchal norms can affect labor force participation
through fertility and education decisions as well. Women with a more traditional
mindset may value family more and start a family earlier than others. Internaliza-
tion of patriarchal norms can affect women’s age at first marriage, age at first birth
and fertility rate all of which are expected to negatively affect labor force participa-
tion. The correlation between fertility (number of living children) and patriarchy is
0.2360. The correlation between fertility preferences (ideal number of children) and
patriarchy is 0.0997. Although determining causality is complicated, the negative
association between fertility and female labor force participation is well established
in the literature (Bloom, Canning, Fink, & Finlay, 2007). In this study fertility is
not the main variable of interest, so I simply investigate how the impact of patriarchy
changes for women who have different fertility preferences by splitting the sample.
Another channel through which patriarchy can effect women’s labor force partici-
pation is education. Similar to the fertility preferences, women who have a traditional
mindset may put lower value on education and have a preference for family formation
instead of having an individual career. Moreover, families play an important role
in girls’ schooling decisions. My instrument, family conservatism, might be directly
affecting women’s years of schooling. Based on the results of field research conducted
in Ankara, Chapter 4 shows that for about fifty percent of women interviewed, the
84
schooling decision was taken by their families, mostly by their fathers. Fathers’ deci-
sions, on the other hand, to a large extent were shaped by cultural beliefs, concerns
about family honor and attempts to monitor daughters. Nationally conducted studies
analyzing gender inequalities in education also point out similar problems. Parent
education, which can be thought of as a proxy for cultural values, is found to be an
important determinant of girls’ schooling decision in many studies (Duman, 2010;
Tansel, 2002b; Rankin & Aytac¸, 2006). The correlation between years of schooling
and patriarchy is -0.4022 while the correlation between years of schooling and family
conservatism is -0.2829. To see if patriarchy has a separate effect on labor force par-
ticipation, I divide the sample according to education levels. If the negative effect of
patriarchy on labor force participation disappears among highly educated women, we
can argue that patriarchal norms lower participation mostly through their impact on
schooling decisions.
3.4.4 Instrumental Variable Estimation Results
Table 3.7 shows the summary statistics for the variables used in instrumental
variable estimations. The labor force participation rate in the urban sample is 31
percent, while non-agricultural labor force participation24 is 26 percent. The average
year of schooling is 6.2 and the mean age is 34.2. The mean patriarchy, religiosity
and family conservatism scales are 0.34, 0.49, and 0.39 respectively. The correlation
between patriarchy and family conservatism is 0.2212, not as low as to indicate a
problem of a weak instrument. With an F-statistic of 41.11 (larger than the rule of
thumb value of 10), family conservatism passes the weak instrument test (Table 3.8).
24Non-agricultural labor force participation rate includes women working in services and industry
plus the ones looking for jobs. There were 326 women in urban areas looking for jobs at the
time of survey but they were not asked weather they were seeking jobs in agricultural versus non-
agricultural sectors. In other words, this variable is an approximation to the standard definition of
non-agricultural labor force participation rate and it is expected to slightly overestimate the actual
rate.
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Diagnostics for non-linear models, IV-probit in this case, are not available. Therefore,
I report the diagnostics for linear probability model using ivregress in Table 3.7. Weak
instruments are property of first stage and first stages in ivregress and ivprobit are
identical; both give a t-statistic of 6.41 for family conservatism.
Table 3.9 presents IV-probit estimates of the impact of patriarchal norms on la-
bor force participation and non-agricultural labor force participation. According to
instrumental variable estimation results (specification 1), a 10 percent increase in the
patriarchy scale is associated with a decrease of 0.095 in the probability of labor force
participation and a decrease of 0.12 in the probability of non-agricultural labor force
participation. The signs and marginal effects of other control variables are, to a large
extent, similar in probit and IV-probit regression results. The instrumental variable
estimation results show that an extra year of schooling increases the probability of
labor force participation of a woman by 2.4 percent while an additional child under
age five decreases the probability by 6 percent. Addition of regional control variables
(specification 2) does not change the results significantly.
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Table 3.7: Summary Statistics for Variables in the Instrumental Variable Estimations
(Urban)
Variable Mean S.D. Min. Max. N
Labor force participation rate 0.31 0.46 0 1 5429
Non-agricultural labor force participation rate 0.26 0.44 0 1 5429
Patriarchy 0.34 0.19 0 1 5429
Religiosity 0.49 0.15 0 0.62 5429
Family conservatism 0.39 0.24 0 1 5426
Age 34.2 8.27 15 49 5429
Schooling 6.2 4.01 0 19 5429
Number of children under age 5 0.59 0.76 0 5 5429
Fertility (number of living children) 2.31 1.6 0 14 5429
Fertility preference (ideal number of children) 2.54 1.16 0 15 5355
Household size 4.74 2.09 1 22 5429
Wealth index 3.33 1.26 1 5 5429
Husband’s schooling 8.04 3.81 0 19 5399
Mother’s education 2.28 3 0 13 5367
Migration 0.34 0.47 0 1 5429
Female unemployment rate 19.91 6.99 9.6 36.1 5429
Share of service employment 46.62 10.31 25.08 72.41 5429
Export orientation 2.53 5.91 0.01 20.81 5429
Export share of ISIC 15-18 32.93 20.14 1.56 79.08 5429
Note: Non-agricultural labor force participation=non-agricultural employment + women
looking for jobs (both agricultural and non-agricultural jobs)
Source: TDHS-2008, Household Labor Force Surveys (female unemployment rate and
share of service employment), Foreign Trade Statistics and Annual Manufacturing Indus-
try Surveys (export performance variables).
Table 3.8: Instrumental Variable Estimation: First Stage Regression Summary Statis-
tics
Variable R2 Adjusted R2 Partial R2 Robust F (1,5309) Prob > F
Patriarchy 0.2031 0.1992 0.0077 41.1056 0
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Table 3.9: Instrumental Variable Estimation Results (Urban)
LFP Non-Agricultural LFP
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Patriarchy -0.955*** -0.978*** -1.231*** -1.245***
(0.245) (0.246) (0.159) (0.159)
Age 0.0216** 0.0216** 0.0124 0.0126
(0.011) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)
Age squared -0.0003** -0.0003* -0.0002 -0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling 0.0241** 0.0210** 0.0117 0.009
(0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Schooling squared -0.0073*** -0.007*** -0.0049*** -0.0047***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Schooling cubed 0.0005*** 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of children under 5 -0.0597*** -0.0586*** -0.0370*** -0.0359***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.010)
Household size 0.0054 0.0056 0.0041 0.0043
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Wealth Quintile 2 -0.0417* -0.0336 -0.0312 -0.0229
(0.024) (0.023) (0.023) (0.023)
Wealth Quintile 3 -0.0957*** -0.0855*** -0.0529** -0.0428*
(0.024) (0.024) (0.023) (0.023)
Wealth Quintile 4 -0.143*** -0.131*** -0.0869*** -0.0752***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.025) (0.024)
Wealth Quintile 5 -0.205*** -0.194*** -0.138*** -0.128***
(0.028) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027)
Husband’s schooling -0.0062*** -0.0058*** -0.0062*** -0.0057***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Mother’s education 0.0094*** 0.0092*** 0.0066*** 0.0064***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Migration -0.0032 -0.0029 0.0146 0.0143
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Note: Results continued on next page.
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Table 3.9 (continued): Instrumental Variable Estimation Results (Urban)
LFP Non-Agricultural LFP
(1) (2) (1) (2)
West Marmara 0.00589 -0.0398 -0.0106 -0.0512*
(0.028) (0.034) (0.025) (0.030)
Aegean 0.0756*** 0.0514* 0.0408* 0.0184
(0.026) (0.027) (0.023) (0.024)
East Marmara 0.0784*** 0.112*** 0.0526** 0.0955***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.022) (0.030)
West Anatolia -0.0590** -0.028 -0.0524* -0.0148
(0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.030)
Mediterranean -0.0118 -0.0008 -0.0177 0.0063
(0.024) (0.034) (0.023) (0.031)
Central Anatolia -0.0515* -0.0463 -0.0188 -0.00511
(0.031) (0.035) (0.027) (0.030)
West Black Sea 0.103*** 0.122*** 0.0746*** 0.107***
(0.024) (0.038) (0.022) (0.035)
East Black Sea 0.153*** 0.0576 -0.0301 -0.120***
(0.035) (0.048) (0.025) (0.034)
Northeast Anatolia -0.0731** -0.0982*** -0.0497* -0.0693**
(0.032) (0.035) (0.030) (0.032)
Central East Anatolia -0.115*** -0.156*** -0.0712** -0.100***
(0.032) (0.040) (0.028) (0.035)
Southeast Anatolia -0.0743** -0.142*** -0.0576** -0.126***
(0.029) (0.032) (0.027) (0.030)
Female unemployment rate -0.0014 -0.0022
(0.002) (0.001)
Service employment share -0.0002 0.0003
(0.001) (0.001)
Export share of ISIC 15-18 0.0024*** 0.0026***
(0.001) (0.001)
p-value Wald exogeneity test 0.0098 0.0095 0.0000 0.0000
Observations 5,336 5,336 5,336 5,336
Notes: Average marginal effects are reported. Robust standard errors are shown below
the marginal effects. For the second specification, standard errors are clustered at NUTS-
2 regional level. The data for regional control variables, female unemployment rate and
share of service employment, comes from the household labor force statistics. For the data
used in export share variable, see Appendix A. Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Dividing the sample based on religiosity shows that patriarchal norms have a neg-
ative impact on labor force participation for both sub-samples (Table 3.10). The
impact on labor force participation is bigger for women who have higher than average
religiosity scores, suggesting that religiosity contributes to the internalization of pa-
triarchal norms. However, for non-agricultural labor force participation patriarchal
norms seem to matter more than religiosity because the impact of patriarchy is bigger
among less religious women. In other words, there is evidence that patriarchy is a
channel that is separate from religion in reducing female labor supply in Turkey.
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Table 3.10: IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy according to Religiosity
(Urban)
LFP Non-Agricultural LFP
(1) (2) (1) (2)
Religiosity: <0.49 >0.49 <0.49 >0.49
Patriarchy -1.025 -0.906** -1.149* -1.268***
(0.723) (0.396) (0.615) (0.222)
Age 0.0485 0.0145 0.0338 0.00719
(0.038) (0.014) (0.034) (0.012)
Age squared -0.0008 -0.0002 -0.0006 -0.0008
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling -0.0011 0.0299** -0.0101 0.0144
(0.035) (0.013) (0.032) (0.011)
Schooling squared -0.0044 -0.0083*** -0.0036 -0.0051***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Schooling cubed 0.0004** 0.0005*** 0.0003* 0.0003***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of children under 5 -0.0829*** -0.0539*** -0.0700** -0.0273**
(0.030) (0.015) (0.027) (0.013)
Household size 0.0098 0.0048 0.0051 0.0045
(0.010) (0.004) (0.011) (0.004)
Wealth Quintile 2 -0.0278 -0.0404 0.027 -0.0373
(0.054) (0.026) (0.064) (0.025)
Wealth Quintile 3 -0.0907* -0.0967*** 0.0011 -0.0637**
(0.055) (0.027) (0.058) (0.025)
Wealth Quintile 4 -0.0933 -0.159*** 0.0004 -0.109***
(0.057) (0.029) (0.074) (0.027)
Wealth Quintile 5 -0.178*** -0.213*** -0.0743 -0.153***
(0.063) (0.033) (0.081) (0.030)
Husband’s schooling -0.0087** -0.0051** -0.0094** -0.0051***
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002)
Mother’s education 0.0093* 0.0098*** 0.0077* 0.0067***
(0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003)
Migration 0.0162 -0.0064 0.0139 0.0177
(0.025) (0.014) (0.024) (0.012)
Observations 1,205 4,131 1,205 4,131
Notes: Average marginal affects are reported. Robust standard errors are shown below
the marginal effects. Region dummies are included. Religiosity measures the intensity of
religious practice; fasting and namaz. The mean religiosity in the urban sample is 0.49.
Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
91
To investigate the impact of patriarchy on women with different fertility prefer-
ences, I divided the sample according to the ideal number of children. Table 3.11
presents the regression results. The impact of patriarchy is negative but not sta-
tistically significant for women who said zero or one child is ideal. The patriarchy
becomes statistically significant among the group with preference for two children,
and it exerts the strongest impact on women who have a preference for three or four
children. The results for five or more children are not meaningful probably because
of the sample size (only 248 observations).25
I analyze the impact of patriarchal norms on labor force participation for different
education groups separately to see if the negative impact still persists among highly
educated women. Table 3.12 presents the regression results for sub-samples divided by
completed level of education. For women without formal education, internalization
of patriarchal norms does not lower labor force participation. On the contrary, I
find a positive significant effect. This might be related to the occupations they get.
Based on a survival motive, these women might be working at the jobs no one else
wants. In that case, labor force participation is not a choice but necessity. Unpaid
family worker is the main category of employment for women without education
(Table 3.13). These women might be working at small ateliers and local shops owned
by family in the urban settings. Patriarchal norms are usually not an obstacle for
women’s work under these conditions; on the contrary women might be encouraged
to work since there is full-time monitoring during the work hours and workplaces
are usually close to their homes. The second biggest category is “working for her
own irregularly” which I believe is mostly piecework from home. For this group
of women, patriarchal norms might have led to lack of formal education or family
25When I split the sample based on number of living children instead of ideal number of children,
I get different results. Interestingly, patriarchy affects the women who have zero or one child most.
This contradiction might be related to using an incomplete fertility measure with number of only
living children. Further research with a complete measure of fertility might produce better results.
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conservatism might have deprived them from getting education. But later in their
life, they might need to work and get jobs that do not require formal education. For
secondary and higher education categories, I find a significant negative effect. The
high negative coefficient of patriarchy among women with higher education indicates
that patriarchal norms can affect labor force participation even if there is not a
problem of insufficient education.
93
Table 3.11: IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy According to Fertility
Preferences (Urban)
Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Ideal number of children: Zero/One Two Three/Four Five/More
Patriarchy -0.275 -1.100** -1.353*** 0.15
(1.111) (0.449) (0.186) (0.850)
Age 0.0629** 0.016 0.00442 0.0430*
(0.029) (0.018) (0.015) (0.023)
Age squared -0.0009** -0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0007**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling -0.0084 0.0209 0.0114 0.0907***
(0.036) (0.014) (0.013) (0.028)
Schooling squared -0.0016 -0.0071*** -0.005** -0.0154**
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006)
Schooling cubed 0.0003 0.0005*** 0.0003*** 0.0007**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Number of children under 5 -0.0926*** -0.0517** -0.0315** -0.02
(0.033) (0.021) (0.016) (0.031)
Household size 0.008 0.0077 0.002 -0.01
(0.013) (0.005) (0.005) (0.019)
Wealth Quintile 2 0.0236 0.0005 -0.0645** -0.0764
(0.106) (0.038) (0.032) (0.076)
Wealth Quintile 3 -0.051 -0.0585 -0.0720** -0.0595
(0.105) (0.038) (0.033) (0.088)
Wealth Quintile 4 -0.128 -0.0950** -0.111*** -0.0963
(0.134) (0.039) (0.035) (0.110)
Wealth Quintile 5 -0.0492 -0.155*** -0.202*** 0.0306
(0.163) (0.044) (0.038) (0.096)
Husband’s schooling -0.0054 -0.0061** -0.0041 -0.0084
(0.009) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007)
Mother’s education 0.0173** 0.0098*** 0.0022 0.0132
(0.008) (0.004) (0.003) (0.011)
Migration -0.0108 -0.0137 0.0088 0.0533
(0.052) (0.017) (0.017) (0.047)
Observations 517 2,641 1,929 248
Notes: Average marginal affects are reported. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Region dummies are included. Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
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Table 3.12: IV Estimation Results: The Impact of Patriarchy According to Education
Level (Urban)
Labor Force Participation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
No Education Primary E. Secondary E. Higher E.
Patriarchy 1.097* -0.605 -1.528*** -1.570***
(0.653) (0.555) (0.321) (0.225)
Age 0.0269** 0.0296* -0.0107 0.0265
(0.012) (0.018) (0.022) (0.018)
Age squared -0.0004** -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0005*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Schooling 0.0153* 0.0388 0.0184 0.0518***
(0.008) (0.032) (0.021) (0.020)
Number of children under 5 -0.0676** -0.0767*** -0.0710** -0.0493**
(0.033) (0.018) (0.029) (0.020)
Household size -0.0012 0.0051 0.0166* 0.0098
(0.007) (0.006) (0.010) (0.011)
Wealth Quintile 2 -0.0089 -0.0397 -0.227* 0.149
(0.037) (0.038) (0.129) (0.124)
Wealth Quintile 3 -0.0432 -0.0897** -0.247* 0.024
(0.075) (0.039) (0.133) (0.113)
Wealth Quintile 4 -0.0103 -0.150*** -0.284** 0.0338
(0.131) (0.045) (0.133) (0.111)
Wealth Quintile 5 -0.05 -0.234*** -0.381*** -0.0117
(0.147) (0.050) (0.135) (0.112)
Husband’s schooling 0.0021 -0.004 -0.0011 -0.006
(0.006) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Mother’s education -0.0033 0.0116*** 0.0118* 0.0027
(0.007) (0.003) (0.006) (0.004)
Migration -0.0092 0.0065 -0.0111 -0.029
(0.034) (0.019) (0.034) (0.021)
Observations 1,007 2,582 502 1,245
Notes: Average marginal affects are reported. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis.
Region dummies are included. Estimation is performed using STATA 13.0. Estimations with
non-agricultural labor force participation give similar results except the primary education
category. Patriarchy is significant in determining non-agricultural labor force participation
among primary school graduates.
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01.
95
T
ab
le
3.
13
:
J
ob
S
ta
tu
s
of
W
or
k
in
g
W
om
en
ac
co
rd
in
g
to
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
L
ev
el
(U
rb
an
)
N
o
e
d
u
c
a
ti
o
n
P
ri
m
a
ry
S
.
S
e
c
o
n
d
a
ry
S
.
H
ig
h
e
r
E
d
.
N
%
N
%
N
%
N
%
E
m
p
lo
ye
r
1
0.
1
10
0.
38
2
0.
4
17
1.
3
5
W
ag
ed
,
w
or
ke
r
(r
eg
u
la
r)
25
2.
42
13
3
5.
05
36
7.
11
18
2
14
.4
7
S
al
ar
ie
d
,
go
v
er
n
m
en
t
offi
ce
r
(r
eg
u
la
r)
0
0
0
0
0
0
21
1
16
.7
7
D
ai
ly
w
ag
ed
(s
ea
so
n
al
,
te
m
p
or
ar
y
)
37
3.
59
67
2.
54
5
0.
99
3
0.
2
4
F
or
h
er
ow
n
(r
eg
u
la
r)
16
1.
55
31
1.
18
15
2.
96
18
1.
4
3
F
or
h
er
ow
n
(i
rr
eg
u
la
r)
41
3.
97
15
0
5.
7
15
2.
96
40
3.
18
U
n
p
ai
d
fa
m
il
y
w
or
ke
r
48
4.
65
16
8
6.
38
13
2.
57
21
1.
6
7
O
th
er
0
0
3
0.
11
0
0
1
0.
08
C
u
rr
en
tl
y
n
ot
w
or
k
in
g
86
4
83
.6
2
20
71
78
.6
6
42
0
83
76
5
60
.8
1
T
ot
al
10
32
10
0
26
33
10
0
50
6
10
0
12
58
10
0
S
ou
rc
e:
T
D
H
S
-2
00
8.
96
3.5 Discussion
This chapter analyzes the role of two factors, patriarchal norms and religiosity, in
explaining female labor force participation puzzle of Turkey using cross-sectional data.
It suggests that Turkey’s divergence from the trends in other upper-middle income
countries might be explained by a combination of factors including lower levels of
education, lack of work-family reconciliation policies and affordable childcare services,
and a more patriarchal culture. Further cross-country research is necessary to make
a causal claim about the relative power of patriarchy in relation to other institutional
barriers in creating this divergence. The dynamic part of the puzzle, the declining
trend in female labor force participation rates during the last fifty years, is usually
explained by rapid structural transformation and urbanization (see Figures 2.5 and
2.6 in Chapter 2). For various reasons, women who work as unpaid family workers in
the rural areas withdraw from the labor force once they migrate to the cities. Lack of
decent job opportunities for low-skilled, poorly educated women plays an important
role in this withdrawal. Women with less than high school degree prefer to stay at
home knowing that they would have to spend most of their income on private care
if they take up low quality, informal jobs. In other words, the available jobs usually
do not offer higher wages than their reservation wage that is pulled up mainly by
the cost of private care. The patriarchal norms defining women’s primary role as a
caregiver also contribute to the formation of these preferences. When there is not
a satisfactory material reward from paid work, women might prefer the comfort of
being “the mistress of their own house” and the emotional relief of taking care of
their own children over the potential benefits of having a job and social life.
Data from the World Value Surveys for Turkey reveal that there has been a rise
in traditional values in the last three decades. For example, the importance of family
in people’s lives has increased since 1990 (Table 3.14). The importance of religion has
increased in the same period. The view that “a woman has to have children to be
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fulfilled” has become more accepted. The approval rate for female-headed households,
on the other hand, has decreased. The public support for gender discrimination in
the labor market has increased. In other words, patriarchal norms and religiosity
not only explain why female labor force participation in Turkey is lower than other
upper-middle income countries, but they might also be partially responsible for its
declining trends in Turkey. These trends also provide evidence for I˙lkkaracan’s adverse
path dependency argument. Given lack of demand-side challenges to the patriarchal
male breadwinner family model, the existing care regime and worsening labor market
conditions further strengthen Turkey’s gendered roles and patriarchal culture.
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3.6 Conclusion
My econometric analysis confirms the findings of the previous literature with re-
gard to the positive impact of education and the negative impact of childcare obli-
gations on the labor force participation of women. Both these effects are stronger
for urban women. I find that in both rural and urban areas, women are less likely
to work as the wealth status of the household increases. The effect is again stronger
among urban women. This suggests that women tend to participate in the labor force
only when the household needs a second wage earner. Otherwise, they tend to stay
at home.
To the best of my knowledge, this study is the first to establish a negative relation-
ship between women’s religious practice and labor force participation in Turkey. I find
a strong negative association in urban areas. This finding is important in the light of
the social transformation that Turkey has undergone during the last decade under the
Justice and Development Party’s rule. Pursuing an Islam-inspired social conservative
agenda, the Justice and Development Party intervened in the secular structure of
the country in various ways, especially transforming the education system. Religion
has increasingly become a more important aspect of daily life. This transformation
should be expected to influence women’s labor force participation negatively in the
future as well.
Another important finding is the negative association between patriarchal values
and labor force participation. It is not surprising to find that conservative values
become an obstacle in urban areas rather than rural, because in rural areas women
work mostly as unpaid family workers under the control of their husband/family.
However, the findings presented here pose a serious challenge for increasing urban
women’s labor force participation because they suggest that urbanization does not
automatically weaken the effect of conservatism.
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This study makes a contribution to the literature by establishing a causal relation-
ship between patriarchal norms and women’ labor force participation. In addition to
developing a preference against paid employment outside the home, internalization
of patriarchal norms can lower women’s labor force participation by increasing fer-
tility or reducing years of schooling. I find that the impact of patriarchy is stronger
for women who have higher fertility preferences, which might suggest that the causal
impact is driven by higher fertility. Among the different educational backgrounds, pa-
triarchal norms exert the highest impact on women with higher education. In other
words, they can be a barrier on labor force participation of even highly educated
women, further suggesting that there is a causal relationship between internalization
of patriarchal norms and lack of labor force participation.
However, it is important to note that even if a negative causal relationship is
identified, one should not take these values and preferences as exogenous and constant.
Case studies from around the world have shown that in the presence of demand for
women’s labor, or in the presence of a need for survival, women find ways of reconciling
their conservative values with working outside the home. It is a potentially fruitful
ground for further research to analyze changes in women’s labor market behavior as
a response to positive demand shocks, while accounting for their value systems.
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CHAPTER 4
“WORKING WOMEN WITHOUT EDUCATION ARE
DOOMED TO BE OPPRESSED”: WOMEN’S LABOR
MARKET DECISIONS AND EMPOWERMENT
4.1 Introduction
Understanding the gender gap in labor force participation requires a broader
methodological approach than the choice theoretical framework of the neoclassical
supply model. Neoclassical economists take preferences to be exogenous and focus on
actual behavior, explaining it with variation in prices and income. In other words,
they infer preferences from the observed behavior. As a result they explain house-
hold members’ decisions of time allocation to alternative activities by their relative
marginal productivities (Becker, 1985). Feminist economists, on the other hand, have
long been arguing that a choice theoretical framework based on utility maximization
does not completely explain women’s labor supply behavior because it ignores the
complex social factors that lead women to make different decisions than men under
a different set of “choices”. The prevailing ideologies about gender roles create ex-
pectations that men take up paid work and women take care of the family. These
expectations are incorporated as meta-preferences by individuals and affect their allo-
cation of time to paid work versus unpaid domestic labor. As Kabeer (2002) explains,
these social preferences do not translate mechanistically into individual preferences
which also are affected by the individual’s histories and experiences. Therefore an in-
vestigation of women’s preferences, besides their actual behavior, becomes important
to understand low female labor force participation.
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The empirical studies using available survey data reveal important correlates of
women’s labor force participation (Gu¨ndu¨z-Hos¸go¨r & Smits, 2006; Gu¨ner & Uysal,
2014; Go¨ksel, 2013; I˙lkkaracan, 2012; Uraz et al., 2010). However, they do not provide
any direct information about the actual decision making process in the household.
In this chapter, I analyze the actual decision making process of women using their
narratives from interviews about their life stories. As long as the traditional gender
division of labor prevails in the society, men and women will make systematically
different time allocation choices. To accommodate their responsibilities in the repro-
ductive sphere, women make different decisions with respect to investment in human
capital, choice of occupation, formal versus informal jobs, and part-time versus full-
time employment (I˙lkkaracan & Acar, 2007). Furthermore, there can be situations
where women are directly prevented from working outside the home due to religious,
cultural or social restrictions. In which case the “choice” premise of the neoclassical
model becomes irrelevant. Public opinion surveys provide some insights into the im-
portance of the husband/family’s consent for decision-making in Turkey. Based on
a survey conducted in forty-two provinces in 2008, a private research institute found
that 69 percent of the respondents agreed with the statement “women should acquire
husband’s consent to work” (KONDA, 2008). According to nationally representative
Demographic and Health Surveys, the main reason reported by women for not work-
ing outside was the lack of the partner’s/family’s consent for 25 percent (1998), 12
percent (2003), 21 percent (2008) and 15 percent (2013) of the respondents (TDHS
1998; 2003; 2008; 2013).
A much-debated issue concerning women’s employment is whether it creates em-
powerment. If paid work is not empowering and does not produce net welfare gains
for women, their absence from the labor market may be interpreted as a reflection
of their own preferences rather than a result of cultural and social barriers imposed
upon them. Of course, these preferences still need to be understood in a gender-
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discriminatory social, cultural and economic context (I˙lkkaracan, 2012). Therefore, I
also investigate the relationship between paid work and women’s employment using
various empowerment indicators.
The remainder of this chapter is organized in six sections. The next section
presents a brief literature review. In the third section, I explain my data and method-
ology. The fourth section analyzes women’s education decisions. In policy papers,
common diagnosis of the reason for Turkey’s low female labor force participation rates
is the low level of female education (I˙lkkaracan & Acar, 2007). When it comes to
explaining low levels of education for women, the under-participation trap hypoth-
esis, put forward in recent papers (World Bank, 2009; Taymaz, 2009), holds that
urban women with high homemaking productivity prefer to stay at home because
they do not receive the full return to their investment in education if they engage in
market work. Being in the under-participation trap, these women further lower their
ex-ante investment in education because it is not useful for home production. The
World Bank study recognizes the role of families in making the decision for girls and
argues that low wages and returns to education cause families to under-invest in the
education of girls. In this section, I analyze the validity of this hypothesis through
women’s explanations of their past schooling decisions.
In the fifth section, I deconstruct women’s labor force participation decisions. I
analyze to what extent actual behavior (participation or non-participation) is a result
of free “choice”. I explore preferences and aspirations of non-participant women.
Additionally, I consider their views about policies to encourage women’s employment.
In the sixth section, I investigate women’s responses to the recent pro-natalist
discourse initiated by the Prime Minister Erdog˘an.1 There is a well-established nega-
tive relationship between fertility and female labor supply in the empirical literature.
1Recep Tayyip Erdog˘an is currently the President of the country. He was the Prime Minister
when the field research for this chapter was conducted, July-August 2013.
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How Turkish women are going to be affected by this discourse, launched by a popular
leader, may prove to be important in terms of its implications for the labor market
outcomes. In the seventh section I examine the relationship with employment and
women’s empowerment in various dimensions. Finally, I conclude.
4.2 Literature Review
Notwithstanding its limitations, the majority of Turkish economists have used
an individual rational choice framework in explaining women’s labor market behav-
ior (Dayıog˘lu & Kasnakog˘lu, 1997; O¨zar & Gu¨nlu¨k-S¸enesen, 1998; Tansel, 2002a;
Bas¸levent & Onaran, 2003; Gu¨ndu¨z-Hos¸go¨r & Smits, 2008; Taymaz, 2010). A few
of them have included cultural values into the analysis and have shown that there is
some correlation between having progressive values and engaging in paid work (Gu¨ner
& Uysal, 2014; Go¨ksel, 2013; Gu¨ndu¨z-Hos¸go¨r & Smits, 2008; Uraz et al., 2010). Al-
though the correlation between cultural value proxies, such as “if the bride’s money
was paid during the wedding,” and labor market outcomes indicates that women’s
decisions are not based on pure economic calculations, they need to be unpacked to
reveal the actual causal processes. In this chapter I employ a qualitative methodology
to explain the causal processes driving women’s labor market decisions. I adopt an
integrative approach that emphasizes both structure and agency in the process of
decision making, as suggested by Kabeer (2002). The in-depth interview questions
were designed to reveal the importance of women’s individual aspirations and views
on one hand and structural obstacles on the other hand. This framework is outlined
in Figure 4.1.
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Figure 4.1: Alternative Frameworks to Explain Women’s Labor Market Behavior
Source: Kabeer (2002)
Women’s chances in the labor market are closely related to their past schooling
decisions. Cultural values and families’ control over their daughters might affect
girls’ schooling decisions. National studies analyzing gender inequalities in education
also point out the role of culture. Parent education, sometimes taken as a proxy for
cultural values, is found to be an important determinant of girls’ schooling decision
(Tansel, 2002b; Rankin & Aytac¸, 2006; Duman, 2010). Therefore, I analyze women’s
past schooling decisions in a separate section.
Different approaches attach different degrees of transformatory potential to women’s
access to paid work. According to the school of thought know as the New House-
hold Economics, power is irrelevant in intra-household decisions and therefore it does
not matter who earns the money. Household bargaining models, on the other hand,
consider paid work as a sufficient condition to bring a shift in intra-household power
relations by improving women’s fallback position (Manser & Brown, 1980; McElroy &
Horney, 1981; Lundberg & Pollak, 1993). The role of ideology and perceptions is also
incorporated into the bargaining models. For example, Amartya Sen (1990) argues
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that the relative bargaining positions of individuals also depend on perceived interest
and perceived contribution functions. How the relative contributions of household
members are perceived depends on the form of contribution (market vs. subsis-
tence production, outside vs. domestic labor, etc.). Since employment creates a
visible monetary contribution, it is expected to increase women’s bargaining posi-
tion by changing the perceptions. Perceived interest, on the other hand, can operate
unconsciously through differences in internalized views of self-worth (Sen, 1990) or
consciously through compliance if women are aware of their weaker fallback positions
(Agarwal, 1997). Employment can empower women by increasing their self-confidence
and self-worth to the extent that it brings social recognition.
The relationship between paid work and empowerment is a highly debated issue
in the broader feminist literature, as well. Some argue that women’s economic inde-
pendence is a necessary condition, if not a sufficient one, for empowerment (Engels,
1972; Kessler-Harris, 2001; Bergmann, 2005). Others argue that the degree to which
labor market engagement liberates women depends on their class positions. If women
are pushed into wage labor due to economic difficulties and get low quality jobs, they
would not benefit but only face double exploitation (Humphries, 1977; Hartmann,
1981; Elson, 1999; Kabeer, 2002). Macro data allow us to see how the Turkish women
are disproportionately concentrated in low paid, low security jobs, especially in the
informal sector2, suggesting that the transforming potential of such work would be
limited. But they do not provide any account of the impact of paid work on women’s
lives. In this chapter, I seek to fill this gap by analyzing the relationship between paid
work and empowerment, comparing experiences of two groups of women. Currently
employed women are expected to be more powerful in comparison to full-time home
makers at least in some of the empowerment indicators.
2Informal employment rate was 52 percent for women and 30.2 percent for men in 2013 according
to Household Labor Force Statistics.
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There are few case studies examining the relationship between paid work and
women’s empowerment in Turkey. I˙lkkaracan (2012) presents the results of a field sur-
vey conducted in U¨mraniye sub-province of Istanbul in 1997. She finds that employed
women have comparatively more decision-making power with respect to engagement
in the public sphere, joining a political party, pursuing education, managing personal
income, birth control, and how to dress. Erman, Kalaycıog˘lu & Rittersberger-Tilic
(2002) analyze the employment experiences of migrant women based on field research
conducted in squatter settlements of four big cities. They find that labor force par-
ticipation did not lead to empowerment for the majority of migrant women, because
their engagement in the public sphere did not necessarily lessen their families’ social
control. Migrant families used various ways to control women’s behavior when they
were away from home, so that they had very limited decision making power. Although
earning money increased their bargaining power, they were still subordinates under
their husband’s control.
Bes¸pınar (2010) analyzes women’s agency and their work-related strategies using
a critical feminist approach. Her study is based on interviews with both employed
women and full time homemakers from different classes in Istanbul. She finds that
the main obstacles to employment are husband’s opposition because of patriarchal
values and religious beliefs for working class women, and motherhood for middle-class
women. Her main finding is that women across all classes develop individual strate-
gies based on their specific circumstances. These strategies meet women’s individual
practical needs and bring empowerment in the form of short-term personal advan-
tages but are far from bringing collective empowerment in the long run. For a working
class widowed woman, for example, wearing a fake wedding ring or wearing a veil are
concessions that provide protection from potential harassment in the workplace, but
makes other women who are not veiled more vulnerable. Becoming a “super wife,”
by shouldering all the responsibilities related to childcare and housework while also
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working outside, is another way for working or middle class women to earn their
husband’s approval. Although it ameliorates women’s position in the short-run, it
is far from changing the gender roles. Even upper middle class women use short-
term strategies by adapting a conservative dress code and developing gender-neutral
attitudes in the workplace to avoid gossip and accusations about their sexuality.
These studies focus mostly on decision-making power in the household as an indi-
cator of empowerment. Here I use a broader notion of empowerment that focuses not
only on decision making in the household and control over income but also includes
women’s agency; awareness with regard to government’s work and family related poli-
cies; willingness to question gendered division of labor in the household; and mental
health and control over their own lives. A recently published report, entitled “Fam-
ily, Work and Gender in Turkey,” captures some of these empowerment indicators.
As part of the International Social Survey Program (ISSP), the report is based on
a nationally representative field survey conducted in February-April 2013. The re-
spondents (both male and female) were asked multiple questions about family and
work life, motherhood, and relationship with the spouse. The report concludes that
a majority of respondents sees women predominantly as homemakers. While most
believe that both men and women should contribute to the household income, they
think that a woman’s main role is to stay at home and raise children. Both women
and men recognize that housework is not fairly distributed in their families, although
much fewer men accept that they do not do their fair share. Moreover, realizing the
existence of an unfair distribution in the house does not create different results for
men and women in terms of satisfaction with life. Both men and women tend to
express that they are overall happy and content. Therefore, it can be concluded that
the unfair distribution of housework and the double burden employed women face are
widely internalized (C¸arkog˘lu & Kalaycıog˘lu, 2013).
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4.3 Data and Methodology
This chapter is based on field research conducted in Sincan county of Ankara,
Turkey’s capital city, during July and August in 2013. Among many counties of
Ankara, I choose Sincan for two reasons. First, it is one of the biggest industrial
centers of Ankara, with two organized industry zones. In comparison to neighbor-
ing counties, it is a leading center for services and trade. In other words, there is
some employment opportunity for women outside of agriculture; therefore a choice is
available, at least in principle, between seeking for paid work and staying at home.
Second, it is a relatively conservative settlement3 receiving a lot of migration from
Central Anatolia, and in this respect I believe it resembles Turkey’s country profile
better than other counties of Ankara. However, the sample is too small to generalize
the findings for the entire urban population in Turkey.
I interviewed employed women in their workplaces and full-time homemakers in
their apartments. Semi-structured interviews were guided by thematic questions cat-
egorized under five topics: demographic information, current and past economic ac-
tivity, schooling and employment decisions, government’s policies to increase women’s
employment, and empowerment (use of own income, decision-making in the house,
sexual division of labor, gender role attitudes, mental health and self-confidence).4
The interviews were audio-recorded with the women’s permission and then tran-
scripted. I utilized the purposeful sampling method to reach employed women from
different demographic profiles5, and the snowball sampling method to reach women
3In 2011 general elections, Sincan had a 65% voting rate for the current conservative ruling party,
the Justice and Development Party.
4See Appendix B for the in-depth interview questions.
5To reach employed women I went to the biggest organized industry zone in Sincan and I talked
to the general administration to learn which companies employ women workers. Then, I went to
the working places and asked managers if I could interview their workers. With their permission I
chose one to four women from each working place. Managers provided me a room for the private
interviews. I distributed my contact information to the women interviewed at this stage to reach full
time homemakers. The main challenge in the organized industry zone was to get permission from
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without jobs, approaching them through their neighbors or acquaintances starting
from some key contacts. I interviewed 34 women in total (18 employed, 16 not cur-
rently employed). The demographic profiles of interviewees and sample statistics can
be found in Appendix A (Tables A6 and A7). Ethics approval for the protection of
human subjects was obtained from the University of Massachusetts Amherst Institu-
tional Review Board.
4.4 Schooling Decision
Twenty-four women out of the 34 in my sample do not have a high school degree.
A few of them actually started high school but did not finish. I asked women without
a high school degree why they did not continue their education. Their answers can
be classified as follows:
Table 4.1: Reasons Why Women Choose not to Continue Their Education, Women
with Less than High School Degree
Reasons for not continuing education Number of women
1. I did not want to 5
2. Health problems 1
3. Early marriage 2
4. Financial difficulties 2
5. My father/family did not allow me 5
6. There was no school in my home village 3
Combination of 4 and 5 3
Combination of 5 and 6 3
Total 24
Women who said that it was their own decision not to continue (reason #1)
generally did not give any specific reason why they stopped after primary or secondary
school. They mostly say they do not remember what made them prefer to stay at
managers to interview production workers during the working hours. I was able to interview only
two women working in the production. The rest of the employed women either occupy managerial
positions or they are responsible for food/tea service and cleaning in the workplaces.
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home. As an exception, S¸ebnem says that she admired her older sisters making
doilies6 at home. S¸ule, on the other hand, states that she really does not know, but
she regrets it now.
Sinem is among the women who left school because of early marriage. She left
secondary school incomplete and married when she was sixteen. She explains that it
was not her decision:
No, we did not have any say over it at those times once families decided
on the marriage. I learnt that I was engaged fifteen days after getting en-
gaged. [...] I wanted to go to school.
—Sinem, 47, married, service worker
Five women mentioned financial difficulties as an obstacle for them to get further
education. Six of them explained that the lack of secondary or high school in their
village was the reason. Eleven women stated that their father or family did not allow
them to continue. Yelda explains why she stopped after primary school:
Why did not I continue? My father had the mindset that ‘girls do not
go to school.’ He had that mindset at first, and then as his children grew
older, he became more open to the idea of girls getting higher levels of
education. But since I was the oldest child, that mindset was imposed on
me, you know, the idea that I am supposed to ‘finish the primary school
and stop.’ Because of that mindset I became lazier; I did not have the
enthusiasm for higher education. Others, my younger siblings, were going
to get education. But I have always felt the deficiency of not continuing
my education. Material conditions affected as well: one father (single in-
come), four kids, and livelihood hardships...
—Yelda, 32, married, production worker
Feride likewise explains why she stopped after primary school:
What can I say? My father did not send me to school... He did not
send me because he was scared that I would find a husband by myself
6A small ornamental piece of lace or linen used to protect a surface from scratches by hard objects
or to decorate rooms. In Turkey, there is a habit of making doily among girls to get prepared for
marriage. The decorative pieces of doily are made for the future homes.
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(laughs). He believed that girls find a husband if they go to school.
—Feride, 39, married, homemaker
Similarly, Melike could not continue after primary school because:
My family did not allow me. They said if a girl goes to school, she
becomes more open (she means both physically and mentally), becomes
less respectful to her mother and father. That’s why they did not send me.
—Melike, 38, married, homemaker
Selma, who quit primary school in her third year, explains:
My father did not send me to school because my teacher was male.
—Selma, 52, married, homemaker
For about half of the women who do not have high school degrees, the educa-
tion decision was taken by their families, mostly by their fathers. Hence they never
actually had the chance to weigh the opportunity cost of getting education versus spe-
cializing in homemaking. The under-participation trap hypothesis explains women’s
decisions not to continue schooling in terms of low returns to education, due to the
low expected probability of getting a university degree. Yet many women are simply
not in the position to make the decision in the first place. Moreover, most say that
they would have chosen to continue their schooling, had it been up to them. Fathers,
as decision makers, did not appear to be interested in prospective economic returns,
as the women’s narratives show. Their decisions instead were shaped by cultural
beliefs, concerns about family honor, and attempts to monitor daughters.
In some cases, the interaction between material conditions (namely the lack of
schools in villages) and families’ conservatism was cited as the main obstacle for
women’s education. Pelin could not go to high school because:
There was not a high school in our village; we needed to go to the
city for school. Nobody was sending his daughter to the city because girls
would have needed to take the buses with (male) workers.
—Pelin, 29, married, service worker
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For women who have a high school degree, the primary reason for not getting a
college degree seems to be marriage. Three of them state that they stopped education
because they got married. One woman says that she did not have the opportunity;
she failed the general university entrance exam once and could not try again because
she needed to support the family. Another left college after her first year, because
she realized that she made a wrong choice about her major.7 Finally, one woman did
not go to college because she did not have a score high enough for her desired major
and did not want to go for another major.
4.5 Labor Force Participation Decision
4.5.1 Freedom to Choose
Eighteen out of the 34 women in my sample are currently working. An additional
five have worked at some point in their lives but are not currently working. I asked
these 23 women why they decided to take up paid employment. Table 4.2 summarizes
their main reasons.
7In Turkey, university education is regulated with a national exam (OSS). After taking the exam
high school graduates are assigned to university according to their performance and their ranking
of majors and universities. Therefore, students have to make their major decisions when they take
the exam.
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Table 4.2: Reasons Why Women Decide to Take up Paid Work, Ever-employed
Women
Reasons for taking up paid work (ever-employed women) Women
1. I wanted to have social security 1
2. For psychological reasons (after divorce) 2
3. In order to satisfy my personal needs 2
4. To support my family/spouse 2
5. I wanted to work/women should work 2
6. For my children to get a better education 1
7. Survival (after loss of husband’s income through death/job loss/divorce) 3
8. I was bored after school, I wanted to have an occupation 2
A combination of 3 and 4 6
A combination of 3 and 5 1
A combination of 4 and 5 1
Total 23
Most of these women were able to make working decisions by themselves without
encountering serious objections from their family or spouses. However, five among
23 ever-worked women reported that they had to fight with objections from their
families or spouses and eventually convinced them. I˙pek struggled with her father’s
objection:
After high school I was looking for jobs. But my father did not allow
me to work because I was raised in a small place. Now Yenikent is almost
becoming a town, it was like a village. In those times, if a woman wanted
to work, she could not even go to bazaar let alone work. [...] One day a
highly respected old woman in our village who was cooking for workers in
a small firm came to talk to my father. She said to my father, ‘This firm
is looking for a secretary, let I˙pek work there. We will go to the workplace
together and we will come back together.’ My father said no: ‘She does
not need to work. What is she going to do by working?’ Because when
a young beautiful woman worked at those times, people would have seen
her in a different way. Next morning I left early for the job. There were
a lot of fights that day. Then afterwards as I paid our bills and helped
with all sorts of expenses, my father became less critical. Now my family
is totally supportive. They are happy that I will get retired in ten years
and live more comfortably.
I˙pek, 30, single, accounting supervisor
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Berna (29, married, saleswoman) also faced her family’s opposition at first but
eventually convinced them: “I convinced them by saying that only women come to
this store. They came and visited me. They saw that all the customers are woman,
so they are harmless.” Zehra started to work when her husband lost his job. She had
to struggle to have his approval:
I found the job myself with a lot of effort. My husband did not accept.
I resisted. It took one year for him to accept but eventually I succeeded.
I said I will stand on my own feet and I did. [...] Nobody supported me
except my mother. Only she said, ‘Go and work my daughter. As long
as you work with your namus (honor) nobody can do harm to you.’ My
mother-in-law and father-in-law had the mindset that women do not work.
—Zehra, 47, married, service worker
Yelda (32, married, production worker) began working when she was about thir-
teen. Her family supported her decision because they needed money for the education
of her younger siblings. When she got engaged, however, her fiance´e did not want her
to work:
We are working here in the same place with my husband. This is where
we have actually met. He had a somewhat conservative mindset. He said
‘after the marriage you stay at home, I will take care of you.’ I’m not
a controllable woman, I never have been. I said I would work. During
the engagement process, he insisted that I quit the job. We broke off the
engagement. I said ‘even my father let me work; he is not a conservative
man. I could not continue my education not because he did not let me
but because of material conditions. I can easily find a husband like you.
I do not want to quit my job.’ The separation lasted about ten days. He
came after ten days allowing me to work after marriage.
Eleven out of 34 women have never worked outside the home. Only two said that
it was their decision not to seek paid work, although one of them explained that her
husband’s disapproval was the reason why she did not even consider it. Interviews
with the remaining nine women revealed that they were deprived of the opportunity
to make their own choices. Some of these women are actually so eager to get paid
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work that they see employment as a dream that they could never have. When I asked
if she ever worked outside the home, Feride answers:
No, it was my only dream. I always wanted to work. Even now I want
to work but it is not possible because of children, lack of education, lack
of a profession, I don’t know. At first, there were family restrictions, and
then after marriage there were husband’s restrictions. We just accepted
to be housewives but I still dream about working. I did not even have a
desire to work before marriage, how could I? They did not even let me
get an education; they would have never allowed me to work. Can a girl
who does not go to school, work? There was no such thing. In fact we
were not given such a dream. Then as we grow, it remained as a dream.
But I still hope that I will work some day. I don’t know when. Children
have already grown up I still wait. I don’t know what I’m still waiting
for. But everybody, even my children, get upset when I bring up the issue.
—Feride, 39, married, homemaker
Nilufer’s (33, homemaker) husband wants her to take care of the children but she
says that jealousy is the real reason behind his objection: “he is a little jealous; he
does not send me out”. Husbands’ jealousy came up multiple times in the interviews
as a constraining factor. It can prevent woman from working even from home, as the
case of Selma shows:
He (her husband) did not even allow me to baby-sit in my own house-
why didn’t he want me to? ‘What if the father comes to pick up the
baby when he is not around?’ he said. He is very jealous. [...] But I
took my revenge; I did not send him abroad (laughs). He wanted to go
to Germany to work; I did not let him because he did not allow me to work.
—Selma, 52, married, homemaker
Behind the husbands’ jealousy and attempts to control women by imprisoning
them to the house, there is the concept of namus (honor). Namus is a “type of sex-
ual honor that presupposes the physical8 and moral qualities that women ought to
have” (Sever & Yurdakul, 2001, p. 973). Namus is one of the reasons why fathers or
8Namus is related to virginity and chastity of women before marriage.
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husbands feel justified when they exercise full control over women’s mobility. The pa-
triarchal control of women’s sexual behavior because of jealousy and possessiveness
is not unique to Middle Eastern culture, of course. But “namus-related control is
substantially more all-encompassing, because it is derived directly from cultural per-
ceptions, expectations, and judgments and is not based on the controlling behavior
of an individual man” (Sever & Yurdakul, 2001, p. 973). Sometimes namus is threat-
ened only by groundless gossip, not even the actual behaviors of women. For example,
Berna’s family felt threatened by potential male customers coming to the store. I˙pek
understood her father’s objection (although did not submit) because “when a young
beautiful woman worked at those times, people would have seen her in a different
way.”
4.5.2 Aspirations
In order to understand how they perceive working life and working women, I asked
additional questions to the women who have never taken paid employment. As we
have seen, the majority of these women are not free to choose. I explored what paid
employment would have meant to them, and why they would want to work if they
had a chance. I asked them what would have been the biggest difference in their lives
if they had a chance to get paid employment. Two main aspirations emerge in their
answers. The first is to be economically independent. They find it unpleasant to ask
for money or for permission in their purchases. The desire to be able to spend money
as they wish also shows that they are economically constrained:
You would have had economic freedom. For instance, you can spend
your own money without any problem.
—Aliye, 27, married
You would have had your own money; you would not have to ask your
husband. You would have purchased whatever you wanted. This is very
important. You would not have been dependent on men.
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—Ebru, 42, married
I would have said ‘this is my money.’ I would have shown it to every-
body and said ‘this is my money; I can do anything with this money.’
—S¸ebnem, 36, married
I don’t know, spending without any problem, shopping without prob-
lem.
—Feride, 39, married
I don’t know, what would have been the big difference? I love my
house; I would have bought better furniture.
—Neriman, 25, married
The second aspiration is to provide better living standards for their children.
Because of financial constraints, they feel insufficient ability to meet children’s needs.
The feeling of insufficiency about the children’s education is also related to increasing
costs of education. Many of them express that they want to send their children to
higher quality private schools but cannot afford it.9 Moreover, their answers also
reveal that children’s happiness and future are more important than their own well-
being for most women.
We would have been more comfortable both financially and mentally.
In terms of the children’s future, it would have been much better. Right
now, my children are going to school. I happily buy one type of school
supply, but for the second one I have to think twice whether I can afford
it or not.
—Nilu¨fer, 33, married
I would have helped my children; I would have spent for my grand-
children.
—Selma, 52, married
9The increasing cost of education is related to the highly competitive university entrance exam.
The success in the central exam has been increasingly more dependent on private after-school support
through tutors or dershane (weekend schools specialized only in curriculum related to the central
exam).
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I would have purchased everything that my children want. I mean it is
very difficult for me, not being able to get what they want. Before getting
my own needs, I would have bought everything that they wished for.
—O¨zge, 39, married
When I asked them what they think about women with jobs in general, they
mostly expressed feelings of envy and appreciation:
I admire them a lot.
—S¸ebnem, 36, married
I see it as a big accomplishment especially for mothers.
—Aliye, 27, married
They are doing the best thing. They are not dependent on men. We
are dependent; we eat if they bring food, we don’t if they don’t bring. I
want my daughter to get education and work. I always tell her ‘don’t be
like me, don’t be dependent on your husband.’
—Nilu¨fer, 33, married
I think they are freer than us. They are more independent and self-
confident. They feel stronger. I mean I’m sure they are stronger than me
no matter what kind of job they are doing, how much they earn. I believe
they are stronger than me.
Feride, 39, married
What can I think of? Everyone would be happy if she works. I wish I
were able to work.
—Ebru, 42, married
There are also women who do not consider earning their own income as a pathway
to empowerment, but only an extra source for the family.
I don’t know. I don’t have a general idea. It is an extra income for
the house.
—Neriman, 25, married
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The ones who have a more traditional mindset think that women should work but
never challenge their husband’s main breadwinner role in the house. O¨zge suggests
her daughters to adopt some “wielding and yielding” strategies:
I like working women. They have self-confidence; they can stand on
their feet. God forbid if something bad happens to them, they would not
lean on anyone. But women should not bring up money issues inside the
family. As housewives they should not say to their husbands ‘if you earn
money, I earn too.’ There would be unrest in the house if they do that.
I warn my daughters about this. I tell them they should not bring up
money issues, even if they earn five thousand liras. Otherwise they would
not have a peaceful family.
—O¨zge, 39, married
The common perception of women who did not have a chance to get paid em-
ployment is that employed women are freer, more self-confident, and that they can
spend money as they wish. To exercise some degree of independent purchasing power
is very appealing to all of them. Some women, however, see women’s income as only
an extra financial resource for the house without expressing awareness of its eman-
cipatory potential. Some others are actually afraid of that potential, and argue that
women’s employment should not change the domestic dynamics in the house.
4.5.3 Policies to Encourage Women’s Employment
During the interviews, I explained to the interviewees my motivation for doing
this research. After informing them about three types of policies government has
initiated, or plans to initiate in the near future, I asked for their opinions. These
policies are as follows:
• Discount in social security payments of employers if they hire women.10
• Subsidizing day care for employed women (A 300TL subsidy that goes to private
day care centers).
10The 2008 Employment Package, Law No. 5763.
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• Creating part time/flexible jobs for women.
In their responses, subsidizing day care comes to the fore among the three, with
an overwhelming support from women. S¸ule, for instance, argues that it would be
the most effective way of encouraging women’s employment:
Most of the women with children don’t work because they know half
of their wages would go the cre`ches. They say, ‘what is the point of work-
ing if I spend half of my wage on day care. I would rather take care of
my children.’ I know because I experienced it myself. [] I thought about
working five or six years ago. There was nobody I could leave the children
with. If this opportunity was present at the time, perhaps I would have
started working then.
—S¸ule, 32, divorced, service worker
On the other hand, a few of them are not satisfied with the amount of the day
care subsidy, and therefore are skeptical that it will work. Aycan complains, “But
the crches are not that cheap. I, for instance, wanted to send my child to a private
crche, but could not afford it. It is 1300 lira, school bus included. It is a very high
quality place.” I˙smet points out the problem with older age kids: “What are they
going to do when the child is over-crche age? They will hire a private baby-sitter;
pay that 300 lira to her. What is the point?”
There are different opinions about flexible jobs. Some of them, especially currently
working women, think that the part-time jobs would not be attractive enough because
of the wages. On the other hand, some others think that it can be a solution for women
constrained by their families because of the care work. Nilu¨fer says, “Not everything
is about money. Perhaps it is psychologically easier for a woman, especially with
little children, to be able to spend more time at home at the expense of earning less
money.”
The social security payment arrangement did not elicit many specific comments.
However, there was one positive discrimination suggestion that was more direct than
the subsidy to employers. Nilu¨fer suggests putting a quota on workplaces to hire
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women: “For instance, they can say that factories need to hire 60 percent women and
40 percent men, they can enforce this for both public and private companies.”
A few interesting ideas came up when I asked if they had any other policy sug-
gestions to increase women’s participation. Two relatively older employed women,
Zehra and Dilek, argue for the elimination of maximum age limit in the new hires. As
a widowed woman who had to enter into labor force late, Dilek states, “Any healthy
person can work. If they abolish the limit, maybe fewer women would end up being
on the streets.”
A second group of women, seeing conservative mindset of men as the main obsta-
cle, points out the difficulty of changing mentalities. Ferdane says:
We need to educate men. For instance, when I was young I really
wanted to continue my education. But my father did not let me. I’m still
regretful about it. I think we really need to educate men. If we can do
that, many things can get better.
—Ferdane, 36, married, security guard
I really don’t know. Men rule in Turkey, in our house as well. The
majority of men don’t want their wives to work. They want her to take
care of the kids and the house. They say that is enough for women. I
don’t know what to say; I think it is all because of men.
—Fahriye, 44, married, homemaker
Another group of women emphasize the necessity of family-work reconciliation
policies. Funda wants the state to step up and help private business about paid
maternity leave:
All women have worries about it, thinking that ‘I’m going to take
maternity leave, does it create inconvenience for my company? They are
going to think that they are wasting money.’ The state can pay some part
of the employers’ share. And also many women are having trouble when
they return after maternity leave. About that, maybe the state can spec-
ify a certain time period during which companies have to employ workers
after maternity leave. Some companies use maternity leave as an excuse
to get rid of workers that they don’t want and hire new ones.
—Funda, 33, single, management representative
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Elif brings up a brilliant idea for the socialization of childcare:
My personal opinion is that the state should always support working
families with children. How? For instance, say an employer pays 180 liras
per person as a security payment to the state. It is not all security money;
there are some deductions for administrative services, etc. Say only 150
liras is our security money, the rest goes to the deductions. When a person
starts to work with insurance, the state could put a minor deduction for
childcare as well. Even if it is a small amount, it accumulates and can
finance public cre`ches.
—Elif, 30, single, accounting supervisor
To sum up, women’s policy suggestions are centered on three issues. The first
and the most important constraint for them is childcare responsibility, which is why
they like the idea of day care subsidy. Secondly, several women think that the major
problem is conservative mentality of men, and that it is very hard to do something
about this. Some call for education, some believe that “women have to go through in-
dividual struggles to work” in this cultural context. Finally, they want discrimination
based on age to end.
4.6 Fertility Decisions: State Intervention in Reproduction
Turkey has been implementing restrictive population policies since the 1960s.
However, pro-natalist rhetoric encouraging fertility was introduced by Prime Min-
ister Erdog˘an in 2008. Since his first speech on the issue11, Erdog˘an in various public
occasions has aggressively demanded three children from couples to prevent popula-
tion aging. Against criticisms of interference with private life, Erdog˘an presents his
demand as a scientifically proven necessity for sustaining economic growth:
According to scientific numbers, having even two children means being
in decline. This would never sustain the current situation and we would
have an aged population after 2030, not even 2050. If you have three
11Hu¨rriyet Archive, “Erdog˘an: Give birth to at least three children,” 7 March 2008.
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children, this will sustain the current situation of Turkey; maintain our
population advantage.12
At some speeches he uses this powerful language: “I am calling on those sisters
who are devoted to our cause. Come; please donate to this nation at least three
children.”13 While the choice of word “donate” is reminiscent of fascism, he also
reveals his views on women’s role in a society, confining them to the reproductive
sphere. The government’s intention behind the “at least three children” rhetoric and
the goal of keeping the population young has been questioned widely in Turkey’s
academic circles and among feminist activists.
Sayan (2013) summarizes the main arguments put forward by the supporters of
pro-natalist rhetoric as (i) concerns over inadequate labor supply; (ii) boosting do-
mestic demand through population increase; (iii) concerns over increasing public ex-
penditures with rising numbers of elderly; and (iv) decreasing worker-to-retiree ratios
in the pay-as-you-go social security system. Supporters are mainly concerned about
labor supply. They argue that if the fertility rate does not increase, labor supply will
decrease. This argument is based on the assumption that if fertility does not increase
above 2, the working-age population will eventually decrease. This assumption is not
wrong, because the fertility rate necessary for population renewal is estimated at 2.1.
However, it is not clear why the falling working age population is a problem in a
country that cannot create employment for the existing labor supply anyway.
The demographic window of opportunity is still open in Turkey. Hos¸go¨r and Tansel
(2010) estimate that Turkey’s working age population will reach its maximum in 2041,
and afterward will start to diminish. In order to benefit from the demographic window
12Ntvmsnbc, “Erdog˘an: At least three children before it is too late,”
http://www.ntvmsnbc.com/id/25008774/, 10 October 2009.
13Al monitor, “Erdog˘an insists demanding three children,” http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/08/erdogan-asks-turks-to-have-three-children.html, 13 August
2013.
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of opportunity, however, a country must create sufficient employment for the working-
age population and invest in health and education. Turkey, on the contrary, has very
high unemployment rates (9.7% in 2013) despite the low labor force participation
rates (50.9% in 2013)14, and approximately 40% of the working age population are
employed in low quality informal jobs that do not require higher levels of education.
Moreover, in their concerns about the possible lack of labor supply, supporters of
the “at least three children” rhetoric seem to (purposely or not) ignore the fact that
the labor supply is not only determined by working-age population. Increasing labor
force participation especially for women could be a better and also costless way of
increasing labor supply. Another potential supply of labor could be the still ongoing
rural to urban migration, since approximately 24 percent of the population still lives
in rural areas.
The argument that higher population is better for domestic demand is also not
convincing, because purchasing power essentially determines domestic demand. An
increasing population with joblessness and in poverty would not necessarily increase
domestic demand. Finally, concerns over social security system and pension deficits
are justified to a certain extent, but it is not clear how increasing fertility will solve
these problems in the long run. Supporters of the “at least three children” rhetoric see
rising fertility as a solution to the decline in active-passive ratios. However, one of the
important factors creating pension deficits is low compliance with pension laws due to
the large number of unregistered workers. In a country where informal employment is
estimated to constitute about 40 percent of total employment, trying to solve pension
crisis through population increase is absurd (Sayan, 2013).
14Seasonally adjusted monthly average unemployment rate was 10.7% during the period of 2005-
2013 while labor force participation rate was 48.1% during the same period. Household La-
bor Force Surveys’ data is extracted from the Turkish Statistical Institute’s website on 2.1.2014:
http://www.tuik.gov.tr/PreTablo.do?alt id=1007.
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Moreover, there is empirical evidence that a rise in fertility might well increase
dependency ratios in future years. In a quantitative model of economic growth and
demographic change, Attar (2013) analyzes the effects of an exogenous upward shift
in fertility rates in case the pro-natalist rhetoric of Erdog˘an becomes successful in
persuading people to have more children. According to his findings, technological
progress will be the main source of growth in Turkey until the end of this century.
Even under an increasing rate of technological progress, “a permanent upward shift
in births per capita to its 1995 leveloccurring in 2015would imply a signicantly lower
level of output per capita, a remarkably higher level of dependent population, and a
persistently low level of the share of the working-age population for many decades”
(Attar, 2013).
There is a belief among many economists that fertility decisions of families are
subject to more or less a personal cost-benefit analysis, and would not be affected by
rhetoric. Even if pro-natalist rhetoric is institutionalized by monetary incentives to
encourage fertility15, only poor families would respond to such incentives. This would
create an increase in only unskilled labor supply.
Setting aside the discussion of whether encouraging fertility would improve Turkey’s
economic situation, there is another important dimension of the “at least three chil-
dren” rhetoric that concerns feminists. Together with the recent attack on abortion
rights, this rhetoric is seen as a disturbing intervention in private life. In terms of
its repercussions for women’s labor force engagement, having three children clearly
would lower women’s labor force participation and attachment in the absence of better
work-family reconciliation policies.
In this part of my study I explore women’s perceptions and their responses to
Erdog˘an’s “at least three children” rhetoric. Conducting the fieldwork in Sincan made
15Monetary incentives were recently announced with the Family and Dynamic Population Struc-
ture Conservation Program, see section 2.3 in Chapter 2.
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the results of this analysis more interesting for two reasons. First, it is a district where
the Justice and Development Party (AKP) voters predominate. In other words, more
women are likely to be Erdog˘an’s “sisters who are devoted to our cause.” Second, the
majority of women whom I interviewed belong to the low-income group that is more
likely to respond to fertility-increasing incentives. Despite their sympathy with the
AKP and Erdog˘an—as revealed directly by some of them, and indirectly from their
answers to political participation questions for some others—the majority of women
do not like the idea of having three children. Many say that they did not understand
why the prime minister was demanding three children, and that he had no right to call
for this under the current economic conditions of Turkey. When I asked what they
think of Erdog˘an’s call, twelve women out of the 34 said they agree with Erdog˘an.
Twenty-two women, on the other hand, opposed the idea that three children is ideal.
The main reason behind their opposition was the inadequacy of material conditions
to support three children. Moreover, women reacted to the ignorance of the prime
minister to the material conditions:
I don’t agree. A person cannot take care of only one child under cur-
rent conditions. How is she supposed to look after three?
—Dilek, 42, widowed, production worker
How much did he raise the minimum wage? What about the wages of
retirees? He only speaks for his own good. [...] He wants a young popula-
tion, but he does not create employment opportunities. People don’t have
regular incomes. You get an education, but it doesn’t mean anything. [...]
Let me speak honestly our prime minister, thanks to him, is ruling very
well (sarcastic). It is only sunny for them. He destroyed the lower classes.
He doesn’t want us to survive.
—Sinem, 47, married, service worker
As Sinem points out, unemployment among young and educated people has been
increasing. The unemployment rate among university graduates was 10.1% in 2012
(7.2% for men, 14.7% for women), and the unemployment rate for youth, aged 15-24,
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was 17.5% (16.3% for men and 19.9 for women).16 Feride also emphasizes the lack of
job opportunities:
I don’t agree. He says three children. I’m a housewife, I really want
to work but what kind of job can I do? There is also this problem. What
kind of job can he give to me? How am I going to take care of my chil-
dren? I cannot give birth to three just because the prime minister wants
that. I mean everybody wants something from us.
—Feride, 39, married, homemaker
I mean I’m really curious what kind of illusion Tayyip is in. Does he
think that we earn wages around 8-10 thousand so that we can hire pri-
vate baby sitters? [...] I would support him if he says there will be public
day care centers for working women or crches are free. I would give birth
to five if he provides those.
—I˙pek, 30, single, accounting supervisor
Some of the opposing women actually reveal a preference for many children for
different reasons, such as the benefits of solidarity between siblings, but they note the
“impossibility” of caring for three children under their current conditions.
Yes one should have three children. We are four siblings, there is noth-
ing like a sibling. But these conditions do not allow one woman and one
man to have three children. A child going to cre`che has more needs than
you. I want my daughter to go to a private college. I cannot afford it even
for one child. My total wage would not cover her college expenses.
—Yelda, 32, married, production worker
Prime minster is right. I have one son and one daughter. I want
another daughter because having a sister is very important; my sister
supports me a lot. But I cannot believe that I would be able to support
another child financially under current conditions. I also don’t feel strong
enough to become a mother again.
—Pelin, 29, married, service worker
Only two women explicitly question the legitimacy of such an intervention to
private life, and say that is none of the prime minister’s business:
16Turkish Statistical Institute; Household Labor Force Surveys data extracted on 2/1/2014.
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It is ridiculous. A woman should become mother, that is fine but this
is clearly an obstacle for a working life. Moreover If I want to, I give birth
to three, five, whatever; it is none of his business.
—Ceylan, 37, divorced, sales assistant
He is tactless, this is pure tactlessness, there is no other explanation.
In the past, Su¨leyman Demirel17 was also making fertility suggestions
saying, ‘Children you will give birth to today will demand school in seven
years so don’t give birth to too many.’ That was wrong too. This is just
more annoying because he is a tactless man. He is concerned with pop-
ulation aging. But instead of making plans and initiating incentives, he
gives orders without planning or taking some precautions. It is nonsense.
—Funda, 33, single, management representative
It is not surprising that those who express anger because they see this rhetoric
as an attack to their privacy and command on their bodies are women who have a
university education. On the other hand, there are women in my sample who support
Erdog˘an’s rhetoric for ideological reasons. They are “the sisters devoted to” his cause.
They give the impression that they would support anything that he advocates:
It makes sense. I think it makes sense because it really makes sense.
Why? Yeah future is uncertain, everything is becoming more chaotic but
if the number of “ours” (she means children of people who think like them)
increases, there would be order.
When I ask her why she thinks prime minister is asking for three children, she
says:
I really don’t know, perhaps he knows the future better. I mean we
really love our prime minister, may Allah bless him. Even my husband
always sees him in his dreams. That is how much he loves him.
—Berna, 29, married, saleswoman
17She is referring to the restrictive population policies during Su¨leyman Demirel’s presidency in
the periods of 1965-1971 and 1975-1980.
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Ferdane is among the women who did not hesitate to express her support for the
AKP. She is the only woman in the sample who wants to engage actively in politics.
She wants to become a member of the AKP. She says, “I fully support him. More
children are good for our country.” When I remind her possibility of that many
children being unemployed under current conditions, she replies:
That is fine, they can be unemployed. If you think that way, then
Africa should not have any population.
—Ferdane, 36, married, security guard
Erdog˘an did not explain the reasons behind his rhetoric to the public very well. He
just made some vague explanations about the necessity of population growth. With-
out knowing much about population dynamics, people associate the three children
rhetoric with fear about declining population. Nineteen women in my sample said
that the reason behind the prime minister’s call is declining fertility. They have the
general opinion that higher population growth is better, although they mostly can-
not explain in what sense higher population growth is better. Or as we see in some
examples above, they have a nave belief that “the prime minister must know what
he is doing.” For instance, Aycan made a guess about gaining strength militarily as
against Kurdish guerillas. When I ask why the prime minister wants three children
she says:
I don’t know, maybe to outweigh terrorists in numbers.
—Aycan, 28, married, homemaker
I˙pek is confused too:
Why does he want three children? Perhaps he will employ them or
maybe he sees them as potential voters for the AKP. But when there is
so much unemployment, it does not make sense. I really don’t know.
—I˙pek, 30, single, accounting supervisor
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Feride is very angry with the nationalist content of this rhetoric:
Why does prime minister call for three children? He recruits our son
to martyr. Our daughter is for reproduction. They are for the homeland.
He wants more children for the sake of the nation. [...] Let me tell you
one thing, I don’t understand mothers either. They say, ‘Long live the
homeland’ when their sons become a martyr. I have two children. Once
my children are dead, damn this nation!
—Feride, 39, married, homemaker
There are also women who see this rhetoric as part of the ruling party’s conserva-
tive attempts to strengthen the traditional division of labor by confining women to
the home:
I think they don’t want women to work because they have a religious
mentality.
—Ceylan, 37, divorced, sales assistant
To sum up, as seen in their testimonies, the majority of women in my sample do not
like Erdog˘an’s rhetoric of at least three children. They rightly point out economic dif-
ficulties of raising three children under current economic conditions. Working women
especially emphasize the lack of public care provisioning to support such a demand.
Furthermore, some argue that the intention behind this rhetoric is actually to keep
women in their homes following a hidden religious-conservative agenda. It remains
to be seen whether Erdog˘an’s “at least three children” rhetoric will have a noticeable
effect on fertility decisions in Turkey. However, my limited number of interviews in
Sincan does not confirm such an expectation.
4.7 Paid Work and Empowerment
4.7.1 Use of Own Income
An obvious starting point for a discussion of empowerment through paid work is
control over women’s wages and management of the family income. In this part, I ex-
plore women’s ability to exercise control over their own income. Do the incomes merge
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into a common pool to be redistributed according to a Beckerian welfare maximization
principle under the management of a “benevolent dictator”? Or does a “malevolent
patriarch” (Kabeer, 2002) appropriate women’s incomes? How conflictual or consen-
sual is the redistribution process in the household? Beyond the issue of control, the
question of choice and what difference women’s incomes make to their lives is also
interesting in terms of transformatory potential of employment. Therefore, I analyze
if women are able to use their own income or pooled family income according to their
allocative priorities. Additionally, I investigate the meanings women attach to their
income and how they value what they accomplish with their income. Finally, I com-
pare employed women’s perceptions of their contribution to the family with full-time
homemakers’ self-perceptions.
Income pooling is common among married couples. Out of the eighteen employed
women in my sample, eight of them (seven of whom are married) reported that there
is full income pooling in the household. The remaining ten women say that they had
full control over their income. Only three of these ten women are married, the rest
being single (4), widowed (1), or divorced (2). Single and divorced women living with
their families are usually contributing to the family expenses. For instance, Ceylan,
living with her parents after divorce, is taking care of her brother’s expenses which
amount to one-fourth of her wage. Since they say that the amount or shape of their
contributions is all up to them, we can assume that they have full control of their
income.
The interviews provide some clear examples of how class position determines the
liberating potential of paid work. For instance, Dilek’s experience with work is in
sharp contrast with Emine’s experience, due to their different backgrounds and class
positions. They are working at the same factory in food processing industry, occu-
pying different positions. Dilek’s entrance to the labor market after the death of her
husband can be seen as a distressed sale of labor. Emine chose to work when she
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decided not to continue her university education. Dilek is the head of a household
with two children making a little above monthly minimum wage, 1000TL whereas,
Emine who also has two children, lives in a household with a total income of 5000TL.
Both women have total control of their income. However, when I ask if they could
keep some portion of it to spend according to their own will, Dilek explains:
I can hardly have money for cigarettes as a special expense for myself.
Very occasionally I buy trousers or a pair of shoes. This is really my sit-
uation. Because I have a young daughter, thanks to her when we go for
shopping, she says, ‘I want this I want that.’ I can never have a chance to
think of myself. But I know she only demands what she needs. She does
not have anything either. It is not like she is spoiled.
—Dilek, 42, widowed, production worker
Living on a survival basis, she does not have any savings. Besides the economic
vulnerability, she complains about her family’s pressure and difficulties of being a
“widowed woman”. When I ask if she likes her job, after listing some good and bad
aspects of it, she says she “has to be satisfied.” Coming from a poor family, she
does not have anybody to take care of her and her children. Emine, on the contrary,
comes from a wealthy family. She is “free” to spend all of her income for herself. She
answers the same question as follows:
It depends. I can spend all of it on myself. It would not be a problem.
I mean I can spend my husband’s money on myself. He would not ask
what I’m spending on. He says, ‘it is up to you, you can do whatever.’
Everything is on me, our house, car [...] For instance when I inherited
some property after the death of my parents, he did not even ask what
exactly I inherited. We don’t talk about money.
—Emine, 41, married, treasurer
Although Dilek has a difficult life, working means more than generating income
for her. When she compares her life before and after the death of her husband, she
clearly has a preference for her current status. Here is her assessment of the current
situation:
134
Now I don’t have any interference. I mean I don’t know, I’m a social
person; I can easily establish relationships. It was not like this. Trust me.
The way I dressed, my attitude, everything has changed. I was closed
to home. I would only go to the garden of the house. I could not go
anywhere else. He (her husband) would not let me. Even if he did there
was no money, I was not dressing well. I was living with my relatives’ old
clothes. [...] Now I have my own money, my own budget. I don’t have
to plead for anything. I go everywhere myself, I can take care of my own
stuff.
It seems like the disappearance of one of the strongest elements of patriarchal
control in her life led to increased agency and self-confidence. In that sense, despite
the hardships of working life, she feels empowered.
Zehra, one of the two other married women who say they have full control of their
income, is spending all of her wage on her son’s education. She states proudly, “I
devoted my wage to him, I work for him.” I asked how important does she think her
contribution is to the household. Here is her assessment: “It is very important. How
happy am I if I can give education to my child without asking anyone’s favor. My
husband would not do it because it is difficult to afford with one wage. But I said
I will work and educate my son.” When I asked how her family members value her
contribution, she states, “My husband says my work doesn’t do any benefit to him,
but sometimes he appreciates and says we could not educate our child without me.”
Yelda argues that income pooling is necessary to sustain a marriage:
Of course I don’t put some money on the side for myself. How would a
marriage continue otherwise? It is impossible to survive with one person’s
wage nowadays anyway. [...] Everybody knows what he is supposed to do.
My husband pays for the rent, utilities and food. I spent all my income
on my daughter’s education and my own needs.
—Yelda, 32, married, production worker
When I ask if she is happy with her job, she replies that “one has to be satisfied
because of living conditions even if she does not like,” and explains why she is not
happy about working:
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As a woman, especially if you are married, you have a lot of responsi-
bilities. You have to wake up early, take care of your child; you have to
leave her somewhere/someone during the day. In the evening you have to
take care of her and do all the housework. All women have to do these
things but we, working women, have double burden. Plus we feel guilty
about leaving our child alone. It is very difficult to be a working woman
especially if she is not educated, not having a certain status with a lot of
benefits.
She evaluates her contribution to the household as “very important,” but mostly
emphasizes her role as a mother. She complains that her husband does not appreciate
her financial help:
Husbands usually don’t appreciate women’s contributions. I observe
this with my colleagues and friends as well. They usually say, ‘What do
you earn anyway.’ In other words, for men your income is not important
even if you earn a lot and you really help them financially.
Most of the employed women have a more or less important voice in the manage-
ment of family income even in cases of full income pooling. They take initiative in
children’s health and education at least. There were three exceptions in my sample,
however. Three women literally hand in their salaries to the husbands and ask for
pocket money when they need it:
I don’t take anything out of my wage but I take money from my hus-
band every month for my personal expenses (around 100TL).
—Ferdane, 36, married, security guard
I give all of my salary to my husband because we have debtsBut even
before the debts, I have never used it on myself. I take maybe 50TL for
cigarettes.
—Pelin, 29, married, service worker
I give my salary to him (her husband) and he gives me 50TL thinking
that I might need it.
—Berna, 29, married, saleswoman
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Ferdane and Berna have recently started to work and they are quite happy about
working. For instance, Berna states that working has other benefits besides creating
extra income for the family. She feels healthier both mentally and physically now,
because staying at home “drains a person.” On the other hand, Pelin continues
working out of necessity; she actually wants to stay at home to take care of her
children. Before her current service job in a food factory, she has done different kinds
of jobs, including piecework from home and domestic work. She feels tired and guilty
about not devoting her energy to the training of her children. When I ask about
her husband’s opinion, she says reproachfully, “My husband always wanted me to
work for whatever reason, even when I did not want to.” In her case, working is an
unwelcome obligation, lacking most of the empowering features associated with paid
employment.
The majority of employed women, without hesitation, state that their contribution
to the family is extremely important. Only three of the eighteen say that their
contribution is only somewhat important. On the other hand, full-time homemakers
are more hesitant to think and express that their domestic labor is important: eleven
of the sixteen state that their contribution is very important, and five are not sure.
For instance, Aliye tends to undervalue her domestic labor saying, “It is just usual
work that needs to be done.” Her husband thinks the same way, apparently: “He
doesn’t appreciate my contribution; he thinks that it is stuff that needs to be done,
nothing special.” Nilu¨fer, mother of three little children, is not sure either: “I don’t
know, I guess it is important.” Similarly, Aynur says: “I don’t know, you should
ask my husband.” It is interesting to learn that their sons, if not husbands, tend to
degrade their labor in the household. S¸ebnem’s son, for instance, asks “what do you
do except from cleaning the house? It does not get dirty every day anyway.” Nazife’s
husband accepts the importance of her contribution, saying, “My wife is the minister
of internal affairs,” but her children do not think that she is “useful.”
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To sum up, employed women tend to think that their contribution is more crucial
to the family. This is mostly due to invisibility of housework and lack of recognition
on the side of men. Moreover, as we will see in the next section, employed women,
while earning at least as much as their husbands in some cases, do all the housework
work without even symbolic help from their husbands. Even after accepting this
double burden, they feel that their husbands do not appreciate their contributions.
4.7.2 Sexual Division of Labor
The empowering potential of paid work is directly related to whether it creates
any major shift in intra-household power inequalities by challenging the sexual divi-
sion of labor. In this part, I first examine whether there is any substantial difference
between employed women and full-time homemakers in sharing household responsi-
bilities with their husbands. Then I analyze their perceptions, to what extent they
internalize cultural norms that put the burden of housework solely on women, and
their expectations.
There are ten married employed women and fourteen married homemakers in
my sample. Six of the employed women reported that they are fully responsible
for the domestic chores, cooking cleaning and childcare without any help from their
husbands. Two employed women said that their husbands help in all three of these
chores, although they themselves take the main responsibility. Finally, one employed
woman stated that her husband helps in cleaning and childcare but that cooking is
her responsibility. Among fourteen homemakers, only three said their husbands help
in cleaning and one in childcare as well. Husbands usually do all the repair work
around the house, although there are two exceptions in the sample. One employed
woman and one homemaker take on all the responsibilities, including maintenance of
the house. Couples either do the grocery shopping together or men take care of that.
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Although there are some differences between working women and homemakers in
sharing household chores with their husbands, it is obvious that working wives still
take disproportionate responsibility. When it comes to their views about the ideal
division of labor, almost all women, with one exception, argue that men should help
with the housework. I asked which household chores they would like to be helped
with. Many of them expect only symbolic help from their husbands, not necessarily
getting him involved in “serious” housework. For instance, nobody said that men
should help with childcare. They want to feel the “togetherness” in the household
duties. But even that seems like a dream to some women. After an unhappy marriage,
Dilek explains what she expects from a husband:
I always had a dream. Since I did not really enjoy my marriage be-
cause of fights and poverty, I imagine a marriage where my husband helps
me. For instance, I’m making the soup in the kitchen I would really love
that if he makes a salad. I mean staying with me in the kitchen, giving
me the tomato paste, soaking the rice. [...] These are not difficult things
to do for a man. It is really nice, isn’t it? Doing things together? I always
have this dream.
—Dilek, 42, widowed, production worker
Similarly, Yeliz says:
He can make the dinner table, make the salad, or hang the curtains.
He can help in certain things.
—Yeliz, 48, married, service worker
Not only do they not help with chores, some men do not even take care of their
basic needs, as we see in the example of Zehra:
I was not working in the past, doing everything around the house. He
got used to that. Now he does not even go and get one glass of water for
himself. For instance, I make tea and we drink together. He could at least
put the teapot on the oven. We could go to the bazaar together, do the
shopping together. But he gets bored; he doesn’t do it.
—Zehra, 47, married, service worker
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On one hand, women argue that husbands should help them because “life is for
sharing,” but on the other hand, they only expect some minor duties from men such
as making tea, setting the dinner table or making salad. Either they believe that a
fair distribution of household chores is impossible knowing their husbands, or they
might see some things as “women’s work.” They may be simply afraid of the conflict
that would arise if they ask for more substantial help. Berna explains why she does
not ask for more:
Yes, he should help. But since he is also working, it is difficult to
say something. For instance, we are setting the dinner table. I want to
eat on the kitchen table, he wants to carry everything to the living room
and eat in front of the TV. I say, ‘if that is the case, then carry some
things, bring the bread or water.’ But no, I do everything. I sometimes
say ‘enough! I’m also working like you.’ He does not say anything; he
stays quiet. Someone else would perhaps say bad things but my husband
only stays silent.
—Berna, 29, married, saleswoman
She is grateful that at least her husband does not get angry when she wants some
help. Based on the experiences of married women in my sample, it is clear that
employed women face a double burden. To a large extent, the traditional division of
labor is not challenged by the women’s income or working status. In that sense, the
empowering potential of employment seems to be quite limited.
4.7.3 Decision Making in the Household
To analyze whether paid work gives women more voice and decision-making power,
I explore how household decisions are made with regard to women’s own health, large
important purchases such as a house or car, small everyday purchases, and children’s
education, health, and marriages. Single, divorced or widowed women who live alone
take all their decisions by themselves. Single and divorced women who live with
their parents seem to have substantial voice, but usually decisions are taken together
with the family. To what extent their opinions count might depend on their age.
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For instance, I˙nci (24), living with her divorced mother and younger brother, makes
a substantial financial contribution to the family. Her mother takes most of the
decisions although I˙nci’s opinion is always asked. I˙pek (30) on the other hand, having
been working a longer time and providing even the basic needs of her family, seems
to have more decision making power, especially with regard to household purchases.
The biggest difference between employed and unemployed wives is the decision to
work outside, as I have discussed before. Among ten employed wives, a majority took
the decision to work by themselves. Among the homemakers, on the other hand,
there are a few women who chose not to seek employment freely, as the majority
reported that had to go along with their husbands’ choice. Moreover, it is not only
their husbands making that decision; sometimes their children have a say over it
too. That is the case for Fahriye, for instance: “Even my children would not let
me work; neither my husband nor my children would allow me”. It is common for
women (both employed and unemployed) to take family-related decisions together
with their spouses. Five out of ten employed married women state that they decide
together on all issues. One, Pelin, says that her husband takes decisions related to
purchases, while she makes most of the decisions about the children. The rest of
the employed wives seem to actually have more decision power than their husbands,
especially about their own health and children’s education and health. Emine states
that she has the last word about everything.
Five of the fourteen full-time homemakers take decisions regarding the children
by themselves, while all the other decisions are made jointly with their husbands.
Among the rest, there are examples like Ebru, who says, “We decide together, but
his word is more important,” or Fahriye and I˙smet, whose husbands decide on the
big purchases. Nazlı and I˙smet, living with extended family, state that their opinion
is asked but they participate less actively in decision-making processes. Taking the
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advantage of old age, Selma decides on everything: “I rule, taking all the decisions,
about purchases and everything. Nobody can say anything.”
Women’s narratives suggest that another clear difference between employed women
and full-time homemakers emerges in decision-making regarding large purchases. Be-
ing financially dependent limits the decision making power of housewives; the men
have the final say, as Ebru explains: “We (with children) cannot buy if my husband
says no; we do if he says yes.” However, the need to get husbands’ approval in pur-
chases might be felt by employed women as well. Yelda argues that women, somehow,
always have to convince their husbands for the purchases:
Women always have to convince their husbands in big purchases. This
is the case whether you work or not. Even if you pay for it with your own
money, you have to convince the men first. My husband is not a difficult
person. I’m very thrifty; I don’t waste money. If I need something really
important, he would always support me. But I always ask to him, as a
formality, ‘I can pay for it but would you help if I need?’
—Yelda, 32, married, production worker
To sum up, paid work empowers women by giving them greater say over decision-
making in the household. At least, men do not have the final say over anything related
to family needs. Moreover, in almost every case, we see active participation of women
in the decision-making. For full-time homemakers, “taking decisions together” might
mean husbands getting their wives’ opinion in some cases. Furthermore, being the
breadwinner might lead men to take important financial decisions themselves.
4.7.4 Mental Health and Self-Confidence
Another set of empowerment indicators relates to women’s health and self-esteem.
Table 4.3 reports the differences between working women and housewives with regard
to these indicators. Employed women seem to be doing better BY almost all of them.
The largest differences emerge in experiencing insomnia, losing self-confidence, being
hopeful about future, and feeling respected enough.
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Insomnia might be expected to be more common among employed women due to
stress. Surprisingly, housewives reported that suffer more from it in various degrees.
Some attribute it to “thinking too much,” although three explained that they were
having insomnia at the time of interview because of pregnancy. The majority of
employed women are hopeful about future. Some of them are looking forward to
being retired. Zehra says, “I˙ns¸allah (if god permits) I’m hopeful. How happy am I if
I can get retired with health.” Those who are somewhat hopeful are not concerned for
themselves, saying “what can I hope for myself at this age anyway,” but think of their
children. Most of the worries about the future among homemakers are related to their
material conditions and economic vulnerability. Living on her husband’s minimum
wage with three children, Nilu¨fer explains: “I feel insecure; it is uncertain what will
happen to us. We might be better off once children grow up. But I’m not sure
even for that at these times.” There are also other kinds of vulnerabilities. Melike
is hopeful about future “a little bit” because of her relationship with her husband;
faintheartedly she mentions her husband’s pressure and violence “at times” in a few
words.18
The majority of women in my sample consider themselves successful in life even if
they do not have a job. They do justice to themselves, saying that they are successful
“under their own conditions”. Not having enough education is the major reason why
others do not find themselves successful:
I could not be successful because I could not get education. I mean
I did not have anything since I did not have education. I have such a
deficiency.
—Ferdane, 36, security guard, secondary school
18In the original set of interview questions, I included a section for domestic violence. However
while I was conducting the interviews, it was extremely difficult to talk about it. I ended up asking
only one general question, whether they are exposed to any kind of violence in the house, and I
got the impression that domestic violence is not very common. Domestic violence is a problem for
Turkey according to more carefully conducted nationally representative surveys. I am guessing that
I did not get very good response rate because of the sensitivity of the issue. Therefore, I excluded
that section from the analysis.
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I failed to realize some of my dreams especially about my education.
But things happened independent from me; I could not go to university
although I passed the entrance exam. [...] I was taking care of my sister
at that time. The university was out of the city; I could not go.
—Arzu, 34, secretary, university (2 years)
I have not been successful in some things. If I had education I was not
going to be in this position.
—Nazlı, 24, homemaker, high school incomplete
I mean I’m not successful as long as I can’t read. I’ve always felt re-
gretful about it. No matter how successful I say I am, I can’t go anywhere
or do anything as long as I can’t read.
—Ebru, 42, homemaker, primary school (but illiterate)
Pelin thinks that the lack of education is behind her general weaknesses:
I should have got education. I really should have because I don’t
know; I mean I have actually a strong personality to improve myself with
education.
—Pelin, 29, service worker, secondary school
She is not satisfied with her life:
I don’t want to be in this life. I don’t know, ok I agree that women
should participate in every sphere of life. But a woman can only stand
on her feet if she gets education. Working women without education are
doomed to be oppressed. You come to work but your mind is at home,
worrying about children. The state doesn’t provide cre`che to women who
are working as laborers.
When I ask if she feels strong enough to deal with unexpected circumstances, she
says, “I did so far, but I’m a very cowardly woman behind all these conversations.”
Women’s regrets are mainly about education, where as we saw in the first section,
most of them were constrained by their families. They did not have a real choice.
There are also other types of regrets. Getting married young, and especially living
with the extended family at the beginning of the marriage, weakens the women’s
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position in the house. S¸ebnem (36, homemaker) blames herself for not being resistant
enough to her husband’s family: “I had a lot of failures. I could have succeeded in
some things by myself. But I think I could not...For example, I let my husband’s
family oppress me.”
On the other hand, there are highly self-confident women, not employed, such as
O¨zge (39) who states, “Yes, I’m very successful. I’m a housewife but there has been
nothing I could not succeed at so far.” She is very hopeful about future, too. When
I ask if she is also hopeful about her daughters’ future, she reveals the secrets of her
happiness, so to speak:
I’m hopeful. Their future would be good if they become as altruistic
and devoted as me. I’m a very altruistic mother and wife. That is why we
have peace and order in our family; all the beauties belong to me. If I was
not like this, I’m sure we were not going to be so peaceful. I know very
well how to take the line of least resistance when my husband is angry.
If I was not like this, perhaps there were going to be big fights or even
violence.
I asked what if her daughters get oppressed:
Of course I don’t want them to get oppressed. But they should be
aware of their womanhood. As a woman, they should know their place.
She defines the place of women as somewhat inferior to men, but she takes pride
in maintaining a relationship if necessary with sacrifices. This is what is traditionally
expected from women. But it is interesting to see features that are believed to put
women in a weaker position in the family such as altruism, make her feel stronger
and controlling.
In other cases, however, altruism makes women feel absolutely powerless. Drawing
on a question from World Values Survey19, I asked them to what extent they are able
to control their life. Feride replies to that question saying, “No way, I don’t have
19“Some people feel like that they have a great deal of control over their own lives. Others feel
that what they do has very little effect on what happens to them. How would you classify yourself?”
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control. I don’t live for myself”. More interestingly, sometimes control means to take
excessive responsibility with various kinds of altruisms and facing with more than
a double burden, as in the case of Yelda who sacrificed her education and started
working for her siblings in the past:
I’ve always kept the control of my life in my hand. I was like this dur-
ing my childhood, my teenager years. I got married I’m still controlling.
I like taking responsibility. But this really makes me tired sometimes. I
take my husband’s responsibility, my child’s, my family’s, and my sister’s.
I shoulder these responsibilities because I like being in the driving seat.
—Yelda, 32, married, production worker
In other words, these empowerment indicators reveal some differences among em-
ployed women and homemakers with respect to agency, self-confidence, satisfaction
and self-respect. However, a crude comparison based on their yes/no answers might
hide some more complex phenomena. Altruism may become a condition of being at
peace with oneself. It can be defined as the condition of being a successful mother or
wife, if those are the most important self-defining identities. The ability to exercise
control might result in getting overwhelmed with excessive responsibilities instead of
feeling stronger. The limitations of the rational choice framework used by economists
become even more evident in these cases. Nancy Folbre argues that as a result of social
organization of childcare, “women may have a less ‘bounded’ concept of themselves
than men, a greater propensity for interdependent utilities, even altruism” (1994,
p. 26). If that is the case, bargaining outcomes favor men even when women have
same economic resources. Moreover, having a greater propensity for interdependent
utilities is usually something learnt since their early ages for women as we see from
O¨zge’s suggestions to her daughters.
4.7.5 Gender Role Attitudes
Attitudes can be important indicators of people’s tendencies to respond to the
opportunities and constraints they face (Scott, Alwin & Braun, 1996). Here I explore
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the relationship between women’s employment status and their attitudes towards
paid work. I asked three questions about the perceived consequences of employment.
Table 4.4 presents women’s opinions.
Table 4.4: Women’s Opinions on the Consequences of Paid Work for the Family
Employed women Full-time homemakers
Agree Disagree Depends Agree Disagree Depends
A working mother can-
not maintain as close and
warm a relationship with
her children as a housewife
mother
10 7 1 14 2 0
It is not important for
women to have their own
source of income for self-
dependency
1 16 1 1 15 0
Wife’s being involved in
market activity outside the
household affects relation-
ship with husband nega-
tively
1 17 0 6 7 3
One question generated overwhelming support among both employed women and
housewives. Almost all of them think that it is important to have their own income
for self-dependence. On the other hand, I˙pek, the only working woman who said it
was not that important, has a preference for motherhood:
People usually barely survive with a minimum wage. That’s why wives
are also working. They would not need to work if husbands made enough.
[...] This is my opinion. I would not work today if my husband (hypo-
thetical) earned enough. Because I’m already 30, I would like to see every
moment of my child.
—I˙pek, 30, single, accounting supervisor
The vast majority of employed women do not think that the relationship with the
spouse is affected by women’s employment. Some of them even argue that it might
148
have a positive impact. Funda, for instance, states that “staying at home all the time
would have a negative impact on marriage, a woman must be engaged in some things
outside the home.” However, homemakers are less likely to think that way. Those
who experience conflict about the decision to work believe that women’s employment
creates trouble in the family. Some of them are ambivalent, and think that it should
not create a problem if “women do not raise their voice”. Women should not “bring
up money issues and oppress men” if they do not want trouble. Another condition is
providing men with the same comfort level. As Ebru says:
For most of them, the relationship is affected because men complain,
saying, ‘Since you work, you can’t take care of me.’ But in some cases it
may not affect. Some men say, ‘You can work only if you don’t reduce my
care.’
—Ebru, 42, married, homemaker
The biggest attitudinal difference between employed women and homemakers is
in their perceptions of good motherhood. Only two women without jobs think that
employed women can have a close relationship with their children. Many of them cited
the time constraint as the main obstacle, and argued that even if working mothers
want to and try hard, it is impossible to be as close as full-time mothers. Priorities
might differ as well, as Ebru argues, “she would be attached to her job, while we are
attached to our kids.” Some employed women share the same view, also emphasizing
the time constraint. Drawing from her experience with her working mother, Ceylan
argues that emotional attachment is weaker because of being absent at the most
special moments of the child. On the other hand, others emphasize the quality of
time spent together:
I don’t believe in that. Why? The quality of the relationship is impor-
tant. Instead of being a mother who stays with children all day without
really taking care of them, listening to them, spending good times with
them, I would prefer to spend one hour of good quality after the dinner.
That might make me a more caring mother.
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—Yelda, 32, married, production worker
I don’t agree. Perhaps I have more control over my children’s lives
than a woman staying at home because I have a more regular life. I have
to prepare the meals from night, do the cleaning in the weekend. A normal
mother staying at home might be waking up at around 10-11am without
knowing what her kid is doing in the living room. I wake up earlier than
them; prepare the breakfast, then I go to work. I would know what my
child is eating or what he is doing.
—Emine, 41, married, treasurer
Treas and Widmer (2000) identify three different attitude regimes with respect to
balancing motherhood and employment, based on cross-country studies of value sur-
veys: “work oriented,” “family accommodating,” and “motherhood centred.” Turkey
is not in their sample. But my findings, although from a very limited sample , give
some hints of presence of a “motherhood centred” regime. The majority of employed
women agree with the first statement, and the feelings of guilt (of not being a good
enough mother) are quite widespread among them.
In addition to attitudes towards employment, I analyze if there are any differences
in cultural values between working women and housewives with two additional ques-
tions. I explore the extent to which son preference is prevalent, and their views on
marriage.
Table 4.5: Son Preference and Ideas on Marriage Type
Employed women Full-time homemakers
If you had only one child, would you prefer it to be a boy or a girl?
Son 4 1
Daughter 9 13
Indifferent 5 2
How do you think marriage should be arranged?
Arranged marriage 4 5
Love marriage 14 11
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There is no general son preference among either employed women or homemakers.
On the contrary, there is a clear daughter preference, as Table 4.5 shows. Accord-
ing to Kag˘ıtc¸ıbas¸ı’s (2007) family change theory, son preference in Turkish society
disappeared through the course of social change and industrialization in the recent
three decades. As material interdependencies within the family were replaced by emo-
tional interdependencies, the economic value of children as a form of old-age security
diminished. Families started to value daughters more.
Arranged marriages are still common in conservative families in Turkey. More than
employment status, whether or not they themselves had an arranged marriage seems
to be important in determining women’s opinions about it. Three of the employed
women and all five of the homemakers who said arranged marriage is better had gone
through it themselves. Since they are happy about their marriages, they believe it is
better. Their main argument is the high divorce rates in love marriages:
I prefer arranged marriage. We see love marriages as well, they get
divorced in two days.
—Neriman, 25, married, homemaker
I would like my daughter to have an arranged marriage as well because
when you date a lot of issues might come up. As you learn the personality
of the other person, everything finishes even before marriage starts.
—Ebru, 42, married, homemaker
I prefer arranged marriage. Why? Because they dream a lot when
they date. There are a lot of promises. No man or no woman would
show his/her personality honestly while flirting. With marriage they get
to see the sides that they haven’t seen before. They start fighting and get
divorced.
—O¨zge, 39, married, homemaker
However, five other women (one employed, four homemakers) who had an arranged
marriage want their daughters to have love marriages.
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4.7.6 Summary Findings
From the narratives of women, the following summary findings may be presented
about the relationship between paid work and empowerment:
• Income pooling among married couples is very common, although the majority
of employed women still have full control over their income. Even if women have
the freedom to control their income, their ability to spend it on their own welfare
is determined by various factors, including their class position, preferences, and
allocative priorities. However they attach significant meaning to their income
even if they do not spend it on themselves. The feeling of accomplishment is
actually stronger when they finance children’s education with their income. Due
to the invisibility of housework, on the other hand, several women understate
their contribution to the family through their unpaid domestic labor.
• The sexual division of labor in the household to a large extent is not challenged
by women’s employment. This is one of the biggest difficulties employed women
face. But at the same time, women’s expectations from men are very limited.
Instead of demanding a fair distribution of household chores, they want help in
only certain tasks they believe men can handle. In other words, there is certain
type of housework seen as women’s work. Childcare seems to be one of them.
• Employed women have more decision-making power in the house than full-time
homemakers. This difference becomes evident especially in financial decisions.
Besides employment status, a woman’s age plays a role in determining her
decision-making power.
• Having a job and social life outside the house makes employed women mentally
healthier and relatively freer from insomnia. Being in control of certain impor-
tant things, such as the children’s education, lessens their worries and makes
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them more hopeful about the future. This is also due to the fact that dual-
earner families have generally higher income. Another clear difference between
employed women and homemakers is about feeling respected enough and not
losing self-confidence.
• Regardless of employment status, women have a very positive attitude toward
paid work as a source of self-sufficiency. There is, however, a difference in per-
ceptions of its consequences on the relationship with the spouse and especially
with the children. For the majority of homemakers, paid work makes a close
relationship with the child impossible, while several employed women argue
against such a negative impact. Nevertheless, it is clear from the interviews
that feelings of insufficiency about motherhood are somewhat common among
employed women. This is another big challenge they face, making the paid work
less empowering.
• Some traditional values are maintained even among employed women, such as
a preference for arranged marriage. Some others such as son preference, on the
other hand, prevail among neither employed women nor homemakers.
4.8 Conclusion
Understanding the gender gap in labor force participation requires analyzing com-
plex social factors that lead women to make different decisions than men under a
different set of choices. In this chapter, I use a qualitative method to investigate
women’s preferences besides their actual behavior. I examine their labor force par-
ticipation decisions, past schooling decisions, and fertility decisions in the context of
recent pro-natalist rhetoric. Moreover, I explore whether paid employment leads to
empowerment of women.
153
Based on field research from July-August 2013, the analysis carried out in this
chapter suggests that education is important not only in determining women’s ability
to access paid work but also for their self-confidence. Many women believe that
empowering jobs are accessible to only educated women; others have to deal with
the hardships of working life without the benefits of decent jobs. The empowering
potential of employment without a profession seems to be limited. It is clear that
women value education and they do everything to provide their children with better
education. However, for a significant number of the women in my sample schooling
decisions were made by their families. Starting from early ages, women are not given
equal opportunity to make their life choices starting from early ages. Therefore, in
designing policies to encourage women’s labor force participation, policies to increase
the compulsory schooling age should be considered. The recently enacted “4+4+4
Law” that replaces 8 years compulsory primary education is a step backward in
achieving gender equality in education.
In addition to lack of education, two other limiting factors stand out from the
women’s narratives. First, the main obstacle to their participation in labor force
seems to be the burden of care work. Second, the conservative mentality of husbands
is a serious challenge for several women. The majority of full-time homemakers admire
women with jobs and they express preference for a working life. As expected, among
different types of policy proposals they favor day care subsidy most strongly. The
presence of this kind of support system is especially crucial for divorced or widowed
women with small children.
The empowering potential of employment varies considerably with factors such
as age, marital status, type of the job, household economic position, and class back-
ground. In general, employed women have more decision making power in the house-
hold, especially in financial decisions. They are more hopeful about the future, feel
more respected, and lose their self-confidence less frequently. Some employed women
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manage to share the housework responsibilities with their spouses, although the dis-
tribution of housework is far from being fair. Yet the sexual division of household
labor, to a large extent, is not challenged by women’s employment status. Moreover,
a fair distribution is not demanded, which suggests that women internalize the sexual
division of labor.
To summarize, one of the reasons why female labor force participation rate is so
low in Turkey is that there are cultural pressures on women when they make impor-
tant life choices. Families’ decisions about girls’ schooling and their marriages, and
interventions of women’s husbands in their working decisions, are among the cultural
obstacles revealed by the field research. The recent pro-natalist discourse launched
by the government may add to these pressures. However, most of the women in my
sample do not support this discourse and their main expectation from government is
state-supported childcare. When designing policies to increase women’s labor force
participation, government needs to have a more integrated plan that intervenes in
multiple spheres of the problem. Active labor market policies should be comple-
mented with the policies encouraging girls’ schooling, such as the 1997 Compulsory
Education Law.
On the other hand, there is an unequal burden on the shoulders of employed
women. Unless the sexual division of labor in the house is challenged, the empowering
potential of employment will be limited. This is a long-run problem that requires
changes in the society’s attitudes and social norms, increases in education for both
men and women, and also increases in women’s participation in social life, including
working life. However, there are things to do in the short-run such as improving the
working conditions of women and enforcing the requirement of day care centers for
workplaces.
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CHAPTER 5
TARGETING WOMEN’S EMPLOYMENT: DO
SUBSIDIES WORK?
5.1 Introduction
The Turkish economy has experienced poor employment performance over the
past two decades, as explained in Chapter 2. Despite rapid growth during the 2000s,
the economy could not create sufficient jobs, resulting in high unemployment and
low labor force participation rates. The lack of a strong demand-pull effect may be
part of the explanation as to why female labor force participation rates are so low.
The gender gap in labor market outcomes is usually explained by a combination of
social, economic and cultural factors. First, structural transformation and rural-to-
urban migration contribute to the high and persistent labor force participation gap.
Women who work as unpaid family workers in the rural areas withdraw from the
labor force once they migrate to the city. Second, women’s reservation wage remains
high in the cities given the lack of subsidized childcare and pre-school education. The
expected market value of wages is usually lower than the reservation wage, especially
for women who do not have a university degree. Finally, the Turkish labor market
has a significant informal sector, in which women are disproportionately concentrated
(Table 5.1). This sector often does not offer decent pay and working conditions
(Deg˘irmenci & I˙lkkaracan, 2013).
As an alternative to supply-side explanations based on either education or cultural
values, some researchers argue that lack of demand constrains job opportunities for
Turkish women (Tokso¨z, 2011; I˙lkkaracan, 2012), but to date there has been little
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empirical research on this question. Limited demand and low wages might explain
withdrawal from the labor market in the urban areas by discouraging women from
searching for jobs. Disguised unemployment, which accounts for people ready to
work but not actively searching for jobs, including discouraged workers, is very high
among women. The total unemployment rate (open + disguised unemployment) is
22.6 percent for women while it is 12.7 percent for men in 2013 (Table 5.1). In
other words, higher labor demand in urban areas could raise women’s labor force
participation and employment.
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Table 5.1: Main Labor Market Outcomes by Gender in the Turkish Economy
1990 2000 2008 2013
Labor force participation rate (%)
Total 56.6 49.9 46.9 50.8
Male 79.7 73.7 70.1 71.5
Female 34.1 26.6 24.5 30.8
Employment rate (%)
Total 52.1 46.7 41.7 45.9
Male 73.5 68.9 62.6 65.2
Female 31.2 24.6 21.6 27.1
Open unemployment rate (%)
Total 8 6.5 11 9.7
Male 7.8 6.6 10.7 8.7
Female 8.5 6.3 11.6 11.9
Total unemployment rate (%)a
Total 10.4 11.1 17.4 15.9
Male 9.6 10.6 14.8 12.7
Female 12.3 12.6 23.9 22.6
Informal employment rate (%)b
Total n.a. 51.2 43.5 36.7
Male n.a. 44.3 38.1 30.2
Female n.a. 69.8 58.4 52
Source: TURKSTAT Household Labor Force Surveys
a Total unemployment = open + disguised unemployment. Dis-
guised unemployment account for persons not looking for a job
yet ready to work if offered a job: (i) Seeking employment and
ready to work within 15 days, and yet did not use any of the
job search channels in the last 3 months; plus (ii) discouraged
workers.
b Informal employment ratio gives the number of not registered
workers as a percentage of total employment.
To improve labor market outcomes for women, the Turkish government initiated
an employment subsidy scheme targeting women in 2008. Employment subsidies are
used to address unemployment in many advanced and developing countries. Subsidies
specifically aimed at disadvantaged groups are common since they are believed to be
more effective. Turkey has used various subsidy schemes to encourage job creation,
the 2008 employment package being the only targeted one. The package included an
arrangement that exempted employers from paying the social security contributions
158
for newly hired women (aged over 18 years) and young men (aged between 18 and
29) for the first year, with the amount of exemptions gradually decreasing over the
following five years.
In this chapter, I analyze the impact of subsidies given for women and youth
employment as part of the 2008 employment package. As an example of positive
discrimination, the package provides a fruitful ground to research the importance of
demand-related factors in determining women’s employment in Turkey. If there is a
significant increase in women’s employment, especially in culturally conservative re-
gions, as a result of increasing demand for female labor, the gender gap in employment
cannot be attributed to only supply-side factors or patriarchal culture.
My empirical analysis relies on a difference-in-differences estimation strategy using
province-level monthly data from the Social Security Institution of Turkey. The 2008
employment package introduced cost reductions in the employment of women in all
81 provinces. However, positive discrimination was only effective in the provinces
that did not already benefit from social security contribution cuts under a different
subsidy scheme.1 I investigate whether the package succeeded in closing the gender
gap in employment in the provinces where the positive discrimination was effective.
I find that those provinces saw a 1.43 percent higher increase in the female share
of employment in comparison to provinces where positive discrimination was not
effective. Moreover, the effectiveness of the package is found not to be significantly
lower in the conservative provinces. In other words, the 2008 employment package
was successful in closing the gender gap even in more conservative provinces.
This chapter makes two important contributions. First, it explores the causal
relationship between the 2008 employment package and the improvement in the gen-
der gap in employment. Second, it evaluates the effectiveness of the package, taking
1See section 5.3 for the timeline and beneficiaries of different subsidy schemes.
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into account the influence of culture. By showing that a demand-side intervention
can overcome the cultural constraints, it offers valuable insights to policy-makers
interested in pursuing policies related to disadvantaged groups, particularly women.
5.2 Employment Subsidies
Employment subsidies 2 aim to lower labor costs. The basic idea behind the
subsidies is to stimulate demand for a targeted group of workers and to raise their
employment and earnings by lowering the cost of employment. Employment subsidies
can be implemented as direct wage refunds, or as credits to labor taxes such as social
security contributions of employers. As a response to high unemployment rates, many
OECD countries have implemented employment subsidies to promote job creation.
Although they are widely regarded as a potentially efficient method of increasing
targeted groups’ employment, there is mixed evidence for their success in terms of
job creation.
Marx (2001) argues that the net employment effects of subsidies are generally
substantially lower than what the theoretical models and simulations predict because
of larger than expected deadweight losses. In some cases, there is a large pass-through
effect and subsidies lead to an increase in the wages without affecting employment. For
example, Grueber (1997) analyzes the impact of privatization of the Social Security
system in Chile, which led to a reduction of payroll taxes by 25 percent, and finds
that the reduced cost of payroll taxation to firms was fully passed on to workers, with
little effect on employment levels.
On the other hand, there is empirical evidence for employment creation with
subsidies targeting specific groups of workers. For example, Katz (1998) finds that
the Targeted Jobs Tax Credit program in the U.S. had a net employment effect of 7.7
2I use the term employment subsidies to refer employer-side wage subsidies.
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percent on disadvantaged young workers. Galasso et al. (2004) analyze the impact
of a subsidy scheme targeting temporarily employed workers in Argentina, and find
that the employment effects were significant for women and youth. Di Liberto et
al. (2013) find that employment subsidies targeting disadvantaged workers in the
depressed Italian region of Sardinia increased the probability of finding a job for the
participants, especially for women.
Several other studies have analyzed the impact of employment subsidies in the
form of social security tax cuts for employers (Kramarz & Phillippon, 2001; Goos &
Koonings, 2007; Bennmarker et al., 2008; Egebark & Kaunitz, 2014; Huttunen et al.,
2009). The evidence is again mixed. Goos and Konings (2007) find that employment
subsidies known as “Maribel subsidies” had a positive impact on manual employment
in Belgium, the impact being larger for low-wage exporting industries. Kramarz and
Philippon (2001), on the other hand, do not find any net job growth as a result of
cuts in employers’ social security contributions of minimum wage workers in France.
Similarly, Beenmarker et al. (2008) find no employment effect after a reduction in
payroll taxes introduced in 2002 in Sweden. Analyzing the impact of Finnish low-
wage subsidy scheme, Huttunen et al. (2009) find that subsidies were not effective
in increasing the employment of eligible workers, although they might have increased
the working hours of the currently employed.
As a country with persistently high unemployment, Turkey has implemented sev-
eral employment subsidy schemes in the form of social security cuts to employers.
The first set of cuts came as part of broader incentive schemes that targeted specific
provinces rather than a specific group of workers. To increase investment and employ-
ment opportunities in low-income provinces, the Turkish Government legislated three
regional incentive schemes through Law 4325 (1998), Law 5084 (2004) and Law 5350
(2005). These included four components: reductions in employers’ social security con-
tributions; credits on income taxes on wages; subsidies on electricity consumption;
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and land subsidies. Betcherman et al. (2010) find that these subsidy programs led to
significant increases in formal jobs in the eligible provinces. Depending on the model
specifications, they find that employment gains ranged from 5%-13% for the subsidy
scheme under the 2004 law and from 11%-15% for the subsidy scheme under the 2005
law.
The 2008 employment package targeted disadvantaged groups, women and youth,
and it applied to all provinces. It is important to evaluate not only the job creation
impact of this scheme but also the effects of this first demand-side positive discrimi-
natory intervention in the labor market. However, the existence of regional subsidies
prior to the 2008 employment package complicates the analysis. In the provinces
subsidized before 2008 with one of the regional schemes, the cost of formal employ-
ment was lowered for new hires, independent of gender. In other words, the positive
discrimination in new hires introduced in 2008 was not effective in these provinces.
Therefore, the analysis separates the provinces into two groups. The 32 provinces
where positive discrimination for women was effective, since they did not benefit
from any regional incentive schemes prior to 2008, form the treatment group, while
the remaining 49 provinces form the control group.
Two prior papers have analyzed the impact of the 2008 employment package on
women’s employment. Based on a descriptive analysis of monthly household labor
force survey data, Uysal (2013) finds that employment subsidies positively affected the
employment of women between ages 30-44. The positive impact is especially visible
among married women who have less than a high school degree. Using a descriptive
“pre-post” methodology, Uysal relies on descriptive statistics, and her analysis does
not attempt to establish causality, nor does it distinguishes the 32 provinces that did
not receive a subsidy prior to 2008 from the rest.
Using quarterly data for the period between 2006 and 2010 from the household
labor force surveys, Ayhan (2013) analyzes the effect of the employment package
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through a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, and uses triple differences to
eliminate the impact of the 2008 economic crisis. Although the average policy effect
over the period is not statistically significant, she finds a significant effect in the quar-
ters shortly after the policy announcement. Specifically, she finds that the probability
of being hired for women aged 30 to 34 compared to men of the same age increased
by 1.4% in the third quarters of 2008 and 2009, and by 1.6% in the fourth quarter of
2009. Due to the lack of provincial information in the household labor force surveys,
she too studies the impact of the package across the country without focusing on
affected provinces.
In this study I use a monthly panel of province-level employment data from the
Social Security Administration of Turkey (henceforth SGK). The main advantage of
using SGK data is that it makes it possible to analyze the impact of policy package at
the province level, thereby allowing differentiation between the 32 “treated” provinces
and the rest. The main disadvantage of the SGK data, however, is the lack of age
bracket information for the employees. Because the social security cuts are given to
employers under the 2008 employment package are for newly employed women (aged
over 18 years) and young men (aged between 18 and 29), to study the impact on
women one would ideally compare changes in employment of women and men above
age 29. The impact of the package on women’s employment might be weakened by
the substitution effect between women at any age and men in the age bracket of 18-29
(or even, by the substitution of younger women for older women). Especially in the
occupations where gendered preferences are very strong, employers might prefer to
employ young males that would limit the increase in female employment (Tokso¨z,
2009). These limitations lead to underestimation of the impact of the package on
female share of employment.
Another issue is the timing of the employment package. It is difficult to assess the
impact of legislation on female employment under crisis conditions, since economic
163
crises might affect men and women in the labor market differently. To control for
the impact of the economic crisis, I use share of industry in gross value added in the
provinces. I also analyze the changes in sectoral composition of female employment to
see if some can be attributed to the differential impact of the crisis on manufacturing
and services sectors.
5.3 The 2008 Employment Package and Other Active Labor
Market Policies in Turkey
The 2008 employment package (Law No.5763) was introduced in May 2008 to
encourage private sector employment, and it took effect in July 2008. The package
sought to promote employment of two disadvantaged groups: women and young
men. Under the new arrangement, employers were exempt from paying social security
contributions of newly employed women (aged over 18 years) and young men (aged
between 18 and 29). The exemption was planned to be phased out gradually over a
five-year period. The Unemployment Insurance Fund would pay 100% of employers’
social security contributions for the first year, 80% for the second year, 60% for the
third year, 40% for the fourth year, and 20% for the fifth year. Employers could benefit
from this subsidy if they hired individuals from the target groups within the period
between July 1st, 2008 and June 30th, 2010. In February 2011, the subsidies were
extended until the end of 2015, and the coverage was extended to the employment
of men who have occupational training or who are registered as unemployed in the
Turkish Employment Agency (ISKUR).
The effect of the 2008 employment package on women’s employment, however,
was limited by the presence of two other policies: regional employment subsidies
and fiscal stimulus measures introduced after the 2008 crisis. Table 5.2 presents the
timeline and targeted beneficiaries of different active labor market policies in Turkey.
When the 2008 employment package was introduced, regional employment subsidies
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had been in effect in 49 low-income provinces. In these provinces the cost of formal
employment was lowered for any new employees regardless of gender. The Unemploy-
ment Insurance Fund paid 100% of the employer’s social security contributions for
the workplaces in organized industry zones, and 80% of social security contributions
for other workplaces in these provinces. Therefore, we expect to see the impact of the
2008 employment package on women’s employment only in 32 provinces that were
not already subsidized before. Additional measures were taken in August 2009 in
response to the 2008 global economic crisis. Social security contributions of newly
hired employees, regardless of gender were paid by the state for six months in all 81
provinces, and in January 2010 the duration of this subsidy was extended until July
2011.
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In sum, owing to interactions with other government policies, the employment
subsidies introduced by the 2008 employment package should be expected to positively
affect women’s employment between July 2008 and August 2009 and after June 2011,
and only in the 32 provinces that did not benefit from regional incentive schemes.
5.4 The Impact of the 2008 Global Economic Crisis
The economic crisis has been argued to be one of the factors that may explain the
increase in female share of employment after 2008 employment package. Tokso¨z (2009)
analyzes the changes in the number of male and female workers covered by social se-
curity before and after the package. She finds that both male and female employment
decreases, but that the decline in male employment is much larger. Therefore, we
see an increase in the female share of employment. She argues that one factor that
may explain this situation is that women working with social security coverage are
concentrated in the services sector which was less affected by the crisis than manu-
facturing. Table 5.3 shows the number of persons covered by social security before
and after the package. By the end of 2008, both male and female formal employment
decreased, with the decline in male employment being larger. Table 5.4 shows that
the female share of employment increased in both manufacturing and services during
the six months after the employment package took effect. Moreover, in the second
period we expect the package to affect women’s employment (after June 2011); the
increase in female share of employment was bigger in the manufacturing industry
than services. These data suggest that the rise in the female share of employment
cannot be completely explained by the differential impact of the crisis on different
sectors.
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Table 5.3: Number of Persons Covered by Social Security, 2008-2013
Jun-08 Dec-08 Jul-09 Jun-11 Oct-13
Male 7,133,431 6,774,527 6,929,944 8,365,871 9,278,608
Female 2,054,574 2,028,462 2,083,405 2,680,038 3,134,390
Total 9,188,005 8,802,989 9,013,349 11,045,909 12,412,998
Female share 22.36 23.04 23.11 24.26 25.25
Source: SGK.
Table 5.4: Female Share of Formal Employment by Economic Sectors, 2008-2013
Jun-08 Dec-08 Jul-09 Jun-11 Oct-13
Agriculture 16.15 16.01 16.92 19.06 20.53
Manufacturing 20.12 20.22 19.83 20.59 22.68
Services 30.59 31.02 30.66 32.51 33.3
Source: SGK.
Another explanation that has been advanced for the rising share of female employ-
ment during this period is the added-worker effect after the economic crisis (World
Bank, 2013; Ayhan, 2014; and Deg˘irmenci & I˙lkkaracan, 2013). Using micro data
from the Survey on Income and Living Conditions (2007-2010), Ayhan (2014) finds
that husbands’ unemployment accounts for 54% to 64% of the observed increase
in the probability of their wives’ labor force participation during the crisis. She
finds that the added-worker effect emerges one quarter after the husband’s unem-
ployment, becomes the greatest in the second quarter after the job loss, and phases
out by the fourth quarter of unemployment. Deg˘irmenci and I˙lkkaracan (2013) find a
smaller added-worker effect using micro data from household labor force surveys for
the 2004-2010 period. The husband’s unemployment increases the probability of a
female homemaker entering the labor market by 6-8 percent. However, they find that
the marginal effects of the unemployment shock are not higher in the crisis years. For
example, the increase in the labor force participation probability of an inactive wife
as a response to the husband’s unemployment is almost same in 2007 and 2009.
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While there is some evidence for the added-worker effect after the crisis, it should
be observed in all provinces. When we look at the share of industry in gross value
added before and after the crisis, we see similar rates of decline in treated and control
provinces: Industrial gross value added shrank by 6.5 percent in the treated provinces
and 5.7 percent in the control provinces in 2009 (Table 5.5). To identify the impact
of the 2008 employment package, this chapter analyzes the difference in the trends of
female employment share in two groups of provinces in the aftermath of the economic
crisis. Moreover, the second time period when the effects of the package are analyzed
(after June 2011) corresponds to the recovery period, where we would not expect the
added-worker effect.
Table 5.5: Average Share of Industry in Gross Value Added, 2007-2011
Average share of industry in gross value added
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
Treated Provinces 29.56 29.12 27.3 28.12 29.15
Control Provinces 23 22.86 21.56 22.74 23.74
Source: TURKSTAT, Regional Accounts.
5.5 Data and Methodology
5.5.1 Data
I use monthly employment data from SGK to analyze the impact of the 2008
employment package on the female share of employment. Figure 5.1 presents the
average share of female employment as a percentage of total formal employment in
the 32 treated (where women’s employment is subsidized with the 2008 employment
package) and 49 control provinces (where regional subsidies were given to employment
regardless of gender). The shaded areas are the time periods between July 2008 and
August 2009 and after June 2011, when we expect to see any positive impact of
the package on women’s employment. There is a steady increase in female share of
169
employment in treated provinces starting from July 2008 and continuing after July
2011, while such a trend is not observed for control provinces.
Figure 5.1: Differences in the Average Share of Female Employment as a Percentage
of Total Employment in Treatment and Control Provinces, 2007-2013
Source: SGK.
Figure 5.2 shows the difference between average male and female employment.
Seasonality in employment might affect men and women differently. In an attempt to
remove the seasonal effects, Figure 5.2 shows the differences in employment for each
month in comparison to the previous year. In other words, it shows the series of (Male
employmentt–Female employmentt)–(Male employmentt-1–Female employmentt-1).
3
In treated provinces, the difference between male and female employment begins
to decline around July 2008 and the decline continues until April 2009. Similarly,
there is a declining trend in difference between male and female employment after
June 2011.
3Uysal (2013) uses this method to remove seasonal effects with household labor force survey data.
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Figure 5.2: Differences in the Average Employment of Men and Women in Treatment
and Control Provinces, Adjusted for Seasonal Changes, 2007-2013
Source: SGK.
One of the main claims of this chapter is that a demand-side policy intervention
can be effective in increasing women’s employment despite the constraining effects
of culture. It is possible to observe rise in female share of employment even in the
conservative provinces after the employment package. For example, when we look
at the changes in female share of employment in the most and least conservative
provinces among the 32 treated provinces, we see similar growth rates. The female
share of employment in Yalova, where the percentage of early marriages was only
15.73 in 2007, increased from 20.7 percent in July 2008 to 25 percent in October
2013. The female share of employment in Kırıkkale where the early marriage is quite
common, 38.87 percent in 2007, increased from 10.6 percent to 15.4 percent (Table
5.6).
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Table 5.6: Change in Female Share of Employment in the Treated Provinces
Provinces Culture Female Female
(2007) employment share employment share
July 2008 October 2013
Progressive (average)a 22.41 20.58 25.07
Conservative (average)b 32.32 16.47 20.46
The five most progressive provinces
Yalova 15.73 20.7 25.01
Eskisehir 17.14 20.96 26.16
Istanbul 17.63 26.09 29.88
Izmir 18.18 26.76 30.18
Bursa 19.57 24.89 28.29
The five most conservative provinces
Kırıkkale 38.87 10.65 15.36
Kayseri 34.73 13.31 17.51
Burdur 32.48 16.15 20.15
Konya 32.39 11.25 15.85
Hatay 31.29 13.78 18.15
Source: SGK data for female employment share and Household Labor Force
Survey data for culture.
a 25 treated provinces where percentage of early marriages is lower than the
country average (26.96).
b 7 treated provinces where percentage of early marriages is higher than the
country average (26.96).
5.5.2 Estimation Methodology
As Figure 5.2 shows, the gender gap in employment narrows down the 32 provinces.
To investigate whether the employment package causes the improvement in women’s
labor market position, I use a difference-in-differences estimation strategy. Specifi-
cally, I estimate the following model:
Female Employment Share it = α + β1Treat i + β2Post t + β3Treat i ∗ Post t
+ β4Province Demographics it + it (5.1)
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where i indexes 81 provinces, and t indexes time. For employment, I use monthly
observations between 2007 and 2013. Demographic control variables for provinces
are only available yearly and only until 2012. Those include the urbanization rate,
percentage of female high school graduates, general fertility rate, share of industry in
gross value added, and a cultural values proxy. Since provincial GDP per capita data
is not available for these years, I use share of industrial gross value added to control
for the impact of the economic crisis.4 For the culture variable, I use the percentage
of early marriages (age 16-19) among women. Definitions of the variables and data
sources can be found in Table 5.7. Treati is a dummy variable taking on a value of
1 for the provinces that were not subsidized before the 2008 Employment Package
(that is, provinces where we expect to see the impact of positive discrimination), and
0 otherwise. Postt is equal to 1 for the months between July 2008—August 2009
and the months after June 2011, and 0 otherwise. The coefficient on the interaction
term (β3) thus provides an estimate of the impact of the employment package on the
female share of employment in 32 provinces between July 2008 and August 2009 and
after June 2011.
4Sectoral gross value added data are not available at the province level but available at NUTS-2
regional level. Therefore, share of industry in gross value added at NUTS-2 level is used in this
analysis.
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To analyze the impact of culture, I focus on the interaction of the treatment with
the culture variable in a second set of estimations, using a dummy variable for con-
servatism. In addition to the percentage of early marriages, I use two other measures
to classify the provinces as conservative and progressive; gender inequality index and
gender empowerment measure calculated by The Economic Policy Research Founda-
tion of Turkey (TEPAV). Gender inequality index (GII) is created using province level
data for secondary and higher school graduation rates among women, female formal
employment rate, women’s representation rate in municipal councils, share of teenage
pregnancies among all pregnancies, and maternal mortality. Gender empowerment
measure (GEM) is created using proportion of seats held by women in the parliament,
percentage of women in economic decision making positions (including administra-
tive, managerial and professional occupations) and female share of income (earned
incomes of women relative to men). Table 5.8 presents the averages of conservatism
measures in treated versus control provinces.
Table 5.8: Averages of the Conservatism Measures: Percentage of Early Marriages,
Gender Inequality Index (GII) and Gender Empowerment Measure (GEM)
Percentage of early marriages GII GEM
Treated Provinces 22.36 0.46 3
Control Provinces 29.96 0.51 2.48
Total 26.96 0.49 2.68
Source: Household Labor Force Surveys and TEPAV (2014).
The conservatism dummy is equal to 1 if percentage of early marriages is greater
than 22.36, GII is greater than 0.46, and GEM is smaller than 3. Thirteen provinces
among the treated are classified as conservative. Using a triple interaction variable for
treatment and culture, I estimate the impact of policy in relatively more conservative
provinces in comparison to others among the treated ones. If the size of the impact in
conservative provinces is not significantly lower than progressive ones, I can conclude
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that policy was successful despite the cultural constraint. I estimate the following
model:
Female employment share it = α + β1Treat i + β2Post t + β3Conservatism i
+ β4Treat i ∗ Post t + β5Treat i ∗ Conservatism i + β6Post t ∗ Conservatism i
+ β7Treat i ∗ Post t ∗ Conservatism i + β8Province Demographics it + it (5.2)
The coefficient of the triple interaction term, β7, gives us the impact of policy in
conservative provinces relative to progressive ones.
A potential problem with the estimation strategy is that the identifying common
trend assumption of the difference-in-differences logic may not hold. In other words,
control and treatment provinces may have different pre-treatment trends for the out-
come variable. To address this problem, I construct an alternative control group that
consists of untreated provinces that have similar pre-treatment trends as the treated
ones in the female share of employment.5 I estimate the following specification to
choose these provinces:
Female employment share it = α+β1Treat i+β2Montht+β3Treat i∗Montht+it (5.3)
where Treat i is a dummy variable, taking 1 for treated provinces, Montht is month
dummies, and it is the error term. This specification analyzes changes in female share
of employment during the pre-treatment period (January 2007-July 2008) relative to
the control group. The untreated provinces for which an F-test that the interaction
terms are jointly zero cannot be rejected at a 10 percent significance level form the
alternative control group. The alternative control group consists of 34 provinces,
5Betcherman et al. (2010) uses the same methodology when analyzing the effect of regional
subsidy schemes on employment.
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while the natural control group has 49 provinces.6 The estimations are carried out
using both control groups as a check on the robustness of the results.
5.6 Descriptive Statistics
Table 5.9 presents descriptive statistics for the treatment and control provinces.
The average share of female employment as a percentage of total employment is 21.9
percent in the treated provinces, while it is 17.4 percent in control provinces. Recall
that the control provinces are the low-income provinces receiving regional employment
subsidies besides some other incentives to promote regional development. They are
also less developed than the treated provinces in terms of other development indica-
tors, with lower urbanization rates, lower education levels of women, higher fertility
rates, and higher prevalence of early marriage among women. As a result, female
share of employment is lower. For this reason, it is important to include demographic
control variables as well as province-specific time trends in the econometric analysis.
Table 5.9: Descriptive Statistics
Variables Treated Provinces (32) Control Provinces (49)
Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs.
Female employment share 21.92 5.11 2624 17.36 4.7 4018
Total Employment 260845 528057 2624 33946 24196 4018
Demographic Control Variables
Urbanization rate 71.42 14.44 1920 57.16 9.29 2940
Share of industry
in gross value added 28.65 8.61 1920 22.78 6.55 2940
Female high school
graduates (%) 20.89 2.86 1920 17.74 4.66 2940
General fertility rate 59.9 13.38 1920 81.26 29.58 2940
Culture (% early
marriages) 22.36 5.61 1920 29.97 7.3 2940
6The following 15 provinces did not have the same pre-treatment trends and excluded when
forming the alternative control group: Artvin, Bingo¨l, Elazıg˘, Erzurum, Gu¨mu¨s¸hane, Ku¨tahya,
Kahramanmaras¸, Mardin, Siirt, Sivas, Urfa, Van, Bayburt, Batman and S¸ırnak.
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Table 5.10 shows the female share of employment during the four time periods.
The second and fourth periods are the ones when we expect the employment package
to affect women’s employment. The female share of employment steadily increases in
the treated provinces. In the control provinces, there is also a rise in female share of
employment from first to second period, but after the third period we see a decline.
The increase in the female share of employment in both treated and control provinces
in the second period (immediately after the 2008 Employment Package) may be due
to the differential effects of crisis on men’s employment, as explained above. After the
third period, male employment starts to recover and the share of female employment
begins to decline in control provinces. In the treated provinces, on the other hand,
the rise in the female share of employment continues.
Table 5.10: Summary Statistics for Female Employment Share
Provinces 1st Period 2nd Period 3rd Period 4th Period
(Jan07- (Jul08- (Aug09- (Jun11-
Jul08) Aug09) Jun11) Oct13)
All Provinces Mean 18.01 19.03 19.74 19.49
Std. dev. 5.43 4.69 4.73 5.93
Treated Mean 20.25 21.03 22.15 23.23
Provinces (32) Std. dev. 5.68 4.82 4.74 4.76
Natural Control Mean 16.55 17.72 18.16 17.06
Provinces (49) Std. dev. 4.73 4.11 4.01 5.31
Alternative Mean 18.34 19.38 19.77 18.95
Control P. (34) Std. dev. 4.13 3.73 3.68 5.04
5.7 Estimation Results
Table 5.11 reports the estimation results with both the natural and alternative
control provinces. The first column presents a regression of the female share of em-
ployment on the policy variable together with province and time dummies. The
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coefficient of 1.4 on the treatment variable suggests that female share of employment
increased by 8.0 percent more in the 32 provinces affected by the law than in the
other 49 provinces, and by 6.6 percent more in comparison to the alternative control
provinces.7 If we allow treatment and control provinces to follow different trends by
adding province specific time trends to the model, the estimated coefficient of the
treatment variable decreases to 0.418, but it remains significant at the 0.05 level,
suggesting a 2.4 percent increase in the female employment share compared to the
control provinces. An F-test of the hypothesis that province time trends are jointly
zero is strongly rejected; therefore I keep the linear trends in the estimations.
7The unconditional mean of female employment share in the natural control provinces when
policy was not effective is 17.45: (1.4/17.45)*100=8.02%. The unconditional mean of female
employment share in the alternative control provinces when policy was not effective is 19.14:
(1.265/19.14)*100=6.61%.
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Table 5.11: Estimated Effect of 2008 Employment Package on the Female Share of
Employment, 2007-2013
Female employment share (1) (2) (3) (4)
Natural control provinces (49)
2008 Employment Package 1.400*** 0.418** 0.410*** 0.245*
(0.27) (0.123) (0.118) (0.106)
Demographic controls no no yes yes
Province and month dummies yes yes yes yes
Province x time trends no yes no yes
N 6642 6642 4860 4860
R2 0.896 0.933 0.906 0.924
Alternative control provinces (34)
2008 Employment Package 1.265*** 0.317* 0.390** 0.186
(0.321) (0.144) (0.139) (0.119)
Demographic controls no no yes yes
Province and month dummies yes yes yes yes
Province x time trends no yes no yes
N 5412 5412 3960 3960
R2 0.886 0.929 0.900 0.922
* Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, **at the 0.01 level, ***at the
0.001 level.
Notes: The dependent variable is female share of employment. Demo-
graphic control variables include urbanization rate, percentage of female
high school graduates, general fertility rate, share of industry in gross value
added, and percentage of early marriages among women as a proxy for
culture. Ordinary least square estimates are given. Huber-White robust
SEs in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals within each
province. The 2008 Employment Package refers to the interaction term
specified as Treat i ∗ Post t.
Additionally, I include a set of province level demographic control variables that
measure urbanization rate, share of industry in gross value added, percentage of
female high school graduates, general fertility rate and percentage of early marriage
among women. The province-level control variables are only available annually for
the years between 2007 and 2011. Even after including these demographic controls
and province-specific time trends, the estimated coefficient on package is statistically
significant with a coefficient of 0.25, suggesting a 1.43 percent increase in female share
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of employment in the treated provinces, compared to the natural control group. The
estimated treatment effect using alternative control provinces is also positive and
statistically significant in all specifications, except the one with province-specific time
trends and demographic controls.
Table 5.12 presents the results for the second model with the culture interaction.
The estimated impact of the treatment-culture interaction is negative, implying that
the policy is less effective in conservative provinces. However, the culture interaction
is not statistically significant in any of the specifications except from the first one.
The coefficient of -0.272 (column 4) suggests that the increase in female share of
employment as a result of 2008 Employment Package in conservative provinces is
only 1.1 percent lower than the increase in progressive provinces.8 The evidence thus
supports the argument that the 2008 Employment Package was successful in closing
the gender gap in employment even in the more conservative provinces.
8The unconditional mean of female employment share in the treated progressive provinces when
policy was effective is 24.80: (-0.272/24.80)*100 =-1.1%.
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Table 5.12: Estimated Effect of 2008 Employment Package and Culture on the Female
Share of Employment, 2007-2011
Female employment share (1) (2) (3) (4)
Natural control provinces (49)
Employment Package*Culture 1.065* -0.128 -0.205 -0.272
(0.429) (0.232) (0.239) (0.205)
Employment package 0.483* 0.357* 0.424* 0.286
(0.242) (0.169) (0.183) (0.157)
Demographic controls no no yes yes
Province and month dummies yes yes yes yes
Province x time trends no yes no yes
N 6642 6642 4860 4860
R2 0.897 0.933 0.906 0.925
Alternative control provinces (34)
Employment Package*Culture 1.067* -0.169 -0.196 -0.322
(0.498) (0.262) (0.265) (0.224)
Employment package 0.375 0.294 0.431* 0.282
(0.251) (0.182) (0.206) (0.171)
Demographic controls no no yes yes
Province and month dummies yes yes yes yes
Province-specific time trends no yes no yes
N 5412 5412 3960 3960
R2 0.888 0.929 0.9 0.922
*Statistically significant at the 0.05 level, **at the 0.01 level, ***at the
0.001 level.
Notes: The dependent variable is female share of employment. Demo-
graphic control variables include urbanization rate, percentage of female
high school graduates, general fertility rate, share of industry in gross
value added, and percentage of early marriages among women as a proxy
for culture. Ordinary least square estimates are given. Huber-White
robust SEs in parentheses allow for arbitrary correlation of residuals
within each province. “Employment Package*Culture” refers to the
triple interaction term Treat i ∗ Post t ∗ Conservatismi, and “Employ-
ment Package” is the interaction term specified as Treat i ∗ Post t. The
other interactions are not shown in the table.
5.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, I evaluate the success of a targeted subsidy scheme, the 2008
employment package, in closing the gender gap in formal employment. Using monthly
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province-level data from Social Security Institution of Turkey, I estimate the impact
of the package on the female share of employment with a difference-in-differences
model. The results suggest that the employment package was effective in increasing
the female share of formal employment. When we look at the female employment in
the main sectors, the improvement is seen not only in services, relatively protected
from the 2008 global economic crisis, but also in manufacturing. Moreover, with a
triple difference technique I show that the effect of the policy is not significantly lower
in more conservative provinces in comparison to more progressive ones. That is, the
policy was effective despite the cultural constraints.
Analyzing the effects of a demand-side positive discriminatory policy, this study
offers valuable insights for policy making to promote greater gender equality in the
developing countries. Previous research focusing on culture’s role in explaining the
gender gap in labor market outcomes acknowledges that weakening the impact of
patriarchal culture can only be achieved in the long run with education and progressive
work-family reconciliation policies. This chapter shows that demand-side policies and
positive discrimination can increase women’s employment in the short-run. Moreover,
women’s attitudes toward family and work life are closely related to their personal
experiences, as qualitative research in Chapter 4 reveals. Employed wives and mothers
tend to have a more positive view of paid work. Therefore, facilitating women’s
entrance to working life also may gradually change culture.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Turkey has a very low female labor force participation rate in comparison to
countries at a similar development stage. This dissertation analyzed the causes of
its low female labor force participation, focusing on gender ideologies, the lack of
family-work reconciliation policies, rural-urban migration, and weak labor demand
conditions.
Using a nationally representative survey, in Chapter 3 I showed that internaliza-
tion of patriarchal norms and personal religiosity negatively affect women’s labor force
participation in the urban areas. Based on a patriarchal gender contract, women’s
primary role in Turkish society has been as good mothers and wives. In the absence
of work-family reconciliation policies, this gender ideology has been strengthened
through the AKP government’s conservative discourse in the past decade. Using an
instrumental variable estimation, I show that gender ideology affects women’s deci-
sions on whether or not to participate in the labor force. The impact of patriarchy on
labor force participation is stronger for women with above-average religiosity. Among
the different educational backgrounds, patriarchal norms exert the highest impact on
university graduates, and they have a stronger impact on women who have higher
fertility preferences.
The qualitative research in Chapter 4 showed that women’s conservative values
are not the only obstacle to female labor force participation. The “conservative men-
tality of husbands”, particularly jealousy, deprives many women from making their
own labor market choices. Moreover, families’ restrictions on women’s past schooling
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decisions structurally limit their chances in the labor market. The major obstacle
to labor force participation identified by the women themselves is childcare responsi-
bilities. Together with the findings from nationally representative surveys (childcare
being cited as one of the most important obstacles both in household labor force
surveys and demographic and health surveys), this chapter suggests that provid-
ing subsidized care services should be a policy priority. Another important finding
of Chapter 4 is that the empowering potential of employment without a profession
is limited for women. Employed women have more decision making power in the
household, especially in financial decisions; they feel more respected and have more
self-confidence. However, this does not translate into using their bargaining power
to achieve a fair distribution of housework. That a fair distribution is not demanded
suggests that the sexual division of household labor is internalized.
Chapter 5 showed that, despite conservatism, it is possible to reduce the gen-
der gap in employment through active labor market policies. It explored the causal
relationship between the 2008 employment package, which included positive discrim-
ination for women, and the increase in the female share of employment, taking into
account the influence of culture and other factors at the province level. By showing
that a demand-side intervention can overcome the cultural constraints, it offers valu-
able insights to the policy-makers interested in pursuing policies related to disadvan-
taged groups. Active labor market policies and their impact evaluation are conducted
mostly in advanced economies; there are very few studies evaluating the success of
targeted employment subsidies for developing countries. This chapter contributes to
literature on employment targeting for disadvantaged groups from a developing coun-
try perspective. Moreover, by taking into account the role of culture, the findings of
this chapter may have broader geographical policy implications, particularly for the
Middle Eastern and North African countries, which also have significant gender gaps
in their labor markets.
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In terms of policy implications, a gender-equitable macroeconomic policy frame-
work is required to facilitate women’s access to well-paid jobs. Once an enabling
macroeconomic environment with stable growth is achieved, supply-side constraints
can be addressed more effectively. Economic equality can give women more bar-
gaining power to negotiate traditional gender roles in the household and trigger a
society-wide change in the long run. The quality of jobs available for women also
matters. Informality, a serious problem for Turkish economy, should be addressed
as well because women are more concentrated in informal jobs, which do not offer
potential for empowerment.
Achieving gender inequality in education should be another goal. The switch from
8-year compulsory schooling to the “4+4+4” system is a policy that will adversely
affect girls’ schooling. Policies aimed at keeping girls in school longer should be
designed. Besides compulsory education laws, making education more affordable
would also give parents incentives to keep their daughters at school.
Without effective work-family reconciliation policies, neither favorable demand
conditions nor increasing education levels will be sufficient to increase married women’s
labor force participation in Turkey. As emphasized in both Chapter 3 and 4, solving
the care problem is an important step to facilitate women’s entrance to labor market.
Subsidized childcare and eldercare, parental leave laws and regulated-reasonable work-
ing hours can be important policies to alleviate the care burden on women’s shoulders.
However, public policies can only socialize some portion of the care work. Gender
norms need to change to have a fair distribution of care work. The transformation
of gender roles cannot happen overnight but require a sustained fight supported by
a combination of economic and social policies that will integrate women into society
as equals of men.
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Table A.3: Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participation of Women
Urban Rural
LFP (%) Number of LFP (%) Number of
womena women
Age
15-19 9.23 130 20.51 78
20-24 21.79 638 27.31 260
25-29 31.52 1009 42.63 373
30-34 34.01 1035 47.48 337
35-39 35.79 1006 52.27 331
40-44 34.46 859 52.41 311
45-49 27.79 752 58.39 286
Own Education
No education 18.9 1,032 39.53 716
Primary school 28.18 2,633 52.57 1,012
Secondary school 25.1 506 29.13 127
High school and higher 49.44 1,258 47.11 121
Husband’s education
No education 20.96 291 34.34 198
Primary school 28.5 2,319 50 1,228
Secondary school 26.68 791 42.11 228
High school and higher 37.01 2,002 40.73 302
Children under age 5
None 36.22 3,015 54.74 939
One 27.73 1,760 43.09 564
Two 17.09 550 28.01 307
Three and more 11.54 104 39.76 166
Household Wealth
Quintile 1 22.65 490 44.06 1,039
Quintile 2 25.55 1,045 48.29 497
Quintile 3 28.21 1,315 46.49 271
Quintile 4 31.86 1,362 45.53 123
Quintile 5 41.33 1,217 50 46
Note: table continued on next page.
a Number of women shows the total number of women in the given categories. For
instance, in the urban sub-sample there are 1,032 women who have no education.
18.90 percent of these women participate in the labor force.
Source: TDHS-2008.
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Table A.3 (continued): Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participa-
tion of Women
Urban Rural
LFP (%) Number of LFP (%) Number of
womena women
Household size
1 77.78 18 71.43 7
2 43.33 390 51.09 92
3 38.37 1032 45.33 214
4 33.31 1543 53.1 403
5 27.82 1071 51.1 319
5-10 21.74 1265 41.27 756
10-35 18.18 110 38.38 185
Region
Istanbul 33.6 506 42.31 26
West Marmara 37.9 314 55.96 109
Aegean 43.47 392 69.43 157
East Marmara 42.36 484 67.27 110
West Anatolia 26.13 444 33.63 113
Mediterranean 28.49 709 47.37 304
Central Anatolia 22.25 382 45.39 152
West Black Sea 42.86 455 56.98 179
East Black Sea 57.76 303 84.15 82
Northeast Anatolia 19.37 413 37.57 189
Central East Anatolia 15.02 426 20.1 204
South East Anatolia 17.47 601 34.19 351
TOTAL 31.06 5,429 46 1,976
a Number of women shows the total number of women in the given categories. For
instance, in the urban sub-sample there are 1,032 women who have no education.
18.90 percent of these women participate in the labor force.
Source: TDHS-2008.
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Table A.4: Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participation of
Women, Cultural Value Proxies
Urban Rural
LFP (%) Number of LFP (%) Number of
women women
Patriarchy
Helpswork: Men should also do housework like cooking, washing, ironing, cleaning
Agree 35.86 3,684 48.75 1,088
Disagree 20.65 1,724 42.65 877
Don’t know/Depends 50 16 45.45 11
Familydec: Important decisions in the family should be made only by men of family
Agree 21.94 875 45.65 609
Disagree 32.91 4,522 46.36 1,333
Don’t know/Depends 18.52 27 37.93 29
Goingout: A women may go anywhere she wants without her husband’s permission
Agree 34.98 1,664 44.8 433
Disagree 29.23 3,715 46.31 1,516
Don’t know/Depends 37.21 43 52.38 21
Menwiser: Men are wiser
Agree 23.45 772 46.79 498
Disagree 32.92 4,490 45.65 1,356
Don’t know/Depends 16.34 153 46.9 113
Womenwork: A woman should work outside the home if she wants to
Agree 36.67 4,958 47.53 1,660
Disagree 14.89 423 38.89 288
Don’t know/Depends 2.5 40 30 20
Womenpolitics: Women should be more involved in politics
Agree 32.65 3,831 45.95 1,271
Disagree 27.58 1,055 46.96 428
Don’t know/Depends 26.49 536 46.06 271
Wifeopinion: Woman shouldn’t argue with husband even if she disagrees with him
Agree 34.28 3,092 47.78 946
Disagree 26.97 2,273 44.31 975
Don’t know/Depends 19.23 52 45.83 48
Virginity: Women should be virgins when they get married
Agree 29.3 4,406 46.27 1,701
Disagree 40.73 874 45.41 218
Don’t know/Depends 27.34 139 40.82 49
Note: table continues on next page.
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Table A.4 (continued): Cross Tabulations of Determinants of Labor Force Participa-
tion of Women, Cultural Value Proxies
Urban Rural
LFP (%) Number of LFP (%) Number of
women women
Sonprf: It is better to educate a son than a daughter
Agree 22.26 611 47.6 334
Disagree 32.22 4,802 45.88 1,625
Don’t know/Depends 20 10 2 10
Religiosity
Practicing namaz
Regularly 23.91 2,681 43.9 1,025
Irregularly 37.64 1,602 51.07 562
No/NA 38.57 1,146 44.62 381
Fasting
Regularly 28.65 4,754 46.01 1,767
Irregularly 44.81 308 47.27 110
No/NA 50.68 367 44.44 99
Source: TDHS-2008.
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Table A.5: Coding for the Scale Variables; Patriarchy, Religiosity, and Family Con-
servatism
Patriarchy
Helphswork : Men should also do the housework like Agree=0
cooking, washing, ironing, and cleaning Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=1
Womenwork : A married woman should Agree=0
work outside the home if she wants to Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=1
Goingout : A woman may go anywhere she Agree=0
wants without her husband’s permission Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=1
Womenpolitics: Women should be more Agree=0
involved in politics Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=1
Familydec: The important decisions in the Agree=1
family should be made only by men of the family Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=0
Wifeopinion: A woman shouldn’t argue with Agree=1
her husband even if she disagrees with him Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=0
Menwiser : Men are wiser Agree=1
Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=0
Virginity : Women should be virgins when Agree=1
they get married Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=0
Sonprf : It is better to educate a son than a daughter Agree=1
Don’t know/depends=0.5
Disagree=0
Note: table continues on next page.
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Table A.5 (continued): Coding for the Scale Variables; Patriarchy, Religiosity, and
Family Conservatism
Religiosity
Prays regularly Yes=1
No=0
Prays irregularly Yes=1
No=0
Fasts regularly Yes=1
No=0
Fasts irregularly Yes=1
No=0
Family conservatism
There is blood relationship among woman’s mother and father Yes=1
No=0
There is blood relationship among her and her husband Yes=1
No=0
She attended Quran course during her childhood Yes=1
No=0
She wears headscarf when going out Regularly=1
Irregularly=0.5
Doesn’t wear/NA=0
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Table A.7: Sincan Case Study: Summary Statistics
Age (average) 35.15
Household income (average) 2361.6 YTL
Number of children (average) 1.68
Household size (average) 3.88
Marital status Percentage Number
Married 73.53 25
Single 14.71 5
Divorced 8.82 3
Widowed 2.94 1
Education
Primary school 38.24 13
Secondary school 29.41 10
High school 17.65 6
University-2 years 2.94 1
University-4 years 11.76 4
Employment status
Currently employed 52.94 18
Not employed 47.06 16
Export Orientation Variables and Data Sources
In contrast to the literature on the feminization of the labor force, a new literature
on defeminization emerged in recent years showing that as manufacturing production
matured and diversified in developing countries, women’s share of manufacturing
employment started to fall (Ghosh, 2002; Joekes, 1999; Jomo, 2009; Tejani & Milberg,
2010). According to this literature, it is not export growth per se that determines the
female intensity of employment. Instead, for both of the feminization and subsequent
defeminization periods, the type of manufacturing growth together with the degree of
occupation segmentation by gender matter most in determining the female intensity
of employment. Therefore, I use two alternative export orientation variables. The
first measure, export orientation, was first used by Baslevent & Onaran (2004) to
capture the effect of trade activity on labor market outcomes. The export orientation
198
variable (Ej) is defined as the employment weighted average of export to output
(X/O) ratios of the two-digit manufacturing industries, denoted by i, in region j. Li
is the employment in sector i and Lj is the total manufacturing employment in region
j. Data on exports in the subsectors of manufacturing are obtained from Foreign
Trade Statistics. Data on manufacturing output and employment are drawn from
Annual Manufacturing Industry Surveys. The two-digit ISIC Rev 2 classification
includes 16 manufacturing sub-sectors.
Ej = (ΣiXi/Oi) ∗ Li
Lj
Export orientation was not significant and not reported in the regression tables.
As an alternative measure, I use export share of major sectors that employ women
relying on the new defeminization literature. To identify those sectors, I used Annual
Manufacturing Industry Surveys. I find that the majority of women (more than 60%
in 2009) are employed by four sub-sectors: manufacture of food products and bev-
erages, manufacture of tobacco products, manufacture of textiles, and manufacture
of wearing apparel (ISIC Rev 2, 15, 16, 17 and 18). The export share (15—18) is
defined as the value of exports in these four subsectors as a percentage of the value
of total manufacturing exports in a region. The export share (15—18) has a posi-
tive significant effect on female labor force participation in line with defeminization
literature.
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APPENDIX B
IN-DEPTH INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
Demographic Information
1. Age
2. Marital Status
3. Education (highest level attended)
4. Why did not she attend a higher level of education?
5. Monthly household income
6. Husband’s income (married)
7. Father’s income (not married)
8. Size of the household
9. Number of children
10. Age of children
11. Working status of children
12. Is there any person who needs care in the household?
13. Who usually takes care of those people?
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Current Economic Activity
14. Are you currently (in the last 12 months) involved in any economic activity?
15. Currently what is your main economic activity?
16. How long have you been involved in this activity?
17. Does this income go to you or your family?
18. Usually how much do you earn a month from this activity? (Money or in-kind).
If it is irregular, how much do you earn per month on average?
19. Do you have any social security?
20. Are you covered by any health insurance?
21. Would you want to continue this activity in the future if it is available? Why?
22. Are you currently involved in any other economic activity during the last one
year? What is it? How long have you been involved? Does the income go
to your family or you? How much do you earn from it? Would you like to
continue? Why?
Working Decision/Experience
23. What was the reason you decided to take up paid work?
24. How did you learn about this employment opportunity?
25. How did you decide to engage in your current main economic activity? (My
decision alone, joint decision with my husband/family etc.)
26. Who objected to your decision to work?
27. Who supported your decision to work?
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28. Please elaborate on the process of decision making, how did you deal with
objections (if there was any), convinced your family/husband?
29. Where is the workplace for your main activity located?
30. Have you ever taken any kind of job training for this activity? What kind of
training?
31. Usually how many hours a day do you work? (If regular, when do you work)
32. Do you ever work overtime? Do you get paid for overtime?
33. Would you be able to get paid maternity leave at your workplace?
34. Can you take paid vacation?
35. Do you think your work has any effect on your health?
36. Have you ever faced any kind of harassment/abuse at work? What kind of
harassment/abuse do you face?
37. Overall are you happy with your work environment?
38. Do you get any satisfaction from doing this work?
39. Mention three most important characteristics that you like about the activity
that you are currently engaged in.
40. Mention three most important characteristics that you don’t like about the
activity that you are currently engaged in.
41. Do you have any children under age 5? Who looks after your children while you
are at work?
Past Economic Activity/Working Decision (for currently non-working women)
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42. Have you ever involved in an income generating economic activity?
43. What was the last market work that generated income for you?
44. What was the main reason(s) for taking up this work?
45. How did you decide to take up that work?
46. How long did you work?
47. Why did you stop working?
48. Are you happy about your current non-working status?
49. In what sense are you better off now in comparison to the period when you were
working?
50. In what sense are you worse off now in comparison to the period when you were
working?
Working Decision (for women who have never worked outside home)
51. Have you ever thought about getting engaged in paid work?
52. If you have, why did not you take up a job? What was the main obstacle?
53. If you had a chance to work, what would be the biggest difference in your life?
54. What do you think about employed women in general?
55. Why did not you ever think about working outside? (if she said no to question
51)
56. Why do you think women should not work outside? (if she answers question 55
by saying that women should not work for pay)
Views on Government Policies to Increase Women’s Employment
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57. In the last year, in various occasions Prime minister said, “women should have
at least three kids, preferable five kids in Turkey”. What do you think about
this statement, do you agree with prime minister?
58. Why do you think he is suggesting this?
59. Do you think following policies of the government can be successful in increasing
women’s employment? Why?
• Discount in social security payments of employers if they hire women (Em-
ployment Package, Law No.5763, 2008)
• Subsidizing day care for working women (A 300TL subsidy that goes to
private day care centers if woman works outside of the home)
• Creating part time/flexible jobs for women
60. What kind of policies do you think would be more effective?
Paid Work and Women’s Empowerment
Use of Own Income
61. Usually who decides how your income is used?
62. Can you keep some portion of your own income for spending by your own will?
What portion of your own income can you keep for spending by your own will?
63. How do you usually spend your own income (that you get to keep)?
64. Do you purchase any cosmetics for yourself with your own income?
65. Do you purchase any clothes for yourself with your own income?
66. Have you purchased any jewelry for yourself with your own income?
67. Do you spend any part of your own income on your own health/nutrition/treatment?
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68. Do you give money to your natal family?
69. Have you purchased any valuable major assets completely with your own earn-
ings? What assets have you bought?
70. Do you have any savings of your own? Where do you save?
Decision-making in the Household
71. What role did you play in making the following household decision? (I was the
major decision maker, joint decision with my husband/family, I was consulted,
not consulted)
• Own working decision
• Large important purchases (house, car, TV, etc.)
• Small everyday purchases
• Children’s education
• Children’s health expenditure
• Children’s marriage
Housework
72. Who takes the main responsibility for the following activities?
73. Who helps with these activities?
74. Which of these activities would you rather someone else did?
• Cooking
• Cleaning the house
• Childcare
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• Kitchen shopping
• House maintenance/repair
Domestic Violence
75. Over the last one-year, did you face any of the following incidences/violence
from anyone in your home?
• Took your money away against your will
• Took your assets (jewelry etc.) away against your will
• Restricted/prohibited you from going to your parent’s house
• Prohibited/restricted you from being involved in market work outside the
home
• Exercised physical violence
• Threatened to exercise physical violence
• Exercised sexual violence
• Accused you of being unfaithful
• Insisted on knowing where you are at all times
Mobility in the Public Domain
76. Do you go to the following places on your own and are you comfortable with
going to these places on your own?
• Health facilities
• Market
• City or town center
• Natal families/relatives
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77. Do you wear headscarf when you go out? Why? When did you start wearing
headscarf?
Political Participation/Views
78. Are you currently member of any political party/group/organization/union?
79. Which political party/group/organization/union are you a member of?
80. Did you vote during the last national election? If not, why?
81. Did you vote during the last local election? If not, why?
82. How did you decide how to vote on? (By myself, with family, with husband
etc.)
83. Did you campaign during the last national or local election?
84. In the last 5 years, did you participate in any demonstration/protest? If yes,
what was (were) the issue(s)?
85. In the past year, have you participated in any religious meeting? What do you
do in those meetings?
Access to Media
86. How often do you do the following activities in a week? (Did you do the activity
last week? How many days a week? How many minutes per day?)
• Read a newspaper
• Read a book
• Read magazines
• Watch TV
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• Internet
Attitudes
87. How important do you think your contribution (economic/physical) to the
household is?
88. How do your family members value your contribution (economic/physical) to
the household?
89. Has your participation in paid work made a difference to how others in your
family see you?
90. Has your participation in paid work made a difference to how others in the
community/society see you?
91. Has your economic contribution to your family made a difference to how others
in your family see you?
92. Do you believe that the quality of your life has improved in the last 5 years?
93. Are you hopeful about your own future?
94. Are you hopeful that your son’s (or if you had a son) future will be better than
his father’s future? Why?
95. Are you hopeful that your daughter’s (or if you had a son) future will be better
than your future? Why?
96. If you had only one child, would you prefer it to be a boy or a girl?
97. How do you think marriage should be arranged?
98. Some people feel like that they have a great deal of control over their own lives.
Others feel that what they do has very little effect on what happens to them.
How would you classify yourself?
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Views on Work and Relationship with Household
99. Please state whether you agree or disagree with the following statements
• A working mother cannot maintain as close and warm a relationship with
her children as a housewife mother.
• It is not important for women to have their own source of income for
self-dependency.
• Wife’s being involved in market activity outside the household affects re-
lationship with husband negatively.
• If a wife is involved in any economic activity outside the household, her
husband should help her with household responsibilities
Indicators of Mental Distress
100. • Do you think you can’t concentrate on your work?
• Do you think you are suffering from insomnia because of worry/stress?
• Do you feel that people around you are not giving enough importance to
you?
• Do you think you don’t have the strength to deal with your own problems?
• Do you think you’re losing self-confidence?
Indicators of Mental Well-being
101. • Are you satisfied with your life?
• Do people around you show you enough respect?
• Do you consider yourself successful in life?
• Do you think you can face/handle undesirable circumstances?
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